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The Best Evidence Principle 
Dale A Nance* 
The first therefore, and most signal Rule, in relation to Evidence, is this, 
That a Man must have the 'J),tmost Evidence, the Nature of the Fact is 
capable of; For the Design of the Law is to come to rigid Demonstration in 
Matters of Right, and there can be no Demonstration of a Fact without the 
best Evidence that the Nature of the Thing is capable of; less Evidence doth 
create but Opinion and Surmise, and does not leave a Man the entire 
Satisfaction, that arises from Demonstration. 
-Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert (c.1726) 1 
While some modern opinions still refer to the "best evidence" notion as if 
it were today a general governing legal principle[,] most would adopt the 
view of modern text writers that there is no such general rule. The only 
actual rule that the "best evidence" phrase denotes today is the rule 
requiring the production of the original [of a] writing. 
-Dean Charles McCormick (c.l954)2 
The last two centuries have witnessed a major change in professional 
attitudes toward the rules controlling the proof process in Anglo-American 
courts. This Article runs against the tide, for my thesis is that there exists, 
even today, a principle of evidence law that a party should present to the 
tribunal the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated factual issue. 
This principle is not absolute, and in particular circumstances other 
considerations may override it or excuse its nonsatisfaction. Nevertheless, it 
is a general principle that manifests itself in a wide variety of concrete rules 
governing the trial process. In fact, it provides an organizing principle 
within the law of evidence. Consequently, it is improper for a court to 
reason from the premise, explicit or implicit, that there is no such principle. 
Unfortunately, such a premise has been widely professed by modern 
commentators and is regularly employed by the courts. 3 
The case of United States v. Gonzales-Benitez4 illustrates the problem. 
*Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A. 1974, Rice University; J.D. 
1977, Stanford University; M.A. (Jurisprudence and Social Policy) 1982, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
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1. G. GILBERT, THE LAw OF EviDENCE 3-4 (1st ed. 1754). 
2. C. McCoRMICK, EviDENCE§ 195, at 409 (1st ed. 1954) (footnotes omitted). 
3. See McCoRMICK oN EviDENCE§ 229 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCoRMicK]; M. GRAHAM, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EviDENCE § 1001.0 (2d ed. 1986); 5 D. LouiSELL & C. MuELLER, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE§ 569 (1981). 
4. 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.) (Kennedy,].), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976). 
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Defendants appealed their convictions for importing and distributing 
heroin. One ground for the appeal was the trial court's allegedly erroneous 
admission of testimony relating to the appellant~' conversations with 
informers. 5 Appellants claimed that, because these conversations were 
taped, the recordings, and not the informants' testimony, provided the 
"best evidence" of the conversations. In a brief passage, the court of appeals 
summarily dismissed this argument as cognizable only under the original 
document rule: 
We are puzzled that this argument should be advanced so 
seriously and would not consider it if attorneys for both appellants 
had not argued the point so strenuously both in their briefs and iu 
the court below .... 
The appellants simply misconstrue the purpose and effect of 
the best evidence rule. The rule does not set up an order of 
preferred admissibility, which must be followed to prove any fact. 
It is, rather, a rule applicable only when one seeks to prove the 
contents of documents or recordings.6 
No other rules were considered, despite the clear inapplicability of the 
modern original document ruleJ Nor did the court consider whether any 
residual best evidence principle might control in the absence of an 
applicable rule. 8 Moreover, the court felt uncomfortable enough about its 
ruling to explain that "the reason the tapes were not introduced here was 
that the recording quality was so poor that the court translator was unable 
5. Ser iri. at l 053. 
6. The opinion continues: 
Thus, if the ultimate inquiry had been to discover what sounds were embodied on the 
tapes in question, the tapes themselves would have been the "best evidence." 
However, the content of the tapes was not in itself a factual issue relevant to the 
case. The inquiry concerned the content of the conversations. The tape recordings, 
if intelligible, would have been admissible as evidence of those conversations. But 
testimony by the participants was equally admissible and was sufficient to establish 
'vhat was said. 
hi. at l 053-54. 
7. The federal rules state: "To prove the coment of a writing, recording, or photograph, 
the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as othenvise provided in 
these rules or by Act of Congress." Fm. R. Evm. 1002. The drafters of the rules explained as 
follows: 
Application of the rule requires a resolution of the question whether contents are 
sought to be proved. Thus an event may be proved by non-documentary evidence, 
even though a written record of it was made. If, however, the event is sought to be 
proved by the written record, the rule applies. 
Fm. R. Evm. l 002 advisory committee's note. This explanation is somewhat better than the 
court's opinion, which contains the typically misleading suggestion that the rule applies only 
if the content of the recording is an "ultimate" factual issue in the case as well as the obviously 
false claim that such content was not relevant in the case. See supra note 6. A more precise 
statement of the point-which I have yet to encounter in print-is that the rule requires the 
original if, but only if, the proponent uses the past or present existence of the recording as 
nondemonstrative evidence of its contents-that is, the transactions, statements, or other 
information recorded therein. The court thus rightly, if inartfully, held the rule inapplicable, 
as the prosecution apparently made no claim that an inference should be drawn from the 
existence of the tapes. 
8. The opinion does not reveal precisely what authority, if any, the appellants claimed for 
their "best evidence" argument. A waiver may have occurred. See Fw. R. Evm. l 03(a)(l ). 
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to understand and translate them."9 Yet, this fact clearly was not considered 
germane to the decision, as the court's reasoning would lead to the same 
result even if the tapes were ,perfectly intelligible. 10 
This Article challenges the premises underlying the reasoning in 
decisions like Gonzales-Benitez. The point is not that the appellants in that 
case should have prevailed, but simply that the court's treatment of their 
argument was inadequate. The court should have considered whether the 
trial court had and abused a discretion to deny admission of the testimony 
pursuant to .a general best evidence principle. At the very least, the court 
should have justified its implicit assumption that the phrase "best evidence" 
could only refer, in the context of this case, to the original document rule. 
More generally, this Article demonstrates that, putting aside the rules, 
such as those governing privileges, which are said to serve extrinsic social 
policies, the remaining evidentiary rules are more plausibly attributable to 
the epistemic concerns of a tribunal encountering the adversarial presen-
tation of evidence tl1an to judicial concerns about the irrational behavior of 
weak-minded lay jurors. 11 This point coheres well with recent historical 
scholarship arguing that the modern rules of evidence were instituted 
primarily for the control of lawyers rather than for the control of juries. 12 
Relatedly, our investigation undercuts at least one of the principal argu-
ments for employing evidentiary rules in bench trials that are different 
9. See Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d at 1054 n.2. 
10. There are many cases that reject similar best evidence arguments despite the existence 
of apparently intelligible taped evidence. See, e.g., Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 707, 234 S.E.2d 
918, 926- 27 (1977); Jackson v. State, 274 Ind. 297, 299-301, 411, N.E.2d 609, 611-12 (1980); 
State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 533, 220 S.E.2d 495, 508 (1975); Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 
Pa. 404, 407-09, 143 A.2d 652, 653-54, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 885 (1958). Some decisions 
mention the unintelligibility or unavailability of the tapes in question despite a ruling that 
would seem to make these factors unimportant. See, e.g., People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 
37-38,357 P.2d 1049, 1054-55, 9 Cal. Rptr. 793, 798-99 (1960). Of course, the opposite result 
obtains when it appears that the witness did not observe the original declarations but learned 
their contents only by listening to the recording. See, e.g., Forrester v. State, 224 Md. 337, 
348-49, 167 A.2d 878,884 (1961). The distinction between these results is blurred by cases in 
which the witness' memory has been "refreshed" by use of the tapes or transcripts thereof. See, 
e.g., People v. Hawkins, 218 Cal. App. 2d 151, 155-56,32 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (1963) (testimony 
admitted); People v. Swayze, 220 Cal. App. 2d 476, 507-08, 34 Cal. Rptr. 5, 22-23 (1963) 
(same). 
11. Jon Waltz recently described the common-law evidence rules as follows: 
Most of those rules-relating to relevance, hearsay, privilege, and so on-were 
calculated to exclude various kinds of testimony and tangible evidence from a lay 
jury's consideration during its fact-fmding deliberations. The notion underlying 
many, although not all, of these categorical negative rules was that jurors in a less 
sophisticated time were ill-equipped accurately to assess the relevance and reliability 
(the probative worth) of some classes of evidentiary material. Jurors, it was specu-
lated, might assign substantial weight to some forms of evidence without pausing to 
focus on their questionable trustworthiness and the ready availability of stronger, or 
at least more thoroughly tested, proofs. Furthermore, it was said, again in an 
empirical vacuum, that certain types of evidence might confuse jurors or ignite their 
irrational prejudices. 
Waltz, judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Fed.eral Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1985). 
12. See Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 300-06 
(1978); see also Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder 
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 123-34 (1983). 
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from those applicable in jury trials. These arguments often proceed from 
the premise that the conventional rules are based upon a distrust of the 
trier of fact which, it is thought, is inappropriate when trial is to the judge. 13 
A theory of such rules that does not depend upon distrust of the jury would 
find confirmation in the long-prevailing principle that those rules apply in 
bench trials as well. 14 
Part I of this Article develops the general argument that can be made 
for a best evidence principle and e}f:plores its possible dimensions. 15 The 
discussion emphasizes the rational aspects of persuasion before a reason-
ably competent tribunal. Part II criticizes the now conventional wisdom by 
examining the historical shift ofscholarly opinion away from a general best 
evidence principle. 16 It is argued that the modern decline of the principle 
is less real than has been supposed and, to the extent real, less justifiable 
than is commonly believed. Part III continues the inquiry into the signifi-
cance of such a principle for understanding many widely recognized rules 
of evidence. 17 It is argued that such a principle works better as an 
interpretive device than the alternatives generally 'employed today. The 
Article concludes by placing the present argument in a wider, theoretical 
perspective. 18 
I. The Nature of a Best Evidence Principle 
Suppose we take seriously the view of eighteenth-century jurists like 
Baron Gilbert that a general best evidence requirement animates our law of 
evidence. Only when one has sympathetically participated in such a 
nonstandard view can its merits be fairly evaluated. What then can be said 
in its support, and how can it be elaborated? This part of the Article 
explores broadly the notion of a best evidence principle, both its rationale 
and meaning. This elaboration forms the conceptual framework for the 
discussions in ensuing parts. 
A. Rationale 
If settlement of a dispute does not occur and the consequent litigation 
is not voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed or summarily determined,_ a 
trial becomes necessary. It is a regrettable necessity, for a tribunal must be 
convened, drawing heavily upon Lhe time, money, and energy of various 
members of society, including those composing the tribunal itself. 19 These 
13. See, e.g., Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A.]. 723, 
723-26 (1964); Note, Exclusionary Rules of Evidence in Non-Jury Proceedings, 46 ILL L. REv. 915, 
923-25 (I 952). 
14. It is frequently noted that this principle is often honored in the breach. See McCoRMICK, 
supra note 3, § 60. That, of course, may simply reflect a failure to appreciate fully its reasons. 
15. See infra notes 19-99 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 100-206 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 207-316 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 317-30 and accompanying text. Among the topics to be addressed in 
articles to follow is an analysis of the details of the existence and exercise of residual judicial 
authority to reinforce the best evidence principle. 
19. See generally F.jAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§§ 6.3-.4, 6.7 (3d ed. 1985). Empirical 
information on the full costs of litigation is difficult to obtain. See, e.g., J. KAKALIK & N. PAcE, 
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people, professional and lay, are due the litigants' respect. The decision 
makers in particular are due special consideration in view of the gravity of 
their responsibilities. 20 Moreover, litigants owe their opponents a special 
duty similarly informed by the pragmatic consequence of the litigation: the 
determination of the employment of the state's coercive and authoritative 
power. 21 These duties of respect generate for the litigants an obligation to 
give reasonable assistance to the tribunal in the performance of its tasks at 
trial. 
These tasks may be gleaned from the nature of a trial. 22 Under the 
conventional conception of litigation, the primary tasks to be performed in 
generating a final resolution are the identification and interpretation of the 
governing substantive rules, the determination of facts germane to the 
application of those rules, and the application of the rules so interpreted to 
the facts as so found.23 Of course, the first and third of these tasks do not 
always require a trial. When there is no factual conflict, they may be 
CosTs AND CoMPENSATION PAm IN ToRT LITIGATION (The Institute For Civil Justice, Pub. No. 
R-3391-ICJ, 1986); J. KAKALIK & A. RoBYN, Cosrs OF THE CIVIL juSTICE SvSTEM (The Institute For 
Civil Justice, Pub. No. R-2888-ICJ, 1982). 
20. The weight of this responsibility is reflected in the biblical injunction, "Judge not, that 
ye be not judged." Matthew 7:1. The point should not be lost on the decision makers. See A. 
OsBoRN, THE MIND oF THE juROR 1-11, 168-73 (1937). 
21. See generally F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, §§ 6.2, 6.5-.6 (discussing coercive and 
expressive functions of litigation). Theoretical implications are explored in Nance, Legal Theory 
and the Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion, 57 U. Cow. L. REv. 1 (1985) (concept of coercion 
is central to a general theory of the nature of law). With regard to problems in the law of 
evidence, one scholar has recently put the point this way: "The central question in evidence is, 
'What does it mean to prove something so that a court will either order a person imprisoned 
or order a transfer of money or property?'" Green, Foreword, 66 B.U.L. REv. 377, 377 (1 986). 
22. Martin Golding characterizes a "trial" by reference to the following features: 
(I) It consists in the settlement of a dispute by a third party who is not necessarily an 
expert on the matter under dispute. (2) The settlement is effected by the rendering 
of a decision made in accordance with rules. (3) The rules in question are rules of the 
public legal system .... (4) The decision that effects the settlement is intended as a 
final resolution of the controversy. 
Golding, On the Adversary System and justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAw 98, 101-02 (R. Bronaugh ed. 
1978) (arguing these features distinguish trials from negotiations, mediations, and arbitra-
tions). See generally L. FuLLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SociAL ORDER (K. Winston ed. 1 981). 
23. Perhaps it is most accurate to say that the ultimate task of the tribunal is to generate 
a final resolution by giving a bindin,• dFcision together with an acceptable account of that 
decision in terms of the accomplish· .• ent of some or all of the subordinate tasks listed in the 
text. This is not to say, however, tl1at the decision is made independently of the giving of the 
account. See, e.g., R. WAsSERSTROM, THE JuDICIAL DEciSION 25-30 (1961) (distinguishing and 
relating "process of discovery" and "process of justification" of legal conclusion). Moreover, 
reference to "rules" does not preclude resort to principles, policies, and the like to resolve 
issues of substantive law, nor does it limit the present thesis to any particular view of the 
formulation or justification of the substantive rules to be applied. See generally R. DwoRKIN, 
TAKING RlGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1978). Again, it is not suggested that these tasks always can or 
should be performed separately. There is, for example, an obvious but complicated interaction 
between the interpretation of a substantive rule and its application to the facts as found. See 
Jackson, Questions of Fact and Questions of Law, in FACTS IN LAw 85-100 (W. Twining ed. 1983). 
Moreover, the present argument in no way precludes the possibility of decisions that take into 
consideration uncertainty about disputed factual issues in determining damages or other 
remedial sanctions. See generally Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of 
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964). 
232 73 IOWA LAW REVIEW 227 [1988] 
accomplished without trial by relatively informal procedures.24 The reason-
ably accurate determination of disputed factual issues is therefore the 
pivotal task to be performed at trial, a task allocated to· what is commonly 
called the "trier of fact," be that a jury, judge, or magistrate. 25 
Rules and principles of evidence law are viewed as ancillary to this task. 
Nearly all of the Anglo:..American writers [on evidence] from 
Gilbert to Cross have shared essentially the same basic assump-
tions about the nature and ends of adjudication and about what is 
involved in proving facts in this context. There is undoubtedly a 
dominant underlying theory of evidence in adjudication, in which 
the central notions are truth, reason and justice under the law. It 
can be re-stated simply in some such terms as these: the primary 
end of adjudication is rectitude of decision, that is the correct 
application of rules of substantive law to facts that have been 
proved to an agreed standard of truth or probability. The pursuit 
of truth in adjudication must at times give way to other values and 
purposes, such as the preservation of state security or of family 
confidences; disagreements may arise as to what priority to give to 
rectitude of decision as a social value and to the nature and scope 
of certain competing values .... But the end of the enterprise is 
clear: the establishment of truth.26 
24. See, e.g., Fm. R. Crv. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered [upon motion] 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file ... show there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law."). In this regard, it should be noted that the features listed by Professor 
Golding, supra note 22, identify a somewhat broader concept than the conventional notion of 
trial employed throughQut this Article, for they do not differentiate among pretrial, trial, and 
posttrial proceedings. This differentiation, regularly employed by lawyers in the common-law 
tradition, entails a more limited notion of trial as that part of formal litigation or adjudication 
that involves presentation of evidence, arguments by the litigants with respect to the 
significance of the evidence, and judgment by the court. Golding's discussion, for example, 
generally presupposes this more limited meaning of trial, as his focus is upon the common-law 
system. The notion of trial is less significant in civil-law jurisprudence. See]. MERRYMAN, THE 
CrvrL LAw TRAomoN 120-22, 137:..39 (1969). 
25. Professor Golding argues that, as a precondition of trial, the parties' dispute must be 
translated into a controversy over the truth of a relatively clear set of factual propositions. See 
Golding, supra note 22, at 103-04. In any event, adverse parties will tell stories that are 
inconsistent in ways germane to the applicability of substantive rules of conduct. That 
inconsistency determines the contending factual hypotheses of the case. See D. BrNoER & P. 
BERGMAN, FACT lNVESTIGAT!ON 4-6, lQcll (1984). 
Given the inevitable fortuities in the preservation of evidence about disputed historical 
events and the consequent random element in making findings of historical fact, one might 
well conceive of the tribunal's task as being to work out a solution that best allows the parties 
to put their dispute behind them and get on with thier lives, regardless of the truth of their 
historical claims. This conception, with its obvious affinities to mediation, is difficult to 
reconcile with the strong conventional emphasis placed upon making accurate findings of 
historical fact and having remedial consequences turn upon those findings. Cf. P. ATrYAH & R. 
SuMMERS, FoRM AND SuBSTANCE rN ANGLo-AMERICAN LAw 157-69 (1987) (English and American 
adjudication relatively formal in this sense, despite reasons to believe English adjudication 
more truth-oriented than American). Morever; even a more prospectively oriented substantive 
law, that looked more to producing good and less to laying blame, would generate factual 
issues about current and future conditions, issues that would need to be accurately resolved. 
26. Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 Moo. L. REv. 261, 272 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
This "dominant underlying theory" is confirmed in the standard constructional principle of 
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Accordingly, the best evidence principle, as particularly applied to trials, 
expresses the obligation of litigants to provide evidence that will best 
facilitate this central task of accurately resolving disputed issues of fact. 27 
Because these resolutions involve a substantial element of induction, 28 
a rational tribunal will strive to satisfy a well-accepted condition on the 
validity of inductive inference, namely, that the premises of the proposed 
inference embody all available, logically relevant evidence.29 In a world 
without cost, if one can be imagined, the best evidence on an issue is all 
relevant evidence.30 In the real world, of course, litigation is a practical 
enterprise that must seek finality within reasonable time, money, and other 
resource constraints. 31 Thus, to the extent that litigants are the source of 
the information used by the trier of fact to decide the factual questions, the 
litigants' collective obligation is to present the set of evidentiary items that 
will be most probative within the constraints arising from the expenses and 
inconveniences of litigation and the need for finality. 32 The maxim 
modem evidence codes, stated as follows in the federal rules: "These rules shall be construed 
to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. Evm. 102. 
27. Of course, the principle can be expanded to embrace the litigants' obligations to 
present information related to issues of law. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
28. There has long been dispute over whether juridical fact-fmding is truly inductive. See, 
e.g.,]. Gm.soN,. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF 105-32 (1st ed. 1905) (legal fact-finding is deductive 
because it involves application of preexisting factual generalizations to particular evidence, 
rather than derivation of generalizations from those particulars). This author accepts the 
modern characterization of induction as probabilistic logical inference, that is, inference in 
which the conclusion does not follow from the premises as a matter of strict, logical necessity. 
In this sense,juridical fact-finding is clearly inductive. See 1AJ. WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 30 (Tillers 
rev. 1983). 
29. Elementary statements of the principle of complete evidence can be found in B. 
SKYRMs, CHOICE AND CHANCE 25 (2d ed. 1 975) and W. SALMON, LoGIC 91 (2d ed. 1973). Those not 
philosophically inclined can find a readily accessible version in Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 
PAC. L.J. 59, 93-94 (1981). 
30. The modern definition of relevance provided by the federal rules captures well the 
sense of relevance discussed here: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fw. R. Evm. 401. See 
generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689 (1941). Of course, the 
operationalization of this concept and its application to particular situations can be quite 
complicated. See 1A]. WIGMORE, supra nore 28, § 37. 
31. See Fw. R. Evm. 102 (quoted supra note 26); 1AJ. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 27. For an 
Australian perspective, see Fox, Expediency and Truth-Finding in the Modern Law of Evidence, in 
WELL AND TRULY Trum: EssAYS ON EviDENCE IN HoNOR OF SIR RicHARD EGGLESTON 140 (1 982). On the 
concept of optimization in procedural law generally, see R. DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PruNCIPLE 
72-103 (1985); L Fuurn, THE MoRALITY or LAw 15-19, 44-46 (rev. ed. 1969). 
32. Of course, one can speak directly of litigants' individual responsibilities without 
postulating group rights or obligations. Reference to the collective obligation oflitigants would 
then simply be a convenient way of expressing a more complicated assertion of the several 
individual obligations in a partially cooperative enterprise. Each litigant's individual respon-
sibility must naturally be measured by the information that is within the litigant's possession, 
actual or potential, with due regard to the litigant's anticipation that important, initially 
omitted information will be presented in a reasonable way by another litigant. For further 
discussion of the litigant's duty, see infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text. With respect to 
the likelihood that evidence will be presented by the litigant's opponent, see infra notes 
185-202 and accompanying text. 
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developed in the eighteenth century reflects the net idea: "The best 
evidence must be given of which the nature of the case permits."33 
It is comparatively uncontroversial today that attorneys have an 
obligation to bring relevant legal authority to the attention of the judge.34 
The attorney, rather than the client, has the peculiar capacity to perform 
this function. By contrast, the client generally has superior knowledge of. 
potentially important factual information-at least initially. As things 
proceed toward trial, the attorney comes to have as much or more 
competence with regard to the facts, so that client and attorney must share 
the responsibility to bring the best available evidence before the court. '• 
Reference hereinafter to the obligation of the "litigant" encompasses in the 
first instance the client, and derivatively the attorney as agent of the 
client.35 No serious conflict of interest for the attorney, as between 
obligations qua professional owed client and tribunal, is thus presented.36 
Moreover, recognition of these obligations with respect to both law and fact 
leaves substantial room for legitimate adversarial efforts at trial, especially, 
but not only, in that third, crucial task of the tribunal: the application of 
substantive law to the facts of the case. 37 
One may reply that this picture of litigant obligation ignores the 
importance of the adversary process, and it will be helpful to discuss briefly 
the significance of that model of adjudication. One of the most conspicuous 
aspects of common-law adversarial procedure is the relative passivity of the 
33. S. PHJrsoN, EvmENCE, § 126, at 55 (12th ed. 1976). The ma."im generally is traced to 
certain eighteenth-century cases and to elaborating commentary by Chief Baron Gilbert. See 
id. § 127. The principal cases include Ford v. Hopkins, 1 Salkeld 283, 283-84, 91 Eng. Rep. 
250, 250-51 (Ch. 1700) (maxim used in allowing goldsmith's note as evidence, against 
defendant, that the goldsmith had received money), Altham v. Anglesea, ll Mod. 210,212-13, 
88 Eng. Rep. 994, 995-96 (Q.B. 1709) (deposition of witness located in Ireland allowed as 
authentication evidence), and Omychund v. Barker, I Atk. 22, 22, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 15 (Ch. 
1744) (deposition of witness located in India admitted notwithstanding absence of Christian 
oath). 
34. See MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSJONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983); C. WoLFRAM, MoDERN 
LEGAL ETHICS§ 12.8 (1986). 
35. To be distinguished is the attorney's peculiarly professional obligation commonly 
thought to arise only whenever he or she knows the evidence being presented can fairly be 
called false. See MoDEL RuLES oF PROFESSJONAL CoNDUCT Rules 3.3(a)(4), 3.3(c) (1983); C. WoLFRAM, 
supra note 34, §§ 12.3.3, 12.3.4, 12.4.3, 12.5; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170-71 
(1986) (professional obligation to resist peijury consistent with defendant's constitutional right 
to assistance of counsel). 
36. In this respect, it has been rightly argued that the problem of suppression of truth by 
counsel is best handled "primarily through re-examination and alteration of evidentiary and 
procedural law, not through ethical proscriptions that would preclude counsel from asserting 
rights that are available to his client under law." Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of 
Truth, 1978 DuKE L.J. 921, 925. Of course, clearly identifying the obligation as that of the 
litigant does not eliminate the possibility of conflicts between lawyer and client over willingness 
to comply. See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 23, 
30, 501 N.E.2d 343, 344, 348 (1986) (no cause of action in tort for allegedly retaliatory 
discharge of corporate counsel for refusal to destroy or remove information subject to 
discovery), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 545,508 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 150 (1987). See 
generally Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 Gw. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1988). 
37. See Summers, Comment: "On the Adversary System and justice", in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 126 
(R. Bronaugh ed. 1978). 
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trial judge and jury in the information-gathering aspect of adjudication.38 
This fact would seem to heighten the responsibility that must be placed upon 
the litigants within the foregoing framework. Indeed, a principal justifica-
tion for the adversary process is that the self-interest of the parties will bring 
about a thorough investigation and vigorous clash of evidence from which 
the relatively detached trier of fact will best be able to discern the truth.39 
Of course, this is hardly inconsistent with the goal of having the best 
available evidence before the tribunal.40 The process accepts as inevitable 
significant p£lrtiality in the litigant's presentation of evidence and tries to 
take advantage of it, in somewhat the same way that Adam Smith's 
"invisible hand" mechanism takes advantage of the self-interest of eco-
nomic agents in maximizing consumer preferences.41 Moreover, just as it is 
sensible to speak of "failures" in the operation of a market system, that may 
call for modifications or supplementary mechanisms,4 2 so it is sensible to 
38. The adversarial mode is usually contrasted with the "inquisitorial" mode, in which 
litigation is structured less as a contest between litigants and more as an official inquiry. See 
Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1088-91 
(1975) (contrasting active role of decision maker in interrogating witnesses in nonadversary 
mode of proof taking with its passive role in adversary mode). Compare J. MERRYMAN, supra note 
24, at 123-24 (contesting characterization of system of proof taking in civil- and common-law 
traditions as inquisitorial and adversarial, respectively). 
39. See generally Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 30 (H. Berman ed. 
1961). The bases of this justification have received limited empirical confirmation. See Lind, 
Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary 
Proceedings, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1973); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and 
Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1972). Note also that, in an ex parte 
proceeding, in which the adversarial clash is absent, the lawyer has an obligation to "inform the 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." MonEL RuLES OF PRoFESSIONAL CoNDUCT 
Rule 3.3(d) (1983). 
40. Professor Golding observes: 
Pretrial discovery and the pretrial conference are designed, in part, to reduce 
gamesmanship and minimize the use of surprise as a trial tactic and thereby raise the 
quality of procedural fairness. These reforms are quite understandable if we keep in 
mind that according to the first component of the truth-finding theory [of the 
adversary process], the discovery of truth-correct or better answers to the disputed 
questions of fact-is an essential purpose of the trial process. 
Golding, supra note 22, at 111-12. Some decisions explicitly recognize the underlying 
relationship between discovery rules and the original document rule, at least when the object 
of discovery is a document. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 417-22 (1953) 
(reversing refusal to order prosecution to produce records of prior inconsistent statements by 
prosecution's chiefwitness).Justicejackson, writing for the majority, recognized that the "best 
evidence rule is usually relied upon by one opposing admission .... Its merit as an assurance 
of the most accurate record possible commends its extension to this unique situation where it 
is the proponent who seeks to rely on it." Id. at 421 n.15. Conversely, even limitations upon 
discovery are similarly informed. For example, Professor Pye has noted that "if each lawyer is 
required to perform his functions diligently, each will be in a better position to present 
evidence to the jury and thus better serve the ends of the adjudicatory process." Pye, supra note 
36, at 937 (discussing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-13 (1947) (affirming denial of 
discovery of attorney work product)). 
41. Although we may treat this analogy as simply illustrative, the relation between an 
adversarial legal system and a laissez fa ire ideology is surely not fortuitous. See generally M. 
DAMASKA, THE FAcES OF JusTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986). 
42. This is not to say that the notion of market failure is intelligently applied in most 
modern policy arguments. For an unusually insightful treatment, see C. RowLEY & A. PEAcocK, 
WELFARE EcoNoMics: A LIBERAL RESTATEMENT (1975). 
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speak of failures in the adversary system that call for analogous remedial 
responses.43 _ . 
Nevertheless, it is commonly suggested that the goal of our adversary 
system, as contrasted with "inquisitorial" European systems; is the resolu-
tion of disputes rather than, or more so than, the discovery of materiaJ 
truth.44 This contrast is superficially attractive, but it is misleading if it is 
intended to do more than call attention to the fact that good dispute 
resolution sometimes requires us to attend to subsidiary goals or policies, 
such as the protection of certain confidential communications, that com-
pete with truth finding.45 The divergence of truth finding from dispute 
resolving becomes serious, in the way this contrast is ordinarily drawn, only 
when the court goes beyond the issues framed by the parties and takes the 
litigation as an opportunity to pursue other interests, usually "societal" 
interests, engaging in fact finding relative solely to that end.46 This may 
well be done more easily under relatively inquisitorial procedures. Never-
theless, the true juxtaposition is between dispute resolution on the one 
hand and policy implementation on the other.47 Regardless of which of these 
conceptions of litigation is proper,48 and regardless of which model of 
43. "The acceptance of truth as a basic value may, therefore, dictate modifications in the 
adversary system where it turns out to be obstructive of truth finding." Golding, supra note 22, 
at 109. See generally M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN juSTICE (1978). 
44. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3 (1984). On this point, the now classic 
exchange between judge Frankel and Professors Freedman and Uviller is also instructive. See 
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975) (asserting 
inability of adversary process to find truth adequately and proposing modifications of 
process); Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060 (1975) 
(responding that adversary process is necessary element in preserving respect for individual 
dignity); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1975) (proposing more moderate ways to modify adversary process 
to focus on finding truth). 
45. As Professor Summers has argued: 
No mode of trial-adversarial, inquisitorial, or other-that is exclusively truth 
oriented should be devised. The rules must make room for other social goals, too, and 
these .will sometimes foreclose inquiry that would lead to discovery of the truth. Our 
own adversarial system is just such a multipurpose system .... 
But it does not follow from the multipurpose character of trials or from the 
inherently limited efficacy of law and legal processes that truth finding either is not 
or ought not to be the main objective of trials of issues of fact. Simply because the 
pursuit of truth conflicts with other goals of the process that sometimes take priority, 
it does not follow that truth is secondary. And simply because we cannot always find 
the truth, it hardly follows that we ought not to try. Moreover, while our society may 
actually have devised a mode of trial that fails to yield the truth as often as feasible, 
this hardly demonstrates that truth is not primary. If truth were not primary, then 
how else could we understand our trial process and most of the rules defining and 
governing trials? I submit that the rules can only be intelligibly understood as 
primarily concerned with the ascertainment of truth. No other single goal similarly 
runs through them, lends them coherence, and ties them together. 
Summers, supra note 37, at 125-26. 
46. As Professor Landsman observes, this is most apparent in socialist legal systems like 
those of Eastern Europe. See S. LA:--:osMAX, supra note 44, at 3. 
47. This distinction is carefully and fully developed in M. DAMASKA, supra note 41. 
48. Professor Weinrib asserts that, in Kant's conception of litigation, "[t]he judge does not 
supervene upon the interaction between the parties with distinct interests of the collectivity or 
of third parties who do not partake of the interaction being judged; the judge thus cannot use 
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procedure best facilitates the ultimate goal,49 truth finding remains the 
central trial task that is instrumentally related to that goal.5D 
The subtlety with which the best evidence principle often operates in 
the modern adversary process is exemplified by the case of Linkhart v. 
Savely. 5 1 Defendant appealed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on an 
assault and battery claim. The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed, inter 
alia, the plaintiff's testimony that his eyesight was impaired by the attack, 
testimony that was not supported by any medical evidence. The court held 
that admission of the plaintiff's testimony on this point was error because 
the plaintiff failed to plead injury to his eyesight as an item of special 
damages.52 The decision thus appears to be based simply upon fairness to 
the defendant, a concern reflected in the state's pleading requirements and 
their consequences in limiting materiality. The defendant was presumed 
unable to present adequate rebuttal evidence because of a lack of notice. 
However, the court's application of the concept of special damages was 
questionable, for the defendant certainly had notice of plaintiff's claim of 
physical injuries adequate to allow defendant to identify during pretrial 
aspects of injury upon which evidence would be needed.53 The court hinted 
at the more important rationale by conspicuously taking judicial notice of 
the existence of "accurate and scientific" tests for the impairment of 
eyesight. 54 Such potential evidence, not presented by the plaintiff, is the 
lUnd of evidence to which the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to have 
ready access as a consequence of medical diagnosis and treatment. This fact 
was apparently crucial, notwithstanding the argument that plaintiffs 
failure was harmless because the defendant had reasonable opportunity to 
the opportunity presented by the lawsuit to promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number." Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 CotuM. L. REv. 472, 496-97 (1987). 
49. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
50. Professor Landsman seems to be aware of this, for at one point he refers to truth 
finding as one "means" to the end of justice and decries the consequences, such as resort to 
torture, of uncompromisingly treating truth finding as the end of litigation. See Landsman, 
supra note 44, at 37. Yet, resort to torture is not evil because it fails to resolve the dispute! Thus, 
Landsman's reductio od absurdum works at least as well against dispute resolution simpliciter-
and it does so in a way that vindicates truth finding. After all, flipping a coin or comparing the 
litigants' heights would be the best sorts of procedures if dispute resolving and minimizing 
litigation costs were really all we cared about. If a resolution is to be just, we must generally 
resort to a decision procedure that addresses the relevant past or prospective facts of the 
parties' interaction. See, e.g., Fw. R. Evm. 102 (quoted supra note 26). See generally]. RAwLS, A 
THEORY OF juSTICE§ 14 (1971) (calling the criminal trial a problem of "imperfect procedural 
justice" in which we know, independently of the procedure chosen, the just result-a decision 
in accord with the facts-but accept an unavoidably imperfect mechanism for reaching that 
result; contrasting problems of "pure procedural justice" -like voluntary gambling-in which 
there is no just result independent of that which actually arises from a fair procedure). 
51. 190 Or. 484, 227 P.2d 187 (1951). 
52. !d. at 493, 227 P.2d at 192. 
53. As noted in one modern treatise: 
Since physical injuries, and the pain and suffering therefrom, constitute general 
damages, the details regarding the injuries in the pleadings are surplusage and [the 
omission of a particular item] should not bar recovery. However, courts on occasion 
have lost sight of this fact and have termed the specified damages as "special," thus 
precluding proof of the additional element. 
]. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 5.16, at 282 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
54. See Linkhart, 190 Or. at 493, 227 P.2d at 192. 
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acquire and introduce such evidence. The court's concern to be presented 
the best reasonably available evidence lies just beneath the surface of the 
decision. 
A more recerit case shows this concern penetrating the surface. In 
People v. Park, 55 the defendant appealed an unlawful possession conviction 
that was based principally upon a deputy sheriffs testimony, and the 
defendant's alleged oral confession, that the possessed substance was 
marijuana. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the sheriffs testimony, 
based upon his supposed familiarity with marijuana's "feel, smell, texture, 
and looks," did not qualify as expert opinion. 56 The court further held that 
without the sheriffs testimony there was insufficient evidence to support 
the conviction, a holding pointedly supported by judicially noticing the 
existence of highly reliable and readily available tests for the presence of 
cannabis.57 The court did not mention the possibility that the defendant 
could have acquired and presented such evidence.58 
As Park suggests, the best evidence obligation is an aspect of the due 
process of law that is constitutionally guaranteed to every person before 
being govemmentally deprived of life, liberty, or property.59 While failure 
to present the best reasonably available package of evidence does not per se 
deprive the opponent of a fair trial, on occasion the circumstances may 
combine to give constitutional significance to a breach of the best evidence 
obligation.60 The most conspicuous example is the well-recognized obliga-
55. 72 Ill. 2d 203, 380 N.E.2d 795 (1978). 
56. See id. at 207-08, 380 N.E.2d at 797. This holding, like the procedural ruling in 
Linkhart, is questionable given the modern liberality in qualifying experts and deference to trial 
court determinations on such matters. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 13. The ruling seems 
better interpreted as an attempt to bolster the importance of presenting readily available 
chemical analysis. Compare, e.g., United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(conviction sustained upon DEA agent testimony identifying, as cocaine, substance never 
available for testing), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976). 
57. See Linkhart. at 212-14, 380 N.E.2d at 799-801. The opinion concludes: "The existence 
and widespread use of such tests make. all the more troublesome the manner in which the State 
sought to meet its burden of proof in the instant case." ld. at 214, 380 N.E.2d at 800-01 
(citation omitted). 
58. The implications of Park were subsequently developed by People v. Ayala, 96 Ill. App. 
3d 880, 883,422 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1981) (holding that Park requires certain chemical tests to 
support conviction, notwithstanding presence of less conclusive expert testimony), People v. 
Jackson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 785, 787, 481 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 (1985) (same, but not requiring 
tests of "every capsule or every gram of a substance"), and People v. Little, 140 Ill. App. 3d 
682, 684, 489 N .E.2d 322, 323-24 (1986) (same, with dissenting opinion on question of how 
much should be required of prosecution). 
59. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. amends. V & XIV. 
60. The issue frequently arises in regard to the prosecution's obligation to collect and 
present physical evidence. For example, in the leading case of State v. Reyna, 92 Idaho 669, 
448 P.2d 762 (1968), the court held that the defendant was not denied due process by the 
government's failure to administer blood alcohol tests and present the results to support its 
charges of driving while intoxicated. The court emphasized that other substantial evidence of 
intoxication existed, that defendant could have had such tests performed and entered in his 
defense, and that a contrary ruling would require the prosecution to gather potentially 
exculpatory evidence for the defendant. See id. at 674,448 P.2d at 767. By way of contrast, the 
more controversial People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 652-53, 527 P.2d 361, 369-70, 117 Cal. 
Rptr. 9, 17-18 (1974), held that, in order to rely upon breathalyzer evidence at trial, due 
process requires that the state preserve breath samples for independent testing. See generally 
W. LAFAVE &J. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 19.5(g)-.5(h) (1985). 
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tion of the prosecution in criminal cases not knowingly to deceive the trier 
of fact or to allow its witnesses to attempt such deception by false 
testimony.61 In the various decisions that fill out this obligation, the 
prosecution was found to have been aware of the existence of highly 
probative evidence that it failed to present to the tribunaJ.62 
These examples of the best evidence principle at work, and the many 
others to be discussed, constitute a response to the weaknesses inherent in 
the adversary process and the incentives it creates for litigants. The 
argument presented here is that we should recognize them as such and 
appreciate the force of the principle they represent. Acceptance of this 
argument does not necessarily mean a dramatic change in the adversary 
process, let alone its wholesale rejection. To those who are inclined to see in 
the present thesis the specter of judicial control over fact gathering and the 
presentation of evidence, the simple response is that existing rules, whether 
or not based upon a best evidence principle, do interfere with litigant 
autonomy in the conduct of litigation, and many do so for "best evidence" 
reasons. The choice, therefore, is not accurately portrayed as one between 
complete litigant control and complete judicial control. There are many 
points along the spectrum between these extremes, and the law has settled, 
and moved and settled again many times, at some intermediate points.63 
B. Structure 
In order to detail the juridical structure of a general best evidence 
principle, it is useful to distinguish two issues. First, what is the precise-
meaning or measure of an obligation to produce the best reasonably 
available evidence? Second, what are the consequences of a failure to meet 
this obligation? Of course, the proposed sanction is relevant to a particular 
determination of breach of duty, but analytically it is helpful to outline the 
potential answers to these questions separately. Frequently, authoritative 
statements of legal norms confuse matters by failing to recognize the 
61. See W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 60, § 19.5(a). Even if the "false testimony" 
problem is not involved, the existence of exculpatory evidence can generate a constitutionally 
based obligation of disclosure for the prosecution. See id. § 19.5(b)-.5(f). "Although the two 
obligations are arguably distinct, the Supreme Court has treated them as based on similar 
principles and governed by analogous standards." Id. § 19.5(a), at 753. This Article focuses 
mainly on the presentation and evaluation of evidence at trial, but it is worth repeating that the 
best evidence principle thus extends to pretrial investigations. See supra notes 40 & 60. 
62. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269-70 (1959); Alcarta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30-32 (1957); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 
103, 112-13 (1935). 
63. Others have advocated more radical changes in the direction of the judicial control 
prevalent in civil-law countries, measures going much further than anything the present thesis 
necessarily entails. For example, Professor Langbein has argued that "the German experience 
shows that we would do better if we were greatly to restrict the adversaries' role in fact-
gathering." Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv, 823, 824 
(1985); see also Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MicH. L. REv. 
204, 204, 206-10 (1979) (similar argument with respect to criminal procedure). Not surpris-
ingly, Professor Langbein's suggestions have drawn critical response. See Allen, Koeck, 
Riechenberg & Rosen, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer 
Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. __ (1988) (forthcoming). 
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difference between an obligation and the sanction that attends its breach.64 
The best evidence principle is a rather classic example, probably because 
evidence rules are often conceived as rules for engineering jury behavior 
rather than as rules for controlling defaults in the litigants' conduct of the 
trial. 
1. The Jvleasure of the Obligation 
The "best evidence" clearly does not mean simply that evidence \vhich 
is strategically optimal from the point of view of the litigant unswervingly 
committed to victory at trial. What then does it mean? One possible answer 
is the set of information, reasonably available to the litigant, that a rational 
trier of fact, expert or nonexpert, would find most helpful in the resolution 
of the factual issue. This onerationalized meanin!:!". which can be said to 
refer to the evidence that is :'epistemically best," is the primary focus of our 
attention. 65 Its employment tends to concentrate the tribunal's energies on 
the rational dimensions of the problem of proof. We may distinguish it 
from that set of information which optimally balances probative value 
against probative dangers, such as arousing prejudice or misleading a less 
than fully rational trier of fact. The latter meaning may be called "cynically 
best" and the dangers "supra-epistemic." It endorses a pervasively cynical 
attitude toward the trier of fact. 
It might seem that, if there is an obligation at all here, it would be an 
obligation to present the cynically best evidence. Even then, there would be 
situations in which the supra-epistemic factors are not implicated, in which 
case the force of the principle would resolve to the epistemic version. On 
the other hand, we need not view the one as simply a special case of the 
other; we can take the epistemic meaning as the full scope of a litigant's 
obligation to present the best evidence, recognizing other principles 
relating to the litigant's conduct as distinct. Those principles would include 
the principle that litigants should not attempt to mislead or prejudice the 
trier of fact. They will conflict with the epistemic best evidence principle 
when, for example, the most probative evidence is prejudicial. These 
situations of conflict cali for the balancing of countervailing principles, 
initially by the litigant and counsel, but also by the judge upon appropriate 
requests by opposing counsel. 
64. This is a principal criticism directed at general jurisprudential theories, like that of 
Hans Kelsen, that interpret a rule of law as just a direction to officials to impose a sanction 
under specified conditions. See J. RAz, THE CoNCEPT oF A LEGAL SYsTEM 77-92 (2d ed. 1980); 
Golding, Kelsen and the Concept of 'Legal System', in MoRE EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 88-91 (R. 
Summers ed. 1971). 
65. This operationalization should help allay complaints that contemplation about what 
evidence is "best" is hopelessly metaphysical. See, e.g., Comment, The Best Evidence Rule-A 
Rule Requiring the Production of A Writing To Prove the Writing's Contents, 14 ARK. L. REv. 153, 
166-67 (1959). It is, of course, heavily context-dependent, but then so is the entire proof 
process, a point that has been recognized at least since modern mankind began to abandon 
arbitrary and formulaic approaches to proof. See, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, §§ 4n, 8. In 
any event, the problems posed by the principle are surely no more complex than those 
encountered in employing the alternative principle of presenting that evidence which is most 
effective in manipulating the trier of fact to a favorable decision. 
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Both versions of the principle, the epistemic and the cynical, may 
operate in the fashioning or retaining of particular rules. Programmatically 
speaking, however, this Article will see how far one can take the epistemic 
version as an organizing principle of extant evidence law without recourse 
to supra-epistemic factors. Thus, we shall be concerned with proof in the 
context of a rational fact-finder-not an omniscient one, nor even neces-
sarily an expert one, but one who behaves for the most part rationally, in 
conformity with the duty to determine the facts as accurately as possible 
under the appropriate standards of proof. Ultimately, this is the realistic 
point of view, in terms of the capacity and inclination of the modern trier 
of fact, as well as the ethically proper view, in terms of our duty of respect 
for the trier.66 
The "reasonable availability" part of the best evidence principle 
responds to an obvious concern: it emphasizes cost containment as a part of 
the obligation. The best evidence on a controversy concerning property 
worth $500 might well cost $500,000 to be produced and evaluated in 
court.67 In the limiting case, it may be impossible to produce. Of course, the 
principle should not be applied so as to require such disproportionate 
expenditures.68 Now one might place such cost containment among the 
various independent principles that must be weighed against an obligation 
to produce all relevant evidence.69 However, the cost containment concern 
is so ubiquitous that it is worth being reminded of it in the very expression 
of the best evidence principle. As we have seen, concern over costs in time 
and money is a crucial element in the very rationale of the principle.7° 
Consequently, the countervailing notion of not putting the parties or the 
tribunal to unreasonable expense or inconvenience should be considered 
66. See Morgan, Foreword to MoDEL CoDE OF EviDENCE at 8-10 (1942). In an important, 
modern decision, the United States Supreme Court described the jury as a "presumptively 
rational factfinder." County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). For further discussion 
of the significance of the lay jury, see infra notes 247-316 and accompanying text. 
67. The costs of evaluation should not be ignored, though it may be difficult to place a 
monetary value upon them. Aside from the more obvious and measurable court costs, there 
is the important Expenditure of the cognitive resources of the trier of fact. We are coming to 
understand how the limitations upon such normal human resources result in decision 
strategies that seek to optimize the allocation of the trier's mental energies. See generally H. 
SIMON, MoDELS OF THouGHT (1979). An intuitive grasp of this phenomenon, coupled with an 
exaggerated sense of its significance in the context of a lay jury, may help to account for the 
superficial attractiveness of the cynical best evidence principle. 
68. Indeed, the principle might be limited to control only the production of information 
in the litigant's actual possession, leaving consideration of the cost of acquisition of further 
information to the litigant's unregulated discretion. Certainly, enforcement of the best evidence 
principle might well attend only to actual possession. For example, this appears to be the case 
with respect to private documents under California's original document mle when the 
question is whether a copy is preferred to oral testimony about the contents of the original. See 
CAL. Evm. CoDE§ 1505 (West 1966); see also supra note 60. 
69. This may be suggested by the language of the federal mles. See Fw. R. Evm. 403 
(discussed infra notes 288, 305-10 and accompanying text). Again, these mles do not directly 
concern the litigants' obligations, but rather those of the trial judge, discussed in the next 
subsection. 
70. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. Optimization cannot be conceived 
adequately in terms of the separate maximization of variables that necessarily trade off against 
one another. See generally G. TuLLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL (1980). 
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intrinsic to the best evidence principle.7l It is manifested in the structure of 
rules based on the best evidence principle. These rules excuse a presump-
tive preference when that preference as stated fails to track important 
differences in probative value, when conditions of inconvenience or impos-
sibility exist, or when the point to be proved has minimal importance in the 
case.72 
With regard to an epistemic best evidence principle, then, extrinsic 
countervailing considerations include (a) the obligation not to insult the 
tribunal by, for example, supra-epistemic appeals to the trier of fact, 
harassment of witnesses, or other courtroom misconduct, and (b) the 
obligation to avoid impinging upon a recognized interest, the importance 
of which is extrinsic to the immediate goals of adjudication.73 More 
pervasively important is a consequence of the adversary process. We have 
previously addressed the significance of that process and rejected the 
notion that it must invariably provide a license for a strategic free-for-all.74 
However, it is not without impact on the measure of a litigant's individual 
obligation, for its being in place generates a special, but limited, privilege, 
along the following general lines. In civil cases, each litigant is privileged to 
present any sufficiently probative evidence, and to present it in a manner 
favorable to the lititgant's position, provided the proponent reasonably 
believes that any epistemically better evidence thereby omitted will be 
presented to the tribunal in an effective manner by the opponent.75 In 
criminal cases, this privilege is both augmented and diminished. The 
criminal defendant has a constitutionally based privilege to put the prose-
cution to its proof, that is, to refuse to assist the prosecution in reconstruct-
ing pertinent historical events.76 The proviso drops away. Conversely, the 
best evidence principle operates upon the prosecution with particular force 
in criminal trials because of the government's special obligation to pursue 
justice rather than simply a conviction.77 The privilege itself contracts or 
disappears entirely. 
Of course, contrary to the description just given, one might structure 
71. This may account for Wigmore's merger of logical relevance and practical counter-
weights in the concept of a "plus value" necessary for the admissibility of evidence. See IA J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 28. 
72. This structure is, of course, most easily visible in the original document rule. See, e.g., 
Fw. R. Evm. 1003-1007 (providing for situations in which production of original, otherwise 
required under rule 1002, is excused). Further examples will be considered throughout the 
following text. 
73. With respect to the former, compare subsection (3) of the general federal rule on 
judicial authority: "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (I) make the interrogation and 
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of 
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harrassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R. Evm. 
611(a). With respect to the latter, the concept of protecting interests extrinsic to the trial 
process itself is well known in evidence scholarship, referring primarily to the rules of 
privilege. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 72 (rules of privilege distinguished from other 
evidentiary rules); 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE §§ 2175-2186 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing 
exclusionary rules based on extrinsic policy). 
74. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
75. The significance of this proviso is discussed infra notes 180-206 and accompanying text. 
76. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 60, § I.6(b). 
77. See MoDEL RuLES oF PROFESSIONAL CoNoucr Rule 3.8 (1983). 
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the best evidence idea directly around the agents of government. That is, it 
might be taken that the litigants have no responsibility to present the best 
reasonably available evidence, being legally and morally privileged to 
present evidence in any way that satisfies constraining procedural rules. 
Under this conception, the trial courts, with the help of appellate court and 
statutory rules, would have the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the 
best reasonably available evidence is presented to the trier of fact. 78 
Although this framework may seem comfortably familiar to the average 
litigating attorney, it is at least potentially inconsistent ~ith prevailing 
Anglo-American practices because its failures may generate demand for a 
substantially more active judiciary.79 To ensure the adequacy of the 
performance of the system while maintaining a relatively passive judiciary, 
it is necessary for the primary actors in the development and presentation 
of evidence, the litigants and their lawyers, to internalize the system's goals 
to a greater extent than this picture allows. 80 Indeed, we will see that failure 
to focus on the litigant's obligation to the forum is the source of much 
confusion about the nature of our present rules. In any event, the present 
thesis would remain largely intact under a judge-centered conception of the 
best evidence principle. The absence of a litigant-centered obligation would 
render judicial intervention more frequently necessary.8 1 
78. The notion is analogous to the view that managers of a business corporation have no 
social obligations other than to maximize profits-an obligation presumably owed the 
shareholders-and to remain within the requirements of substantive law. See M. FruEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (I 962). Arguably, however, this framework makes more sense in 
substantive legal contexts, in which freedom of action is a fundamental good to be fostered, 
than in the procedural context, in which such freedom is an important but subsidiary 
advantage in an activity explicitly founded upon social goals. 
79. We have already noted a prominent example of such demand. See supra note 63. See 
generally Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 
1, 80 (1978) ("The position asserted here is that the trial judge can act in many ways to assist 
the litigants in trying their cases fully and fairly, but that the trial judge who attempts to usurp 
control from the parties compromises the integrity of the bench and often threatens the 
independence of the jury."). 
80. A prominent jurisprudential scholar has noted that: 
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal or not, is 
likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one hand, accept and 
voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other 
persons' behavior in terms of the rules, and those who, on the other hand, reject the 
rules and attend to them only from the external point of view as a sign of possible 
punishment. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT oF LAw 88 (1 961). It is hardly surprising that litigants, in court and 
usually represented by counsel, should take the internal point of view toward the rules of 
procedure, including evidence rules. 1f so, internalization of the purposes, goals, and 
principles behind those rules is practically speaking unavoidable. Even in the economic 
context, though some remedies for "market failure" involve modification of the external 
conditions or constraints within which economic agents attempt to maximize profits-the 
economist's sense of "internalization"-others entail a reemphasis of obligations that those 
agents have, beyond regard for narrowly conceived economic roles-the philosopher's sense 
of "internalization." See generally C. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENos: THE SociAL CoNTROL OF 
CoRPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). 
81. The present thesis would, however, lose part of its power if the best available 
interpretation of prevailing practices combines the cynical best evidence principle with a 
judiciary-directed obligation. Such an approach to evidence would be tantamount to the 'jury 
distrust" model criticized in part III of this Article. Even such a cynical, solely judicial 
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2. The Consequences of Breach 
Assuming, then, that in an adversarial system the litigants bear 
primary responsibility, as well as authority, for developing the epistemically 
best evidence on disputed factual issues, there is an obligation that the law, 
through its judges, must be prepared to reinforce. 82 It is important, 
therefore, to consider the best evidence principle in the context of the 
questions that the trial judge must address. The preceding discussion 
indicates one m~or question: Js it proper under the circumstances to conclude 
that there exists (or once existed) better evidence to which the litigant has (or once had). 
reasonable access but which the litigant has not produced for an improper reason ?83 
Of course, the judge should not ask simply whether he or she would have 
presented the same evidence or presented the evidence in the same manner 
as the litigant. Rather, the judge's role is to place reasonable limits on the 
litigant's range of choices. In performing this role, the judge should step in 
only when there is a strong likelihood that the litigant has attempted to 
press a tactical advantage unreasonably inimical to the presentation of the 
epistemically best evidence, or that the litigant has unreasonably evaluated 
an otherwise legitimate consideration, as when the litigant's cost evaluation 
is palpably improper.S4 
Once a judge has found that a litigant has gone beyond the bounds of 
reasonableness, several conventional remedies are available. These include 
excluding proffered evidence, declaring a mistrial, granting a nonsuit, 
employing an adverse presumption, calling witnesses, and making an 
obligation would, nevertheless, presem serious questions about the present level of judicial 
passivity in the control of litigant conduct. Moreover, it would not necessarily adopt the result 
orientation-i.e., trying to assure the "conect" result in the case-that tends to infect the jury 
distrust model. 
82. The following excerpt summarizes well the legal setting in this regard: 
vVhen a litigant has the choice of several ways to prove a proposition of fact, it is no 
more than simple common sense to put upon him some pressure to produce the most 
reliable and enlightening evidence he can get. This has been stated over and over 
again by cases and commentators on evidence from the most ancient to the most 
modern. These general statements, however, !eave very obscure the nature of the 
pressure legally required or countenanced. 
J. \>\~EINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N. AmtAm & M. BERGER, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON EviDENCE 191 (7th ed. 
1983). 
83. The evaluation problem faced either by a litigant attempting to follow the principle or 
by a court attempting to exercise authority over the litigants is a comjJarative one: when testing 
whether a given proffer is "best," one must look for a potential proffer that is "better." This 
fact has moved some persons commenting on earlier drafts of this Article to suggest that the 
principle be called the "better" evidence principle. That would not be entirely inappropriate. 
"Best" was chosen, however, in deference to history and to avoid conflating the principle with 
the mode of testing its satisfaction. 
84. There is, in other words, a rebuttable presumption of regularity-that the parties are 
producing the best reasonably available evidence. This is related to the instruction commonly 
given juries that they may assume, absent contrary evidence, that parties have performed their 
substantive legal duties. See, e.g., l E. DEviTT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JuRY PIL~CTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONs§ 15.04 (1977) (criminal cases); 3 id. § 72.03 (1987) (civil cases). Consider also the 
following observation about fact-finding: "Factfinders, be they judges or juries, are loathe to 
find that one side has lied, or even that one side has grossly distorted evidence. Instead, 
factfinders ten.~ ;,.o look for '!., n~utral story which can bri~~ ~he otherwise conflicting stories 
mto harmony. v. BINDER Sc r. nERG~I.·IN, supra note 25, at 11/ n.2. 
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adverse determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. 
Although our association of "best evidence" with the original document 
rule tends to narrow perceptions about enforcement options to a focus on 
admissibility, clearly related problems can arise in contexts that are proce-
durally different. 85 Weaker sanctions, less intrusive into the overall eviden-
tiary process, may be appropriate as well. For example, a contempt citation 
or simply some form of public censure may be preferable to sanctions that 
more directly constrain the proof process.86 Even if the stronger "eviden-
tiary" sanctions are, for whatever reason, the only remedies available, the 
trial judge should exercise them with caution lest unreasonable interference 
with the fact-finder's role and consequent damage to the fact-finding 
process cause possibly less important concerns of procedural propriety to 
overwhelm substantive justice. 87 Which remedy is appropriate will depend 
upon a variety of considerations, including (a) the degree of culpability in 
the litigant's breach, (b) the consequent extent of prejudice suffered by the 
tribunal, and (c) the likelihood that imposition of an evidentiary sanction 
will, in the present case or in subsequent similar cases, encourage the 
presentation of the better evidence.88 
Analytically, then, a remedial application of the epistemic best evi-
dence principle is any judicial use of a rule, decision, or argument that 
proceeds by identifying some set of potential evidentiary items, call it P, 
which is rationally of greater probative worth than that set which is or might 
be offered, call itS, and that either (i) enforces a preference for P because 
of its superior probativity, or (ii) recognizes such a preference but permits 
the use of S because of some countervailing consideration.B9 P may be 
85. The example of People v. Park has already been mentioned. See supra notes 55-58 and 
accompanying text. This case suggests that when the failure to present the best available 
evidence goes to the heart of the proponent's case, there will be some tendency to invoke the 
principle, expressly or implicitly, in the context of a decision on the sufficiency of the evidence. 
86. For example, in Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1967), the court 
sustained the admission of heroin against a claim of inadequate chain of custody, but chastised 
the officers charged with custody thereof for being inexcusably lax in preserving the evidential 
integrity of the substance. 
87. The issues and arguments here parallel those concerning employment of the 
exclusionary rule in the context of illegally obtained evidence. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 
168. However, since the whole point of the remedy in the best evidence context is to protect 
and enhance the long-run epistemic quality of adjudication, its application in that context does 
not present the same conflict with the fact-finding process as remedies for other kinds of party 
misconduct. 
88. Similar considerations are relevant in determining the appropriate sanctions for a 
breach of disclosure obligations under the discovery rules. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. K~NE 
& A. MILLER, supra note 53, § 7.16a (civil discovery); W. LAFAvE & ]. IsRAEL, supra note 60, § 
19.30) (criminal discovery). In United States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 929 (1979), the court relied upon United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, discussed infra notes 
4-10 and accompanying text, to reject a best evidence argument against the admissibility of 
testimony about a taped conversation. The court, however, then considered the same issues of 
culpability and prejudice in the context of a challenge to the government's failure to produce 
the tapes in question. See Rose, 590 F.2d at 236-37; see also W. LAFAvE & ]. IsRAEL, supra,§ 
19.5(h) (discussing constitutional issues raised by government's loss or destruction of evi-
dence). 
89. Of course, P and Sneed not be entirely distinct; S may be a proper subset of P, or they 
may be overlapping sets of evidentiary items. To this class of best evidence questions must be 
added one more, which is implicit in the discussion of cost containment: whether evidence 
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called "primary" evidence, and S "secondary" evidence. 90 'vVe can, for 
example, distinguish this from judicial action that addresses the admission 
of a set of evidentiary items without regard to the actual or potential 
existence of rationally superior evidence91 or that evaluates the relative 
probative value of distinguishable sets of admitted evidence in making some 
determination, such as sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict. 92 
To illustrate these ideas, reconsider the case of Gonzales-Benitez, 
discussed in the introduction to this Article. 93 Suppose the court found that 
the tapes \Vere intelligible enough to constitute epistemically better evi-
dence of the transactions in the motel room than the participants' 
testimony. 94 How might the court respond if the prosecution, without 
adequate excuse, refused to introduce the tapes as evidence? Alternatively, 
what should be done if the government refused to present the tapes for a 
determination of their relative probative quality? One option would be to 
exclude the secondary evidence, here, the testimony of the participants. 
This is the conventional remedy in the context of the original document 
rule. 95 Of course, the exclusion of the secondary evidence is not a logically 
necessary remedial consequence of a requirement of the primary evidence. 
One could look, for example, to other sanctions, such as adverse presump-
proffered is so unimportant as to waste the time and energies of the tribunal. This latter class 
of questions is sufficiently uncontroversial that it is not described in the text at this point. It 
demonstrates that P may be a proper subset of S, a pleasingly symmetrical result. These points 
will be elaborated infra notes 207-41 and accompanying text. 
90. A classic statement is that of Lord Esher, M.R.: "primary evidence is evidence which 
the law requires to be given first; secondary evidence is evidence which may be given in the 
absence of the better evidence which the law requires to be given first, when a proper 
explanation is given of the absence of that better evidence." Lucas v. Williams & Sons, 2 Q.B. 
113, 116 (1892). Clearly, these terms are relative: an item, or set of items, of evidence may be 
secondary relative to another item, yet primary relative to a third. See supra note 83. We have 
defined "epistemically best" evidence as that which optimally balances the preference for the 
logically most probative evidence against intrinsic countervailing concerns, that is, cost 
containment. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. Comj;are 3 WHARTON's CRIMINAL 
EviDENCE § 489 (14th ed. 1987) (primary evidence not synonymous with "best" evidence since 
secondary evidence may be best evidence if primary evidence not available). 
91. An example is the application of the rule excluding evidence of prior crimes or other 
bad acts when used to show a character propensity to commit such acts. See McCott,IICK, sujna 
note 3, § 188. But see infra note 293 and accompanying text (at least part of the rationale for 
that rule can be derived from the best evidence principle). Some rules make no explicit 
reference to the existence of other evidence and therefore ordinarily call for no determination 
by the trial judge regarding its availability. These rules nevertheless may be based upon a 
preference for evidence of a superior probative quality, with ad hoc determinations of 
availability being perceived as unnecessary or undesirable for some reason. 
92. Typical are determinations on the merits in which the evidence favoring one side is 
found to be better than that favoring the other. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. 
Oaks, 282 Ky. 577, 580, 139 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1940) (unimpeached written records entitletlto 
greater weight on issue of date of accident than ambiguous testimony of claimant some 10 
years after evem). 
93. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
94. Obviously, a number of best evidence issues can arise from attempts to render the 
tapes more intelligible by transcription or by technological means. See, e.g., People v. Marcus, 
31 Cal. App. 3d 367, 368-71, 107 Cal. Rptr. 264, 265-66 (1973). 
95. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, §§ 230, 237-243. Of course, authority other than the 
original document rule must be found for such an exclusion. An obvious candidate is the 
residual discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., Fm. R. Evm. 403. 
BEST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE 247 
tions or comments to a jury or judicial subpoena of the recording. There is 
also the option of admitting the secondary evidence but granting a motion 
to dismiss for failure of the prosecution to meet its burden of presentation. 
The availability of this approach depends upon whether the prosecution's 
version of the events in the motel room is necessary to support a conviction 
and, if it is, whether the secondary evidence satisfies the presentation 
burden. Finally, there is the option of doing nothing. This may be 
reasonable if, upon inspection, the judge determines that the tapes are 
realistically available to the defense for use in its case-in-chief, that there is 
no obvious intent to mislead the jury by presenting the testimony, and that 
the presentation of both versions would not be too time consuming relative 
to any additional probative information to be derived from them. 
Conversely, suppose the prosecution had presented the assumedly 
intelligible tapes. Would there be any residual role for the best evidence 
principle? What, for example, would be its role in deciding a challenge to 
the introduction of the testimony of the participants in addition to the tapes? 
Under the original document rule, were it applicable, presentation of the 
original would probably satisfy the rule's requirements whether or not 
secondary evidence is also presented.96 Assuming the testimony added 
nothing new, such as aspects of demeanor that were not caught on tape, the 
court would treat the issue as one about the propriety of corroborating 
evidence. The testimony might then be excluded under rules prohibiting 
merely cumulative evidence.97 Assuming that the secondary evidence is 
admissible as well, the best evidence principle has still one possible further 
role, for the tribunal must decide how the two will be presented-for 
example, which will be presented first. Here, perhaps more than in any 
other area of decision, wide latitude is normally allowed the parties. 
Nevertheless, the trial judge's authority to control these decisions is well 
established.98 The best evidence principle has a role in informing this 
exercise of judicial discretion. Within the original document rule context, 
there is authority for the proposition that the principle requires the 
presentation of a reasonably available original before any secondary evi-
dence is presented.99 A similar result may be appropriate here. 
These comments exemplify how an epistemic best evidence principle 
might operate in a concrete setting. This kind of analysis is responsive to 
the valid instincts of attorneys, such as those representing the defendants in 
Gonzales-Benitez, and of many judges who find themselves saying, or 
wanting to say, "Counsel, yov can do better than that." 
II. The (Supposed) Decline of the Best Evidence Principle 
Perhaps the previous part of this Article has succeeded in making the 
epistemic best evidence principle intelligible and plausible, both as a 
prescriptive matter and as a description of what the law in fact follows, at 
96. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE§ 1186, at 427 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). 
97. This exclusion would also be a manifestation of the best evidence principle, operating 
to exclude evidence not worth the costs of presentation and consideration. See supra note 89. 
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 6ll(a)(l) (quoted supra note 73). 
99. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 96, § 1172. 
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least some of the time. If so, it may seem surpnsing that general best 
evidence arguments are treated so harshly by modern courts and commen-
tators, as illustrated in the introduction to this Article. This was not always 
the case. This part of the Article critically examines how the modern view 
came about. 
A. Positivism and the Critique of the Classical View 
The rise of authoritative commitment to a general best evidence 
principle in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its decline toward 
the end of the nineteenth century is often passingly mentioned, but it is 
rarely examined and poorly understood. 100 The classical view arose in cases 
and commentary that put forth the best evidence principle as the major 
unifying idea in the emerging Anglo-American law of evidence. 101 These 
authorities were subsequently criticized, most notably by Thayer, who 
launched the modern era of evidence scholarship. 102 One may expect a 
review of this criticism to be particularly enlightening. 
Thayer's critique focused upon the work of Greenleaf, who until that 
time was the most influential commentator on evidence law in the United 
States. 103 Greenleaf had claimed that, aside from the requirement of 
materiality, the major principle of admissibility is a general best evidence 
requirement. 104 In particular, he suggested that various specific rules, such 
as the original document, hearsay, and attested document rules, are 
essentially applications of this general requirement. 105 Although the appli-
cations were not always well demonstrated·, the centrality of the best 
evidence principle in Greenleafs conception of evidence law is 
undeniable .106 
100. A standard hornbook account is McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 229. 
101. See generally G. GILBERT, supra note I; S. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE o,.; THE LAw or EvmE,.;CE (1st 
ed. 1814); T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE o,.; THE LAw or EvmDICE (1st ed. 1824); S. GREE,..LEAF, 
A TREATISE oN THE LAw or EviDENCE (1st ed. 1842); W. BE5T, A TRL-\TISE o,.; THE PRINCIPLES or 
EviDENCE (1st ed. 1849). 
102. See generally Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL A,.;o TRl'LY 
Trum 211 (1982). 
103. See]. THAYER, A PRELIMit-;ARY TRL-\TISE ON EviDENCE AT THE CoMMON LAw 484-507 (1898). 
Similar criticisms of the best evidence principle appeared in England at about the same time. 
SeeS. PHIPSON, THE LAw OF EviDENCE 12-13 (1st ed. 1892);]. Gl'LSo,.;, supra note 28, at 448-54. 
I 04. 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note I 01, § 50. Although Greenleafs treatise is not a model of 
clarity, this interpretation is probably correct. In any event, it corresponds to Thayer's 
interpretation. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 484-86. 
105. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, § 82 passim. For the sake of clarity, I shall continue 
to use the phrase "original document rule" to refer to what is often today called the "best 
evidence rule," that is, the rule which requires that in proving the terms of a recorded 
statement, when the terms are material, the original recording must be produced unless it is 
shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent. See 
McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 230; see also supra note 7. The attested document rule refers to the 
common-law rule requiring, unless excused, the testimony of an attesting witness in order to 
authenticate an attested document. See McCoR~IICK, supra note 3, § 219. 
106. One of his most concise statements ofthe idea is the following passage: 
This rule does not demand the greatest amount of evidence, which can possibly be 
given of any fact; but its design is to prevent the introduction of any, which, from the 
nature of the case, supposes that better evidence is in the possession of the party. It 
is adopted for the prevention of fraud; for when it is apparent, that the better 
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Thayer's criticism had two principal thrusts, each of which is seriously 
misleading, if not simply wrong, as well as fundamentally inconsistent with 
the other. 107 The first criticism began by observing that each of the 
supposed manifestations of the best evidence principle, and in particular 
the three rules listed above, has a different procedural origin in Anglo-
American law. 108 From this observation Thayer concluded, with virtually 
no additional argument, that each rule "stands on its own bottom and has 
had its own reasons for existence, and for continuing." 109 The non sequitur 
is obvious: that different concrete rules, institutions, or practices arose in 
different contexts does not demonstrate that they reflected fundamentally 
different concerns when they arose or that they have been retained for 
fundamentally different reasons: Surely, any good comparativist can give 
numerous counterexamples. 11 D 
If there was any additional argument, it consisted of suggesting that 
rules which arose prior to the authoritative articulation of the general best 
evidence principle cannot have been, or now be, based upon it. 111 Of 
course, there is no warrant for this suggestion. Indeed, Thayer's own 
arguments elsewhere belie it. This appears when he presented his own 
fundamental principles of evidence: "There is a principle-not so much a 
rule of evidence as a presupposition involved in the very conception of a 
rational system of evidence, . . . -which forbids receiving anything 
irrelevant, not logically probative .... "112 And conversely: "subject to many 
exceptions and qualifications, whatever is logically relevant is 
admissible."ll 3 In exploring these principles, Thayer revealed the very 
attributes he claimed disprove the existence of a best evidence principle: 
evidence is withheld, it is fair to presume, that the party had some sinister motive for 
not producing it, and that, if offered, his design would be frustrated. The rule thus 
becomes essential to the pure administration of justice .... 
. . . All rules of evidence, however, are adopted for practical purposes in the 
administration of justice; and must be so applied as to promote the ends, for which 
they were designed. Thus, the rule under consideration is subject to exceptions, where 
the general convenience requires it. 
1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, §§ 82-83, at 93-94. 
107. The influential Wigmore merely echoed Thayer's arguments. See 4 J. WIGMORE, 
EviDENCE §§ 1173-1174 (3d ed. I 940) 
108. Thayer traced the hearsay rule back to the development of separate roles for jury and 
witnesses, the attesting witness rule back to the prejury, Germanic "transaction witnesses," and 
the original document rule back to the pleading requirement called "profert" and further to 
proof by documentary record rather than by jury. See J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 497-505 .. 
109. I d. at 505 
110. Edmund Morgan, noting the different historical origins of the original document rule 
and the attesting witness rule, nevertheless agreed with Chief Baron Gilbert and concluded 
that in each case 
the central theme is the obligation of the proponent to produce the best he has, so 
that it may be scrutinized by the adversary and its weaknesses exposed to the trier .. 
. . In other words, these rules of preference are merely a salutary modification of the 
adversary's control over the course of litigation. 
Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 250-51 (1937). 
111. Cf J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 505 ("To attribute results like these, traceable to the 
slow writing out of ancient customs, methods, and institutions, to the operation of a controlling 
principle of the 'Best Evidence,' is to forget the facts and lean on idle theories."). 
112. J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 264-65. 
1l3. Jd. at 266. 
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In an historical sense [the admissibility of logically relevant 
evidence] has not been the fundamental thing, to which the 
different exclusions were exceptions. What has taken place, in 
fact, is the shutting out by the judges of one and another thing 
from time to time; and so, gradually, the recognition of this 
exclusion under a rule. These rules of exclusion have had their 
exceptions; and so the law has come into the shape of a set of 
primary rules of exclusion; and then a set of exceptions to these 
rules . . . . And yet, while this is historically true, the main 
propositions which I have stated should, in the order of thought, 
be first laid down and always kept in mind as fundamental. If the 
doing of this shall bring about a restatement of some material 
parts of the law of evidence, that, perhaps, will only turn out as it 
should. 114 
It is difficult, therefore, to understand Thayer's hostility to the best 
evidence concept as a rationalizing principle on the stated ground-its 
being ahistorical. 
Moreover, Thayer did not offer alternative, distinguishable rationales 
for the three rules in question. He argued only that the hearsay rule, unlike 
the other two, reflects the division of responsibility between jury and 
witness. Witnesses are to report what they have seen and heard, and the 
jury is to draw any factual inferences therefrom. 115 From this he concluded: 
The objection, then, of hearsay goes, fundamentally, to the 
point that something which should come through an original 
witness is sought to be put in at second hand, by one to whom it 
has been told, one who is not a witness properly speaking, who did 
not perceive it and cannot therefore testify to it, but only to the 
fact that somebody said so.116 
Yet this is a best evidence rationale, given within the context of public trials. 
Moreover, it ignores the argument that the separation of witness and jury 
functions and the requirement of public testimony by witnesses reflect, in 
no small degree, the desire to adjudicate on the basis of the best available 
evidence .117 
The -other main thrust of Thayer's critique was more subtle. He 
conceded, contrary to the import of his historical argument, that the best 
evidence principle had been a useful maxim in shaping the concrete rules 
that emerged during the formative common-law period of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, but he claimed that the force of that maxim had 
dissolved with the development of a mature system of evidence law. 118 The 
114. ld. at 265-66; see also id. at 529-38. 
115. Jd. at 498-99. 
116. I d. at 50 I. 
117. That point had been made by Best, see W. BEST, supra note 101, § 88, which Thayer 
noted but then ignored. See J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 488. 
118. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 495,506. The inconsistency of his two main arguments 
is especially obvious in the context of the original document rule. On the one hand, his 
historical argument, if it has any validity, is as valid for that rule as for the other two. Although 
he offered no other rationale for the original document rule, he thus implicitly claimed that 
it cannot be based upon a general principle only articulated hundreds of years after the rule 
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principle is thus useless as a practical guide to the present-day lawyer, since 
a conflict between concrete rule and general principle will be decided in 
favor of the rule. 119 The only remaining scope of operation for the maxim 
is therefore twofold: (a) use as a moral principle in the "development" and 
"reform" of common-law rules, and (b) use as a guide in contexts, to arise 
in the future, in which judges have been granted discretion to exclude 
evidence. 120 
Initially, this argument misses the principle's relevance to the ethical 
litigant who is concerned with more than the exclusionary restrictions and 
sanctions that the courts impose. Of course, early advocates of the best 
evidence principle, such as Greenleaf, are unhelpful in this regard, since 
they wrote primarily in terms of the respective roles of judge and jury.l 21 
Advocates and critics alike reflected an emerging scientism about the 
analysis of law that came to regard the behavior of courts from the outside 
as something to be anticipated and used rather than participated in. 122 Any 
notion of litigant obligation was being segregated from the law of 
evidence. 123 
This positivistic inclination helps explain why Thayer believed that a 
mature system of rules negates the utility of the best evidence principle. 
Apart from his passing reference to the judicial development and reform of 
specific rules, Thayer showed no recognition that such concrete rules might 
not satisfactorily resolve all possible issues. Here again, the early advocates 
of the best evidence principle contributed to the oversight by ambiguity of 
reference: at times they referred to a guiding "principle" and at other times, 
often without explanation or apparent recognition of a difference, they 
shifted to a discussion of sanctioning or restricting "rules." 124 Thayer, then, 
began to evolve. See id. at 503-05. Yet, elsewhere he stated that "in truth, when we talk of 
specific rules of evidence, this one, which requires the production of the original document, 
seems to be about all there is left of the Best Evidence principle." !d. at 488 (emphasis added). 
119. See id. at 495. Elsewhere, Thayer stated that his point was to reject the best evidence 
requirement as a "definite rule of exclusion." !d. at 488. 
120. See id. at 495, 505, 507; cf McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 229, at 703 n.10 (general best 
evidence rule still has appeal as moral argument). 
121. See, e.g., 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, § 2. 
122. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897) ('The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by law."). For a revealing description of the struggle between these different viewpoints in 
legal education today, see Nonet, The Rule of Law: Is That the Rule That Was?, in THE RuLE OF LAw 
125-40 (1987). 
123. Consider, for example, the absence of the notion of obligation in the following 
description of modern authoritative opinion: 
It is sometimes said that all that is feft of the best evidence rule is the requirement that 
the original of a private document must be produced in order to prove its contents 
unless its absence can be explained; apart from this, it is said that the rule is merely 
a counsel of prudence for the absence of the best evidence may always be the subject 
of adverse comment by the judge. 
R. Cnoss, EviDENCE 17 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted); see also R. CARLSON, E. lMWINKELRIED & E. 
KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 449 (2d ed. 1986). 
124. See, e.g., 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, § 50. According to Professor Twining: 
Most of Gilbert's successors, both judges and treatise writers, including Peake, 
Phillipps, Starkie, Greenleaf, Taylor, Best, treated "the best evidence rule" as a 
fundamental principle. Some struggled to free themselves from the straightjacket, 
first by restricting its scope and then by reducing its status from a rigid rule to a 
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had an easy target in taking the principle as if it were a rule and showing 
counterexamples in which relevant evidence is admitted despite the appar-
ent existence of better evidence, 125 and conversely, in which relevant 
evidence is excluded despite the apparent absence of better evidence. 126 In 
other words, Thayer believed that if a principle does not operate like a rule, 
or at least control the operation of seemingly contrary rules in easy cases, 
then it cannot be law. 127 Interestingly, Thayer's treatment of his organizing 
principle demonstrated a capacity for a more subtle and sympathetic use of 
principles genera11y. 128 Nevertheless, this strategy of rejecting the best 
evidence notion as a strict, broadly applicable rule and therefore as a general 
principle of law, continues to be found in modern texts. 129 
It must be repeated that the advocates of the best evidence principle 
were partly responsible for the confusion, being almost as preoccupied with 
rules as their subsequent critics. As Thayer correctly observed, "It seems 
plain that [Greenleaf, et a.l.] are trying, what Gilbert vainly tried before 
them, namely, to reduce to the tangible form of an excluding rule what the 
older judges had put forward as a shaping principle." 130 In doing so, they 
unnecessarily reduced the range of issues governed by the principle to 
obtain a meta-rule, one that accounted specifically for the most obvious 
exemplifications of the principle, such as the three rules discussed by 
Thayer. At the most general level, these writers refened variously to the 
best evidence "that the nature of the fact admitted," "that the circumstances 
would allow," or "that the party could produce." 131 Yet, in the context of a 
more specific exclusionary rule, they spoke of the principle more narrowly. 
Greenleaf's application of the principle is illustrative: 
In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to 
each particular fan, it is meant, that no evidence shall be received, 
which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the 
original evidence can be had. The rule excludes only that evi-
dence, which itself indicates the existence of more original sources 
of information. But where there is no substitution of evidence, but 
only a selection of weaker, instead of stronger proofs, or an 
prudential maxim. 
Twining, supra note l 02, at 217. 
125. For example, Thayer noted that the best evidence rationale, in the form of an 
exclusionary rule, is not applied to uninscribed chattels, or to circumstantial evidence when 
direct is available. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 496-97. These points are discussed, and 
shown not to be counterexamples, infra text accompanying notes 148-51, 168-73. 
126. Thayer quoted with approval a comment by Edward Christian:" 'in general the want 
of better evidence can never justify the admission of hearsay, interested witnesses, copies of 
copies, etc.' " See ]. THAYER, supra note l 03, at 494. The common-law disqualification of 
interested witnesses is discussed infra text accompanying notes 144-46. For further comments 
on the hearsay rule, see infra text accompanying notes 167, 183, 193-95, 263-73. "Copies of 
copies" must refer to an application of the original document rule, which surely is a 
manifestation of any plausible version of the best evidence principle. 
127. This attitude was brought to full expression in Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (pts. l 
& 2), 29 CmuM. L. REv. ll3, 285 (1929). · 
128. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. Thayer's organizing principles are 
discussed further infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., R. CRoss, supra note 123, at 15-17. 
130. ]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 488. 
131. SeeS. l'HIPSON, supra note 33, § 127, at 55-56. 
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omission to supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the 
rule is not infringed.l32 
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In other words, the principle had become a rule restricted to situations in 
which a specific item of proffered evidence itself clearly suggests the 
existence of reasonably available, epistemically better evidence-evidence 
that is "more original."J33 This kind of restriction upon the use of an 
exclusionary rule is not necessarily irrational. Nevertheless, it is confusing 
to suggest, as these writers often did, that the principle is nothing but such 
a rule. 
Today, especially in view of Ronald Dworkin's work, there should be a 
greater appreciation of the importance of principles in legal reasoning than 
that displayed by the positivism that . emerged from the nineteenth 
century. 134 Thayer's counter-examples dissolve once one realizes that a 
principle is not invalidated simply by examples in which the principle is not 
applied to its furthest extreme, at least not when competing principled 
considerations explain the limitations. As Dworkin observes, rules operate 
in an "all-or-nothing fashion" -either the rule applies or it does not-
whereas a principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does 
not necessitate a particular decision."135 This insight enables us td under-
stand changes that occurred in certain areas of evidence law as changes in 
the application of the best evidence principle, rather than as rejection of its 
use outside the narrow context of the original document rule. The latter 
interpretation of the shifts in the pattern of cases is Thayer's, and, 
unfortunately, it has been widely accepted by modern commentators and 
most courts. 136 A few examples will clarify the point. 
132. 1 5. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, § 82, at 93. 
133. Even some of the early critics of the best evidence notion attempted to differentiate 
"substitutionary," "derivative," or "makeshift" evidence from "original" evidence. See, e.g., 3 J. 
BENTHAM, RATioNALE oF JuDICIAL EviDENCE 393-95 (J. S. Mill ed. 1827) (discussed infra notes 
230-32 and accompanying text). They also noted, and criticized, early applications of the 
principle outside these contexts. SeeS. PHIPSON, supra note 33, § 129. 
134. See generally R. DwoRKIN, supra note 23, at 14-130. Dworkin elucidates one of the subtle 
consequences of the positivist assumption that law is just a system of rules: · 
When the positivists do attend to principles and policies, they treat them as rules 
manqwfes. They assume that if they are standards of law they must be rules, and so 
they read them as standards that are trying to be rules. When a positivist hears 
someone argue that legal principles are pan of the law, he understands this to be an 
argument for what he calls the 'higher law' theory, that these principles are the rules 
of law about the law. He refutes this theory by pointing out that these 'rules' are 
sometimes followed and sometimes not, that for every rule like 'no man shall profit 
from his own wrong' there is another competing 'rule' like 'the law favors security of 
title,' and that there is no way to test the validity of'rules' like these. He concludes that 
these principles and policies are not valid rules of a law above a law, which is true, 
because they are not rules at all. He also concludes that they are extra-legal standards 
which each judge selects according to his own lights in the exercise of his discretion, 
which is false. It is as if a zoologist had proved that fish are not mammals, and then 
concluded that they are really only plants. 
!d. at 39 (citation omitted). 
135. Jd. at 22-28. With regard to the objection that rules and principles are not really 
different in kind, see id. at 71-80, in which Dworkin emphasizes that "rules often represent a 
kind of compromise amongst competing principles," id. at 77. 
136. See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 229. The force of Thayer's personal influence (he 
was Wigmore's teacher, for example) is seen in Wigmore's adulatory statement that "[t]he 
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Consider the attested document rule. When a document is attested, 
the epistemically best evidence to authenticate the document is often the 
testimony of the attesting witness. 137 A naive application of the best 
evidence principle might demand that the party who would offer the 
document as evidence produce the attesting witness. That was indeed the 
rule at early common law, but as the courts came to recognize the great 
inconvenience that attended this requirement, the rule was modified to 
require the production of the attesting witness unless it appeared that 
attendance could not be produced. 138 Does this shift in result demonstrate 
an abandonment of the best evidence principle in this context, as critics of 
the principle have claimed, 139 or simply a change in its application? The 
change seems to be interpreted more reasonably as reflecting the recogni-
tion that a strict requirement would not, in many cases, produce the best 
reasonably available evidence. It reflects, in other words, a more realistic 
sophistication in the employment of an epistemic best evidence principle. 140 
Indeed, the original document rule underwent a comparable evolution 
leading to the modern pattern of excuses for nonproduction of an 
original.I 41 Yet, it would be odd indeed to suggest for that reason that the 
original document rule is not a best evidence rule. 
A similar analysis can be made of other examples that are often 
history of the phrase [best evidence] has been traced, once for all and without the possibility 
of better statement, by Professor Thayer." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note I 07, § I I 73, at 301. For 
further discussion of Wigmore's views, see irifra notes 237-46 and accompanying text. 
137. One might argue that the attested document needs no separate authentication because 
it is self-authenticating. Indeed, a similar point may be raised with respect to an unattested but 
signed document. Why there is an authentication requirement at all is an interesting question. 
Ultimately, it should be considered another manifestation of the best evidence principle. See 
infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text. 
138. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 220. 
139. See J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 501-03; S. PHIPSON, supra note 33, § 128. 
140. This is not to say that the strict rule at early common law was necessarily unreasonable 
in not recognizing excused nonproduction. One might conclude, for example, that the 
uncertainties and costs attending the making and evaluating of excuses require a strict 
exclusionary rule, one that would be most likely to result, in the long run, in the presentation 
of the best reasonably available evidence in the largest number of cases. On the other hand, 
modern statutory reforms have gone further in the opposite direction, abolishing the 
common-law requirements and seemingly making production of attesting witnesses a matter 
largely within the discretion of the litigants. See, e.g., Fw. R. Evm. 903. Again, these reforms 
need not be viewed as a pro tanto rejection of the best evidence principle, for they no doubt 
issued under the influence of Wigmore's sharp criticisms of the common-law rule. Wigmore 
argued, in effect, that the attesting witness' testimony is simply not epistemically superior to the 
alternative evidence in the usual case: "the attester is in practice not usually a person who 
knows anything about the circumstances preceding the document's execution, or knows more 
than any other person who by being present would be a qualified witness." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 110, § 1288, at 576. 
141. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 96, § I 192. A rather humorously illustrative case is Mattson 
v. Minnesota & N.W.R.R., 98 Minn. 296, 108 N.W. 517 (1906), concerning testimony 
regarding identification numbers on wrappers of dynamite sticks. The state supreme court 
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in permitting the testimony over a best 
evidence objection when it was not shown that the wrappers could be detached from the 
dynamite: "[I]t is fair to assume that all parties interested were willing to waive the production 
of the dynamite in court. The rule is not inflexible and must be applied by the trial court with 
due regard to all the circumstances. The best evidence must be produced when feasible." !d. 
at 298, 108 N.W. at 518. 
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presented as showing a decided rejection of the best evidence requirement 
during the nineteenth century. A leading British treatise presents several 
such examples, outside the context of the three rules discussed by 
Thayer.142 That the noted changes involved a reevaluation of the appro-
priate application of the principle, rather than its rejection, is reflected in 
the author's own conclusion that 
it began to be recognized that a prudent relaxation of strict rules 
tended not to encourage fraud or concealment, but to effect 
economy, convenience and dispatch, while the risk of losing their 
cases was found to supply the parties with an ample inducement 
still to procure the best evidence available.I4 3 
One shift in doctrine deserves particular mention because of its 
importance in the history of evidence law. It has been argued that the 
reforms which permitted the parties and other "interested" witnesses to 
testify are contrary to the best evidence principle because the testimony of 
interested witnesses is, or was thought to be, an inferior form of 
evidence. 144 Yet the old common-law competency rules disqualifying 
interested witnesses were not true examples of the best evidence principle 
at work, for exclusion of these witnesses was not premised upon the 
availability of superior evidence. 145 In fact, the frequent unavailability of 
svch evidence was the principal argument presented by the reformers. 146 
By removing legal obstacles to the presentation of highly probative evi-
dence, the reforms manifest commitment to, rather than a departure from, 
the best evidence principle. 147 It is important to remember that such 
commitment need not come in the form of adherence to an exclusionary 
rule. 
This last point is reinforced by another example. Reference is often 
made to a nineteenth-century shift in judicial attitudes toward circumstan-
tial evidence as reflecting a rejection of the best evidence principle. We are 
told that circumstantial evidence was at one time excluded in favor of direct 
142. SeeS. PHII'SON, supra note 33, §§ 127-129. 
143. /d. § 128, at 56-57. 
144. See id. 
145. Rather, to the extent founded in reason at all, it was based upon the following 
concerns: A fear that peijury from interested witnesses might mislead jurors unable to 
discount for bias; the unconscionability of placing pressure upon a party or other interested 
witness to take the stand and thereby experience the discomforting temptation to commit 
perjury and imperil the witness' immortal soul; or the embarrassment that the suspicion of 
perjury might cast on the tribunal itself, quite apart from any effect upon the accuracy of 
fact-finding. See 71 PARL DEB. (3d ser.) 909 (1843); 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 17 (1861); 118 PARL 
DEB. (3d ser.) 840 (1851); see also M. DAMASKA, supra note 41, at 126-30; Wigmore, Looking 
Behind the Letter of the Law, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 259, 262-63 (1937). 
146. Bentham and his followers argued that the parties were likely to know more about the 
matter in controversy than anyone else and that the trier of fact should have little difficulty 
discounting for such obvious sources of potential bias. See 2]. WIGMORE, EviDENCE, §§ 575-577, 
579-80 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Ever ruthless in the pursuit of truth, these reformers simply 
ignored arguments based upon unconscionability or unseemliness, and so have most modern 
commentators. See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 65. 
147. It is worth noting that Bentham's criticisms were endorsed, albeit in less radical terms, 
by the more insightful and reform-minded of the classical best evidence proponents. See, e.g., 
W. BEST, supra note 101, §§ 60-62, 110, 118 passim. 
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evidence because the latter was the best evidence, but that this rule was 
rejected over time. 148 Although there was a shift in judicial attitudes toward 
the relative weight of direct and circumstantial evidence, the change did not 
reflect an abandonment, in this respect, of the best evidence principle. The 
earlier cases employing the best evidence rationale to the direct/circumstan-
tial evidence distinction seem generally to have been decisions about the 
sufficiem} of evidence: the circumstantial evidence was not excluded but, 
rather, was held insufficient in situations when the offering party, generally 
the party with the burden of proof, did not excuse the absence of 
apparently available direct evidence. 149 The movement away from this 
application reflects an increasing reluctance to impose upon the trier of fact 
judicial evaluations of the strength of whole classes of evidence and, in 
particular, a greater appreciation for the variable probative value of direct 
and circumstantial evidence. The judicial shift thus reflects a recognition 
that direct evidence is not invariably so important as to justify a general rule 
adverse to any party bearing the burden of proof simply for failure to 
produce such evidence when available. 15° That expounders of the classical 
best evidence view were among the critics of the earlier cases employing-
such a rule confirms, in an historical sense, the compatibility of this shift 
with the best evidence principle.Isi 
B. The Written Word and the Special Need for an Original Document 
Rule 
In the previous section, we saw how the best evidence principle came 
in this century to be viewed, rightly or wrongly, as essentially restricted to 
the original document rule. That claimed restriction, however, raises 
difficult questions: Why is application of the principle appropriate in the 
context of the proof of documentary contents but not in other contexts? In 
particular, given adversarial motivation and liberal availability of pretrial 
discovery, why is it necessary to preserve the original document rule 
itself? 152 If we cannot answer these questions adequately, then we should 
either eliminate the original document rule or reject the claimed restriction 
on the best evidence principle. In this section and the next, \Ve \vi11 exan1ine 
148. See, e.g.,]. GuLSON, supra note 28, at 451; S. PHIPSON, supra note 33, §§ 127, 129. 
149. This was the posture of Williams v. East India Co., 3 East 192, 102 Eng. Rep. 571 (K.B. 
1802), which Thayer, as well as Phipson and Cross, memion as a discredited example of the 
best evidence principle at work. See]. THAYER, supra note 103. at 496-97 (describing but not 
citing case); S. PmPSON, supra note 33, § 127; R. CRoss, supra note 123, at 16. w,:!liams 
exemplifies a fairly strict view in the early case law of what constitutes reasonable excuse for 
nonproduction. See Williams, 3 East at 201, 102 Eng. Rep. at 574 (proponent of circumstantial 
evidence not excused even though direct evidence in question was testimony of servant of 
party opponent). That view has been relaxed, even in the comext of the original document 
rule. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 239. 
150. See 1A]. WIG,IORE, supra note 28, §§ 25, 26. On the common law's general rejection of 
rules for determining the weight of evidence, see Twining, supra note 102, at 215-22. 
151. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 497 (referring to such criticisms by Starkie, Phillipps, 
and Amos). 
152. One critic of the original ·document rule made just this argument in opposing the 
retention of that rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Broun, Authentication and Contents 
of Writings, 1969 L;w & Soc.ORn. 611, 616-18. 
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the current rationale for the original document rule with these questions in 
mind. 
Thayer said nothing about this dilemma. 153 The task fell to Wigmore, 
who, early in this century, developed what is still the most widely accepted 
strategy for maintaining the original document rule in the face of the 
supposed demise of any general best evidence principle. 154 He accepted-
uncritically-the adversary process argument against the general employ-
ment of a best evidence principle, 155 but he presented a rationale intended 
to distinguish the class of problems covered by the original document rule. 
In his treatise, Wigmore argued that the true rationale of that rule IS a 
combination of the following factors: 
(1) As between a supposed literal copy and the original, the copy 
is always liable to errors on the part of the copyist, whether by 
wilfulness or by inadvertence; this contingency wholly disappears 
when the original is produced. Moreover, the original may 
contain, and the copy will lack, such features of handwriting, 
paper, and the like, as may afford the opponent valuable means of 
learning legitimate objections to the significance of the document. 
(2) As between oral testimony, based on recollection, and the 
original, the added risk, almost the certainty, exists, of errors 
ofrecollection due to the difficulty of carrying in the memory 
literally the tenor of the document. 15 6 
According to Wigmore, then, these factors demonstrating a high risk of 
error justify the rule's continued existence. 157 It should be clear, however, 
that this rationale is perfectly consistent with the epistemic best evidence 
principle presented here. Indeed, Wigmore diverged from the classical 
view only in shifting emphasis away from fraud prevention, a factor 
appearing conspicuously in some of the older texts. 158 The recognition of 
153. Indeed, if one looks for a rationale for the original document rule, instead of an 
historical explanation of it, one finds only Thayer's conclusory comment that it "firmly holds 
its place on the ground of its excellent sense and its tendency to promote justice." J. THAYER, 
supra note 103, at 505. 
154. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 231. 
155. For a discussion of Wigmore's version of the adversary process argument, see infra text 
accompanying notes 181-82. 
156. 4]. WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 1179, at 318. 
157. Elsewhere, Wigmore suggested further that the important premise of the rule is the 
centrality of the written word in the law. See id. § 1181 (discussed infra text accompanying note 
165). This is most plausible in the context of wills, deeds, and other written 'jural acts," that 
is, with regard to documents the execution of which constitutes an operative event changing 
the legal relations of the persons involved, not simply evidence of such an event. See McCoRMICK, 
supra note 3, § 231. As a descriptive explanation of the original document rule, the problem 
with this latter rationale is that, though it may accurately identify the rule's historical origins, 
the modern rule applies to an enormous class of writings and recordings that do not constitute 
jural acts. See 5 D. Lou1sELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 570, at 402-03; McCoRMICK, supra note 
3, § 233. Normatively, once one moves away from jural act documents to those of purely 
evidential significance, there is little reason to distinguish, for example, between the written 
word and the spoken word-as the hearsay rule attests. Moreover, there is doubt nowadays 
about the validity of the concept ofwrittenjmal acts, for "it has been suggested that in modern 
law there are few if any instances in which a writing is anything more than a recordation of 
some nonwritten fact." !d. § 233, at 709. 
158. See, e.g., 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 101, § 82 (quoted supra note 106). 
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a multiplicity of underlying risks does not undermine the classical view in 
any serious way, and, on closer examination, the deemphasis of the fraud 
rationale is less convincing than he suggested. 
In the first place, Wigmore argued that fraud prevention does not 
explain the original document rule because that rule applies even if there 
is no reason to suspect fraud, and, conversely, the rule does not apply in 
contexts in which fraud is possible. 159 However, any rule that is based upon 
a rationale which is not explicitly enunciated in the authoritative statements 
of the rule will suffer from possible over- or under-inclusiveness: the rule 
simply tries to capture the importance of its rationale(s) in an administra-
tively convenient way. 160 Of course, a massive mis-fit of rule and purported 
rationale would be a telling criticism of one or the other. Yet, Wigmore's 
examples do not reveal such a serious gap, even if fraud prevention were 
the only rationale under consideration. 161 Thus, the serious risks of fraud, 
and th~ often difficult administrative problems of ascertaining fraudulent 
intent, help to explain the original document rule, as Wigmore apparently 
conceded. 162 
Secondly, notwithstanding the classical authorities' frequent refer-
ences to the risk of fraud, there are many possible explanations for a 
litigant's presentation of epistemically inferior evidence. The proponent's 
conduct may be advertent or inadvertent, intentional or negligent or even 
159. See 4 J. WIG~IORE, supra note 107, § lJ 80. 
160. A classic discussion of the problems of classification inherent in the use of rules can be 
found in the context of constitutional review oflegislation. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rrv. 341, 344-53 (!949). 
161. He presented examples in 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note l 07, § 1180. He refered to a litigant 
unaware of the importance of the document's terms, that is, to a case in which fraudulent 
intent is demonstrably absent and in which the original document rule would nonetheless be 
applied. Yet, in such a case, how can a court be sure that the litigant was truly unaware? 
Similarly, he refened to a litigant who has no reason to believe the terms would be disputed, 
but how is a court to be confident that such ignorance is not feigned? He refened to a situation 
in which the original is in the possession of a third person, but that would relieve the 
proponent of the suspicion only if the court is sure the proponent is ignorant of any 
discrepancies between the original and the secondary evidence to be offered. He referred to 
a situation in which the opponent has possession of the original and a right not to produce it, 
but that would relieve the proponent of the suspicion only if reasonable notice is given to the 
opponent that secondary evidence will be offered, in !Vhich case production of the original is 
generally excused, see McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 239. 
Conversely, Wigmore argued that the fraud rationale applies to inferential chains that 
contain reference to objects other than writings, and use of secondary evidence in these 
contexts does not invoke the exclusionary rule. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note l 07, § 1180. This 
argument is somewhat exaggerated, see infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text, but even if 
accurate it would not establish Wigmore's claim. Fraud may be simply more likely in the 
context of writings. 
162. Wigmore acknowledged that the fraud prevention rationale does contribute to the 
support of the rule. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 1180. In contrast, certain modern 
scholars have expressed doubt that the original document rule can serve to prevent or detect 
fraud, on the ground that "[t]he litigant determined to introduce fabricated secondary 
evidence can hardly be expected to stick at manufacturing an excuse sufficient to procure its 
admission under one of the numerous cunently recognized exceptions to the best evidence 
rule." Cleary & Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context, 51 IowA L. REv. 825, 847 
(l 966). This argument depends, of course, upon those exceptions and how they are 
administered. Moreover, it overlooks Lhe potential value of the excuse-explanation process, 
with its educating and deterrent effect upon a litigant merely contemplating fraud. 
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perfectly innocent-at least in a subjective sense. These factors or condi-
tions may well be relevant to the issue of what remedial sanctions a court 
should impose. However, their variety does not negate the principle to 
which such remedies provide support. In one sense, Wigmore simply 
confused purpose with the modes of its failure. 163 Nevertheless, his focus 
upon the risks of innocent transmission errors regarding the contents of a 
document does help to justify the continued existence of the original 
document rule by identifying modes of failure not previously emphasized 
by commentators. 164 It may be reasonable to use an exclusionary rule 
simply to remind the honest litigant of the importance of the precise 
language of the original. Additionally, such a rule may be necessary to 
override the litigant's cost evaluation with regard to obtaining and present-
ing the original. 
At best, then, Wigmore may have succeeded in demonstrating a 
comparatively stronger case for the original document rule than for the 
application of exclusionary sanctions in contexts for which, ceteris paribus, 
there is little reason to be concerned about such transmission errors. 
Wigmore explained: 
In the first place, It IS in the terms and the construction of 
language that the special risk of error lies. To remember, for 
example, the color of a horse is a simple matter in comparison 
with remembering or even accurately transcribing the terms of a 
written warranty about the horse. In the second place, it is chiefly 
in respect to language that slight inaccuracies are likely to be of 
important legal consequence. A mistake, for example, in counting 
the number of bushels in a bin of wheat can hardly lead to serious 
consequences, but a mistake in a few letters of an ordinary deed 
may represent it as giving to Jones instead of to Jonas or as giving 
five hundred instead of four hundred acres. 165 
The first problem with this argument is that other things are rarely 
equal. There are other obvious dissimilarities that may also account for the 
different legal response to the examples presented by Wigmore. The 
supposed reluctance to apply the best evidence principle to evidence about 
horses and bushels of wheat, for example, may simply reflect the desire to 
maintain a sanitary and orderly courtroom or to avoid the inconvenience of 
a jury view, factors easily accomodated under the best evidence principle 
rightly understood. 166 More importantly, the risks of transmission errors 
are not exactly correlated with the situtations covered by the original 
document rule. On the one hand, a covered case may present no serious 
issue of mistransmission, as when X gives Y a note reading simply, 
163. Many contemporary scholars accept both the prevention of fraud and the avoidance of 
innocent or negligent misrepresentation as rationales for the original document rule. See, e.g., 
McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 231; 5 D. LomsELL & C. MuELLER, supra note 3, § 569. 
164. This is not to say that earlier commentators paid no attention to these modes. See, e.g., 
3 J. BENTHAM, supra note 133, at 402-04. 
165. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 1181, at 320. 
166. See also Meyer v. State, 218 Ark. 440, 446, 236 S.W.2d 996, 1000 (1951) (proper not 
to require production of allegedly adulterated meats). Such problems can, of course, be 
equally serious in the context of inscribed chattels. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 232. 
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"Agreed." Conversely, there are contexts not covered by the rule in which 
the risk of transmission errors can be equally serious-for example, 
hearsay. 157 
Ultimately, whether a category of situations can be usefully identified 
for the imposition of a sanction as a general rule depends upon whether the 
category, and the risks that cause concern, are encountered in practice with 
sufficient frequency and correlation. This condition may very well be 
satisfied for the categories of hearsay statements and documentary proof. 
Wigmore helped to make the case for relatively drastic remedies as a 
general rule in the documentary proof context. That does not mean, 
however, that no exclusionary rule is appropriate outside that context. Nor 
does it mean that an equally drastic remedy is never appropriate as an 
exercise of judicial discretion in contexts that are not appropriate for a 
general ru1e. 158 
Strikingly, Wigmore's position concerning the application of the 
original document rule to uninscribed chattels belies the standard eviscer-
ating restriaion of the best evidence principle. The last passage quoted 
above indicates Wigmore's reluctance to employ a blanket rule excluding 
evidence about a reasonably available tangible object that is not produced-
and there is considerable case law to support Wigmore's position. 159 Yet, 
Wigmore himself argued 
it is conceivable that upon occasion the particular features of an 
uninscribed chattel may be so open to misconstruction and may 
become so material to the issue that it would be proper to require 
production; in other words, if the two conditions above named as 
peculiar to writings occur for a thing not a writing, then the rule 
may well apply .... A correct solution is to leave to the discretion 
of the trial Court the occasional application of the rule to 
uninscribed chattels.170 
Cases cited by Wigmore as exemplary of this approach include the very 
cases cited by many as discredited classic applications of the best evidence 
principle. 171 If discretion to exclude is proper here, then there is no reason 
that like discretion should not exist and be employed when similar 
167. See generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. 
L. REV. 177 (1948). 
168. Furthermore, it does not, finely speaking, establish that the exclusionary remedy is the 
more drastic one to be matched with contexts such as that of the hearsay and original 
document rules. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
169. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 96, § 1181. 
170. 4J. WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 1181, at 321. 
171. For example, in Chenie v. Watson, Peake Add. Cas. 123, 123-24, 170 Eng. Rep. 217, 
217 (1797), plaintiff sued in assumpsit on a warranty that defendant-seller's wheat should 
weigh 59 pounds per bushel. Defendant attempted to ask a witness whether the plaintiffs 
bushel measure had not been tried and found to correspond with the public Belford bushel, 
but Lord Kenyon apparently ruled that the question was improper without production of the 
latter for comparison by the jury. Phipson and Cross cite this case as no longer good law. See 
S. PHIPSON, supra note 33, §§ 127, 129; R. Cnoss, supra note 123, at 16. Neither discusses the 
possibility that subsequent cases seeming to reject Chenie can be better explained as applica-
tions of the same principle to distinguishable sets of facts. 
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conditions infect the presentation of evidence about events, such as 
out-of-court declarations, rather than chattels. 172 Nor is there reason to 
limit the conditions on the object of proof to those characteristic of writings 
if the risk of fraud or innocent misrepresentation is significant. 173 
Moreover, Wigmore's thesis, considered as a descriptive claim about 
the basis of what courts in fact do, is seriously compromised by the majority 
rule refusing to exclude comparatively fallible testimony recounting con-
versations or statements when verbatim transcripts or even tape recordings 
are available. 174 As we saw in the introduction to this Article, the original 
document rule, as usually expressed, clearly does not cover this situation, 
but it is equally clear that Wigmore's concems over accuracy in the 
transmission of words is just as strong in these cases as in the cases that are 
covered by that rule. 175 Of course, considered as a normative claim about 
what ought to underlie applications of the exclusionary sanction, Wigmo-
172. See infranotes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
173. This is illustrated by changes in the law since Wigmore's time that have gradually 
extended the applicability of the best evidence rule to the proof of the contents of X-rays and 
other photographs that record the appearance of even uninscribed objects. See M. GRAHAM, 
supra note 3, § 1002.4; McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 232, at 706. By analogy to paradigmatic cases 
of the original document rule, this extension of the blanket rule is limited to preferring the 
photograph itself to other evidence based upon its existence. See supra note 7; see also Fw. R. 
Evm. 1002 advisory committee's note. 
Another set of exemplary cases is that in which extensive, often numerical, information about 
events has been recorded. The now canonical result, relying on the usual reading of the 
original document rule, is that of Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(noting conflicting authority, but holding testimony about business earnings admissible 
without necessity of producing company records). But see Arnett v. Helvie, 148 Ind. App. 476, 
488-89, 267 N.E.2d 864, 872 (1971) (no error to exclude expert opinion estimate of farm 
income when better lay testimony by tenant farmers with actual records readily available). Of 
course, when the testimony is in reality a summary of information obtained from records, the 
original document rule applies, but such testimony is still allowed upon a foundation that 
includes making the records available to the opponent and, on order, to the court. Fw. R. Evm. 
1006; McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 233, at 708. 
174. The leading case is Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
(witness in peljury subornation case allowed to recount allegedly peljured testimony of 
defendant at earlier transcribed hearing), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1949). Though Meyers is 
said to represent the majority view in the absence of a controlling statute, there are significant 
contrary decisions, particularly in the context of confessions. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 181 Md. 
439, 444-45, 30 A.2d 744, 746-47 (1 943). See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 233, at 709. It is 
frequently noted that a similar split of opinion attends the problem of proving dying 
declarations. See id. 
175. According to Wigmore, this argument regarding the underinclusiveness of the original 
document rule has been received favorably by the majority of courts in only a few situations, 
such as when a magistrate transcribes the statement of an accused person pursuant to a duty 
imposed by law. See 4 ]. WIGMORE, supra note 96, §§ 1325-1339. Significantly, Wigmore's 
explanations on this point actually endorse the best evidence principle by what can only be 
called a strained application thereof: 
The report of a stenographer is of course more trustworthy in the ordinary case than 
mere recollection; but, regard being had to the serious burden of searching for a 
preferred source of evidence and of showing it to be unavailable, the advantage to be 
gained by requiring a stenographic report to be used if available does not seem worth 
the inconvenience; ... 
Id. § 1330, at 773 (citation omitted). 
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re's observations argue strongly for an extension to cover these cases. 176 At 
the very least, they give reason to impose discretionary sanctions. As one 
commentator argues: 
[T]he much higher degree of accuracy and completeness of the 
transcript should make a trial judge reluctant to allow witnesses to 
the prior testimony to testify about the prior proceeding when a 
transcript exists. He should insist upon production of the tran-
script if it is practicable to produce it. ... The trier is entitled to 
have the most accurate available reconstruction of what hap-
pened. H a film, sound recording or TV tape was taken and can 
conveniently be played back, that rather than-or in conjunction 
with-the transcript should be made available to the trier if it will 
better assist him in evaluating the evidence. 177 
\A/hat is striking about modern decisions i11 these docLrinai pockets is 
that those-the vast majority-that are not said to be based upon a general 
best evidence principle display an embarrassing but predictable struggle. 
On the one hand, the force of that principle seems to be felt, the courts 
wanting to accommodate it in some fashion. On the other hand, the 
opinions manifest a sense of constraint to decide that either the original 
document rule applies, resulting in exclusion of the allegedly secondary 
evidence-absent a relevant exception-or it does not apply, resulting in 
noalternative control over the proponent's proffer. 178 Probably due to the 
176. Accord 5 D. LouiSELL & C. MuELLER, supra note 3, § 570, at 418-22. Judge Prettyman, 
dissenting in Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (discussed supra note 174), 
argued for recourse to a broader principle, described, with some obvious rhetorical exagger-
ation, as follows: 
The rationale of the so-called "best evidence rule" requires that a party having 
available evidence which is relatively certain may not submit evidence which is far less 
certain. The law is concerned with the true fact, and with that alone; its procedures 
are directed to that objective, and to that alone. It should permit no procedure the 
sole use of which is to obscure and confuse that which is otherwise plain and certain. 
!d. at 816-17. In application of this principle, Prettyman argued that "an accurate stenographic 
transcription of a witness' testimony during a two-day hearing" is "as a matter of simple, 
indisputable fact" better evidence than "the recollection of one of the complainants as to the 
substance of that testimony," and that to say otherwise "is to apply a meaningless formula and 
ignore crystal-clear actualities." !d. at 817-18. 
177. 4 WEINSTEIN's EvmENCE 'll 804(b)(1)[01], at 804-73 (1987) (footnote omiued). The 
argument seems particularly convincing against the prosecution in criminal cases, given 
decisions like Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1972), a habeas corpus 
proceeding in which admission of a video-taped confession, offered by the prosecution, was 
sustained against constitutional challenge. The court noted that the video-taping of confes-
sions, in view of its high probative value concerning the defendant's statement and surround-
ing circumstances, "is a protection for the accused" and suggested that "to the extent possible, 
all statements of defendants should be so preserved." Id. at 506. 
178. Occasionally, a court will ride the fence by denying, or not determining, the 
applicability of a best evidence principle but then suggesting how the same result would be 
reached even if the principle were employed. See, e.g., London v. Standard Oil Co., 417 F.2d 
820 (9th Cir. 1969). In that case, involving a dispute over the condition of some spark plugs, 
the court stated: 
London makes some reference to the best evidence rule. Assuming that, by analogy 
to the best evidence rule, oral testimony concerning the appearance of the plugs 
would be inadmissible if the plugs were available as evidence, the fact is that they are 
not available. Secondary evidence is admissible when the primary evidence is 
unintentionally destroyed. 
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labors of scholars like Thayer and Wigmore and like-minded members of 
the judiciary, there is rarely any obvious recognition of other options. 
Consequently, the courts' entire intellectual energy goes into deciding 
whether or not the original document rule applies, generating in most cases 
the very considerations that would go into deciding about a discretionary 
exclusion of the evidence without regard to the original document rule. 179 
This kind of focus represents the culmination of the historical shift 
away from explicit recognition of a general best evidence principle. We now 
see how most courts have come to decide cases, like the one discussed in the 
introduction to this Article, on the assumption that "best evidence" argu-
ments inevitably relate to, and can be accepted only under, the original 
document rule. We should also see how dubious that assumption is. 
C. The Adversary Process and the Continuing Need for a Best Evidence 
Principle 
Even if we accept the special importance of written communications, 
this would not necessitate an original document rule unless there were 
reason to believe that the adversarial clash fails to produce the best available 
evidence of those communications. 180 More importantly, this would not 
require only an original document rule unless that failure were peculiar to 
written communications, indeed, to written communications used as evi-
dence in the particular way addressed by the original document rule. This 
section considers more carefully the significance of the adversarial clash for 
the necessity of recourse to a best evidence principle. 
Some of the earliest formulations of the adversary process argument 
are conclusory or fundamentally confused. Wigmore, for example, started 
I d. at 825. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal of any remedial response to the 
allegedly negligent loss of the plugs by the defendant, despite atypical efforts of the plaintiffs 
counsel in developing additional arguments not based upon the original document rule. See id. 
at 824-25. 
179. These points are particularly well illustrated in the context of evidence concerning 
inscribed chattels. See 5 D. LouJsELL & C. MuELLER, supra note 3, § 550, at 287-90. 
180. For an explanation of why the adversary process and best evidence rationales are not 
inconsistent, see supra text accompanving notes 38-43. The adversary process argument was 
made by the drafters of the Federal P..ules of Evidence and accepted by Congress to the extent 
of not codifying any preferences among different forms of secondary evidence of the contents 
of documents. "Most, if not all, that would be accomplished by an extended scheme of 
preferences will, in any event, be achieved through the normal motivation of a party to present 
the most convincing evidence possible and the arguments and procedures .available to his 
opponent if he does not." Fw. R. Evm. 1004 advisory committee's note. Unfortunately, this 
argument applies equally to the preference in favor of the original. A better reason not to go 
the next step and formulate a hierarchy of secondary evidence is the great variety of its 
possible forms and the relative infrequency with which a problem regarding different forms 
of secondary evidence appears. Thus, the committee's note also reads: "While strict logic 
might call for extending the principle of preference beyond simply preferring the original, the 
formulation of a hierarchy of preferences and a procedure for making it effective is believed 
to involve unwarranted complexities." Id. Recourse to this rationale leaves open the possibility 
of discretionary exercises of the best evidence principle in dealing with diferent forms of 
secondary evidence. 
264 73 IOWA LAW REVIEW 227 [ 1988] 
with the idea that the adversary process is desirable because it ensures the 
presentation of the best available evidence. 181 He then claimed that the 
process is so successful in this regard that few judicial interventions in the 
presentation of evidence are necessary, thus explaining why few in fact 
occur. From this he concluded that there is no general principle requiring 
the parties to present the best available evidence. In other words, "Wigmore 
equated an empirical generalization (intervention is infrequent) with a 
practical principle (the parties are not required to present the best available 
evidence). Clearly, one can coherently reject the practical principle without 
rejecting the empirical claim. 1B2 Irtdeed, acceptance of Wigmore's inference 
from the generalization to the principle leaves no way to explain or justify 
the very exceptions to the latter that Wigmore acknowledged, and of which 
he at least sometimes approved. Rather, they must be considered simply 
statistical accidents. What Wigmore presumably meant is that courts need 
not concem themselves with the best evidence principle except in those 
unusual contexts in which the adversary process fails. 
To improve our understanding of the modern adversary process 
argument, we shall proceed by identifying and elaborating upon the 
counterarguments to best evidence rules derived from the parties' incen-
tives to win. Initially, one may argue that the natural, purely self-interested 
motivation of each party to win will induce that party to present the best 
reasonably available evidence on any contested issue. Obviously, this 
argument rests upon a questionable assumption that the evidence which is 
epistemically best, best from the rational fact-finder's point of view, 
coincides with the evidence that is strategically optimal from the litigant's 
point of view. We can identify countless realistic counterexamples, both 
within and without the domain of the original document rule. A hearsay 
declaration, for example, can be strategically better precisely because of the 
factors that render it epistemically inferior to the testimony that would be 
given by the out-of-court declarant. 183 Moreover, the determination of the 
reasonableness of gaining access to evidence from the litigant's point of 
view may not coincide with the determination that would be made by a 
disinterested person such as the judge. 184 Slothful case preparation is also 
181. Perhaps the clearest expression of Wigmore's views can be found at4 J. WiGMORE, supra 
note 107, § 1286 (dealing specifically with preferences among witnesses), from which the 
discussion in the text draws. 
182. Wigmore also failed to differentiate between litigam obligation to present evidence 
a."1d judicial obligation to require the presentation of evidence. His discussion suggests that the 
only measure of the former is the latter, and the latter must be implemented by predictable 
rules. !d. In this he followed the positivist line. See supra notes 1 18- 33 and accompanying text. 
183. The usual hearsay declaration, reported by another witness, is neither made under 
oath nor subject to cross-examination and direct observation by the trier of fact. See 
McCoRMiCK, supra note 3, § 245. That the hearsay rule will take care of this problem is not a 
legitimate reply here; it simply shows that the hearsay rule is, at least in part, a best evidence 
rule. 
184. See, e.g., United States v. Rohalla, 369 F.2d 220, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1966) (conviction 
overturned when trial court admitted FBI agent's testimony as to registration of automobile 
based upon information obtained from motor vehicle records not presented in court but 
maintained in same building as place of trial). This problem is likely to be most significam 
when the proponent has superior litigation 1 .:sources, ample to undertake a given investiga-
tion, but declines to do so because of a priori expectations of finding unfavorable evidence. 
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a realistic possibility that should not be discounted. 
Recognizing the weaknesses of the first argument, critics of the best 
evidence principle will argue further that if one party presents epistemically 
inferior evidence, the opponent will have adequate incentive to present the 
better evidence. In the first place, unless the proponent is confident that 
another party will present the better evidence, this "no harm done" 
argument is not a justification of the proponent's choice of the secondary 
evidence, but is at best an excuse. 185 As such, it may suggest that a sanction 
is not appropriate in the isolated case, looking back at the proponent's act 
or omission. Yet, to the extent that the act is intentional, and liable to 
repetition, the excuse is lame. 186 Moreover, even as an excuse, the argu-
ment assumes (i) access by the opponent to the better evidence, (ii) absence 
of legal or tactical obstacles to the opponent's presentation of this evidence, 
(iii) sufficient diligence by the opponent's counsel in obtaining and pre-
senting the better evidence, and (iv) adequacy of a subsequent counter-
presentation. 
With regard to the first of these assumptions, the defects of even 
modern discovery techniques are well known. Edward Cleary and John 
Strong, in their 1966 evaluation of the original document rule, examine 
discovery methods and related procedures, both at common law and under 
modern practice, and delineate the following defects, inter alia, in modern 
civil discovery: (a) documents whose potential evidential use _is not antici-
pated by the opponent may not be sufficiently specifiable to ensure 
production; (b) documents located outside the jurisdiction may require 
more expense to obtain than the opponent is able or willing to bear; and (c) 
privileged documents, though not discoverable, may be presented through 
inferior secondary evidence at trial if the proponent holds the privilege and 
chooses to waive it. 187 They observe further that in criminal litigation the 
problems are more significant because of the comparatively limited role of 
discovery. 1B8 They conclude: 
Areas remain in which the [original document] rule continues 
to operate usefully. As the scope of discovery increases, they will 
185. Indeed, the absence of harm is more a matter of mitigation than of excuse, specifically, 
the kind of mitigation that also justifies less severe responses to criminal attempts than to 
completed criminal acts. See generally H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILIIT 13-24, 126-31 
(1968). 
186. The perils of the "no harm done" approach have surfaced and been rather thoroughly 
discussed in the contexts of the exclusionary sanction for illegally obtained evidence and the 
fruits thereof and the suppression or nondisclosure of material evidence by the prosecution in 
criminal cases. See W. LAFAvE &J. IsRAEL, supra note 60, §§ 9.3, 19.5. · 
187. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 162, at 837-44. The authors also note that the common 
practice of attaching pertinent documents to the pleadings does not significantly ameliorate 
the foregoing defects, because the practice is no longer generally required, usually entails 
attachment of copies only, and does not usually extend beyond documents that go to the heart 
of the claim, such as the contract being sued upon. I d. at 835-36. 
188. Jd. at 844-45. See generally W. LAFAVE & ]. IsRAEL, supra note 60, §§ 19.3-.4 (1985). 
Indeed, the elaboration of the prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, see id. § 19.5, would have been unnecessary absent some significant ineffectiveness 
of criminal discovery. 
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diminish correspondingly, but it seems unlikely that they will 
disappear entirely in the foreseeable future, due to the unlikeli-
hood that any totally comprehensive scheme of discovery will be 
evolved or can be evolved. A sensibly administered [original 
document] rule still has a place in a modern system of evidence. 189 
Now it is true that these scholars accepted the standard restriction of 
the best evidence principle to the original document rule context. 190 Their 
examination thus focused upon the wealmesses in discovery of documen-
tary evidence that justify retaining the original document rule. However, 
this does not mean that these weaknesses apply only when the document 
would be used for a purpose addressed by the original document rule-that 
is, proof of the contents of the document as an important step in an 
inferential chain. 191 They apply to the discovery of documents that are 
relevant in any vvay. tv1oreover, \Ve ca.n readily generalize the arguments 
presented by Cleary and Strong beyond the context of discovery of 
documents. The weaknesses they instantiate infect the discovery process 
generally, even the more liberal discovery allowed in civil cases. 192 
The second assumption of the opponent presentation argument-that 
no legal or tactical obstacles inhibit the opponent's presentation of episte-
m]ca11y better evidence-is also questio11able. There are a number of 
reasons for doubting that an opponent with access to the epistemically 
superior evidence will present it when the proponent of secondary evidence 
has not. The most drastic is the possibility that evidence which would be 
admissible if offered by the proponent would be inadmissible if offered by 
the opponent, a problem that can arise whenever the application of an 
admissibility rule is not independent of which side is offering the evidence in 
question. Consider, for example, a witness' testimony concerning an 
admission by the opponent that was accurately transcribed by another 
189. Cleary & Strong, supra note 162~ at 847-48 (footnote on1iued). This conclusion was 
influential with the drafters of the federal rules. See FED. R. Evm. 1001 advisory committee's 
note. Other commentators have observed: 
Professors Cleary and Strong undersold their point: Where it is party strategy rather 
than the substantive law which elevates a writing, recording, or photograph to the 
primacy which brings the Best Evidence Doctrine into play, Teasonable pursuit of 
discovery is likely to fail to uncover every such writing, even though exhaustive 
discovery might do so. There is inneasing awareness of the extraordinary cost of 
discovery, and the capacity of discovery tactics to exhaust the opposition and delay 
trial, and the abolition of the Best Evidence Doctrine would only add to the need to 
be e:v~haustive in the pursuit of discovery. 
5 D. LouiSELL & C. MuELLER, supra note 3, § 569, at 394. It is interesting that, in explaining the 
use of decision trees in making a cost/benefit analysis of litigation, one decision analyst who 
regularly assists litigators recently gave for publication an example in which the most 
significant contingency was whether an important document would be found during discov-
ery. See Goldner, Borrowing a Tool from Business School, AM. LAw., July-Aug. 1986, at 12. 
190. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 162, at 826. 
191. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, §§ 233-234. 
192. Of course, it remains true that the incidence of these problems might be reduced by 
further reform of the discovery process. See generally Brazil, The Adversary' Character of Civil 
Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978). 
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person who no longer can remember the statements made. Ordinarily, the 
hearsay exceptions would allow the proponent to place either the testimony 
or the transcript in evidence. 193 The hearsay rule, however, would bar the 
opponent from presenting the transcript because of the unavailability of 
the admissions exception. 194 We thus have a situation in which the decision 
to present epistemically superior evidence rests' exclusively with the propo-
nent, who, we have seen, may not be so inclined. One may object that this 
problem is created by the exclusionary rules, not by the adversary process. 
But we must appraise the effectiveness of that process in context. It is true 
that, if all asymmetrical exclusionary rules were eliminated, this problem 
would disappear, but some such rules, like the hearsay exception for 
admissions of the opponent, are firmly entrenched. 195 
A less dramatic, but probably more common, problem arises when the 
opponent has a tactical reason for nonpresentation. Assuming that infor-
mation E 1 is epistemically better than information E 2 and that the propo-
nent tactically prefers and thus presents E2 , it does not follow necessarily 
that the opponent tactically prefers presenting E 1 to not presenting E 1 . 
Under the Gonzales-Benitez facts, 196 for example, suppose that the testimony 
of the informers is more favorable to the government than the tapes, but 
that the tapes are nevertheless damaging to the defendants. The defen-
dants may well not want to proffer damaging taped evidence simply to show 
the distortions in the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. 1.97 The point 
193. The testimony is excepted from the hearsay rule by the exception for admissions of a 
party opponent, and the transcript is excepted by a combination of the admissions exception 
and the exception for "prior recollection recorded." See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, §§ 262, 299. 
A similar problem occurs if the transcript is admissible under the business or public records 
exception See id. §§ 306, 315. 
194. Cleary and Strong note authorities for the proposition that potential opponents are 
entitled to discover their own admissions in the hands of the potential proponents of 
secondary evidence. See Cleary & Strong, supra note 162, at 839 n.77. Apparently oblivious to 
the hearsay problem, they seem to view this as marking off one area in which the adequacy of 
discovery makes even the original document rule unnecessary. If the epistemic inferiority of 
the original proffer is due to its covering only part of the opponent's out-of-court declarations, 
the problem can perhaps be handled under the so-called rule of completeness, a quintessential 
best evidence rule that may override the hearsay rule. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 
556-57, 442 N.E.2d 255, 259 (1982); see also infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text. 
195. One may also argue that the opponent could still use the transcript for some 
impeachment purpose. It is often erroneously assumed that any out-of-court statement used 
to impeach a witness circumvents the hearsay rule, an assumption that is only true to the 
extent that an impeaching logic can be developed without using that statement as evidence of 
the truth of the matters asserted therein. This is often possible, for example, with a witness' 
prior inconsistent statements. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 34. In our example, however, 
conventional theory should preclude any impeachment that uses the transcript simply to 
contradict the first witness' account of what the opponent had said. Some courts, no doubt 
sensitive to the impropriety of this result, nevertheless sanction such impeachment, thus 
demonstrating once more the best evidence principle at work. See, e.g., State v. Worthy, 239 
S.C. 449, 462, 123 S.E.2d 835, 842 (1962) (dictum). 
196. United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 923 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 4-10. 
197. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439,444-46, 30 A.2d 744, 746-47 (1943) (trial court's 
error in failing to require State to produce written confession waived by defendant's failure to 
admit same substantively or for impeachment of State's witness when given opportunity to do 
so; court implicitly assumes hearsay rule would not preclude such uses by defense). Criminal 
defendants may indeed be concerned that their actions to rebut the proffer may be deemed to 
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is not siillply that, out of sympathy, we should extricate the opponent of 
admission, here the defendants, from the inquisitorial dilemma of choosing 
betWeen the distortions and the self-damaging tapes. The point is rather 
that we cannot reasonably oppose invocation of the best evidence principle 
by saying that no harin is done by the proponent's breach of the obligation 
that principle imposes.I9B • · 
A similar point must. be emphasized in connection with the third 
indicated assumption-diligence and competence of the opponent's coun-
sel. Perhaps one of the more common explanations of the opponent's not 
presenting the primary evidence is one lawyers would prefer not to think 
about-poor preparation of the case. It is especially tempting to respond 
that the opponent must bear the risk of sloppy lawyering. Unlike the 
inquisitorial dilemma mentioned above, arguably, the proponent does not 
so much cause the harm to the opponent as provide the occasion for 
opponent's counsel to do so. 199 This is not, however, entirely responsive to 
the point made here. Although no harm is done to the opponent, other than 
that for which we may, under some kind of contributory fault theory, be 
prepared to hold the opponent responsible, there is a distinguishable aspect 
of the "harm done"-that done to the persons charged with accurately 
resolving factual disputes under the difficult circumstances of a trial.200 
Finally, there is reason to doubt the fourth assumption of this part of 
the argument-that subsequent presentation by the opponent, assuming it 
is made, is adequate. The trier of fact should not have to engage in 
extensive comparisons when one admission would be more straightfor-
ward. There is an interest in economy of the fact-finder's time and effort, 
which may be determinative in particular cases. Further, problems of 
memory may plague even the most adept trier, since the second presenta-
tion could be significantly separated in time from the first. 201 
waive their constitutional right to remain silent. Compare United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 
91 (3d Cir. 1984) ("trial judge carefully reviewed the statements and the portions admitted to 
guard against distortion, and we cannot find that the court's decision adversely affected 
[defendant's] Fifth Amendment right"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 914 (1985) with United States v. 
Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum) (placing defendant in situation in which 
defendant must testify to rebut portions of confession "bears similarity" to denial of 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination), both of which arise in the context of the rule 
of completeness. 
198. Compare Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (in deciding 
whether to allow impeachment of defendant by evidence of prior convictions, court should 
consider not only risk of prejudice to defendant but also whether "it is more important that the 
jury have the benefit of the defendant's version of the case than to have the defendant remain 
silent out of fear of impeachment"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). 
199. This argument is particularly unconvincing in criminal cases in which the defendant 
has a constitutional right to effective representation. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra 
note 60, §§ 11.7, 11.10. 
200. The limitations placed upon the parties' capacity to stipulate to the admissibility of 
evidence presuppose some such interest or right of the tribunal, distinct from the interests or 
rights of the parties. See, e.g., People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 239-45, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 
I 077-79 (1981) (rejecting stipulated admissibility of results of polygraph test because stipula-
tion did not eliminate unreliability). 
201. This is one of the problems posed by the famous case of Meyers v. United States, 171 
F.2d 800,812,814 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (discussed supra notes 174, 176), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 
(1949), as the transcript at issue in that case was eventually presented to the trier of fact. These 
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We may easily conclude from this discussion that the adversary system 
does not guarantee that the best reasonably available evidence on an issue 
will be introduced. Of course, without an examination of the frequency 
with which at least one of the indicated assumptions fails, we cannot say 
with certainty that the "holes" in. the process are serious enough to warrant 
the articulation of reinfm;:cing rules. Available empirical studies demon-
strate serious gaps in modem discovery generally.2o2 The continued 
existence of the originaL document rule and of other rules that are 
responsive to the best evidence principle tends to confirm the significance 
of these gaps. In any event, nothing in the arguments that identify these 
holes is peculiar to the context of the original document rule. If there is a 
problem here, it is one that cuts across all areas of the proof process. 
This discussion would be incomplete without mention of a related 
argument, one that does not, to my knowledge, appear explicitly in the 
literature on this subject. Even if one accepts that the adversary process 
does not invariably produce the best available evidence, and that the gaps 
are significant, one may plausibly argue that attempts to improve upon its 
operation will be unfair. If we impose an obligation on litigants to produce 
evidence that is occasionally suboptimal in the strategic sense, then good 
litigants who willingly comply with the obligation will be disadvantaged in 
favor of bad litigants who do not. The implication is that no such obligation 
should operate, or that litigants should be fully privileged to ignore it. 203 
This familiar argument carries an air of validity. Unfortunately, if it 
proves anything, it proves too much. The rather childish plea that "I 
shouldn't have to do X if he doesn't do X!" undermines all moral and legal 
obligations, absent strict and universal enforcement.2°4 At best, the argu-
ment assumes that the number of breaching litigants will be large enough 
to make the unfairness as between litigants outweigh the disrespect toward 
the tribunal inherent in the withholding of better evidence.205 There is no 
considerations have been sufficient to warrant one variant of the rule of completeness. See infra 
note 278 and accompanying text. 
202. See generally W. Gusrn, PRETRIAL DiscovERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968); Brazil, Civil 
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses; 1980 AM. B. FouND. 
REs. J. 787; Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1055, 
1090 (1979). 
203. If one attempts to circumvent the problem by recognizing a limited privilege, one 
against legal sanction, it would only make matters worse. Good litigants generally need no 
compulsion to induce compliance with their obligation, whereas the risk of sanction will be 
crucial to the prudential computations of bad litigants. Compare H.LA. HART, supra note 80, at 
193 (because individual motives for complying with laws differ, reason demands voluntary 
cooperation in coercive system in which sanctions are not normal motives for obedience but 
are guarantees that those who voluntarily obey will "not be sacrificed to those who" do not). 
204. Indeed, that some litigants do their part in facilitating the accurate determination of 
disputed matters may be one ground for imposing an obligation upon others to do likewise. Cf 
Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L. REv. 727, 754-69 
(1984) (citizens who take benefits of society have duty of fair play to fellow citizens to abide by 
rules of the common enterprise). 
205. Once again, the consideration of third persons composing the tribunal distinguishes 
this situation from those involving only the two parties, such as negotiation. See supra note 22 
and accompanying text; see also White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 926, 926-27. 
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obvious reason to believe that the obligation to present the epistemically 
best available evidence is more likely to generate the requisite unfairness 
than, say, the attorneys' obligation to present apposite legal authority, or 
the litigants' obligation not to destroy or refuse to disclose evidence, or any 
number of other obligations that we regularly recognize and enforce 
despite the opportunity for persons to cheat. 
In any event, this "second order" reason not to supplement the 
adversary process as a means for ascertaining the truth about the factual 
issues in the case does little in terms of isolating the original document rule 
for special treatment. It may, however, be the underlying consideration that 
led the classical exponents of the best evidence principle to identify a range 
of application in which the presence of better evidence is immediately 
inferable from the "substitutionary" evidence that a proponent offers in its 
place.206 The principle is thereby limited to contexts in which the proba-
bility of the detection of cheaters is relatively high. Whether or not such 
limits are properly placed upon the operation of the best evidence 
principle, it should be seen as a vital force in our proof rules outside the 
context of the original document rule. The following part will examine this 
more fully. 
III. The Best Evidence Principle and the Rationalization of 
Existing Rules 
This part of the Article explores further the plausibility and signifi-
cance of the best evidence principle as a vehicle for understanding existing 
rules of evidence, including but not limited to the substitutionary rules 
emphasized by many of the classical scholars. This must be only a tentative 
exploration, however, as the topic can readily expand into treatise propor-
tions. There is opportunity here only to provide an argument for the 
viability of such an account and to give some indication of where it should 
lead. In the course of the discussion, we will consider the comparative 
~erits of the primary competing explanatory principle-distrust of the lay 
JUry. 
A. The Basic Structure of the Proof Process Rules 
In part I, we observed that a distinctive feature of the adversarial 
model of litigation, as compared to the so-called inquisitorial model of 
many civil-law jurisdictions, is the relatively low degree of judicial activism 
in, and the correspondingly high degree of litigant control over, fact 
gathering and the presentation of evidence.2°7 An important consequence 
of this feature is a focus of attention upon issues of admissibility. 208 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33. 
207. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also. 9 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2483 
(Chadboum rev. 1981). 
208. Another focal point is the order of presentation of evidence by the parties. See generally 
Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216 (1972); Westen, 
Order of Proof" An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 
CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1978). 
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Historically, in Anglo-American law these issues became potentially impor-
tant when the jury lost its role as an investigative body. That role was not 
then taken up by the judiciary and so was left to the parties.2°9 
In part II, we noted the systematization of the rules of admissibility 
provided by Thayer. To reiterate, Thayer's view was that there is a 
"presupposition" in the very conception of a rational system of evidence 
that forbids receiving anything irrelevant and, conversely, prescribes that 
whatever is logically relevant is, subject to many exceptions for good reason, 
admissible.210 This set of ideas has had great influence over the years and 
is now said to be incorporated expressly into the federal rules.211 
Yet, there is a serious theoretical problem with Thayer's scheme. To 
say that irrelevant evidence should not be considered, which is surely a 
rational presupposition, is not to say that it should not be admitted. To say 
the latter is to assume that the judge should make a threshold relevancy 
determination. Since this essentially logical determination is conceived as 
independent of the consideration of practical counterweights such as 
prejudice and expediency, Thayer's scheme apparently contemplates that 
the judge has an acumen superior to that of the jury for determining 
relevancy. The jury, in other words, is not trusted to recognize and employ 
the rational presupposition. Yet, questions related solely to the weight, or 
probative value, of the evidence are precisely the matters with respect to 
which juries are conventionally thought to be most competent.212 In a 
bench trial, Thayer's "presupposition" makes even less sense. 
We can attempt to extricate Thayer from this difficulty by arguing that 
irrelevant evidence should be excluded because it wastes the time and 
energy of the tribunal. 213 This transforms Thayer's logical presupposition 
into just one aspect of his practical, limiting considerations on the admission 
of evidence, leaving Thayer's scheme as just one principle: Evidence is 
admissible unless there is a good reason not to admit it. This is not very 
helpful, however, absent an indication of what kinds of reasons count 
209. See Jenks, According to the Evidence, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL EssAYS 191-201 (1926); see 
generally J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 47-182. A concise summary can be found in Goodhart, 
A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv. 759, 761-69 (1965). It has been 
argued that this potential importance of admissibility issues was fully realized only when 
lawyers entered criminal trial advocacy in a serious way. See supra note 12 and accompanying 
text. 
210. See J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 262-64; supra notes 112-13 and <o-:companying text. 
211. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 9-10. The federal rules provide: "All relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, 
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Fw. R. Evm. 
402; see also id. advisory committee's note (citing Thayer). 
212. Peter Tillers, in his extensive review of modern theories of relevance, argues that these 
theories generally follow Thayer in failing to distinguish the epistemological dimensions of 
relevance from the practical considerations that justify the authority of the trial judge to 
exclude irrelevant evidence. He goes on to expose the weakness of any supplemental 
hypothesis that the judge has a superior acumen for determining relevancy. See 1AJ. WIGMORE, 
supra note 28, § 37.2. 
213. See, e.g., J. FRJEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 53,§ 10.2, at 462-63. 
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against admissibility and why. At most, it tells us that there is a presumption 
in favor of admissibility without telling us why this is so. It seems simply to 
restate the norm of judicial passivity.214 
Suppose, instead, that we begin with a different presupposition.215 
Suppose we start with the practical premise that litigants should present the 
epistemically best, reasonably available evidence.216 As we have seen, that 
premise entails a cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken by the parties with 
respect to the class of logically rekvant, potential items of evidence.217 A 
respectful assumption that parties and triers of fact do their duty to the 
tribunal yields a presumption against interference with the parties' chosen 
proffers of evidence, including a reluctance to rule evidence 
inadmissible.218 Nevertheless, the best evidence principle explains the 
occasional necessity of judicial intervention. Moreover, we can predict that 
intervention will come in three char::lcteristic forms. 
In the first place, there is a :rational impetus, toward having all relevant 
evidence, that will not always be satisfied by the unguided desires of the 
parties. This generates an "expansionary" pressure in the law: the evidence 
presented should not be truncated unnecessarily, leaving out evidence that 
is probative and not unduly expensive or inconvenient to produce.219 Thus, 
the principle operates to expand the total evidentiary package beyond what 
a party's self-interested tactical or economic considerations might incline 
that party to produce and present in court. This expansionary aspect of the 
principle is manifested by a wide variety of rules and doctrines of evidence 
law, about which more will be said later, as well as the rules of discovery. 
Moreover, it accounts for the law's general trend toward eliminating or 
relaxing rules that allow an opponent to block the admission of relevant 
evidence. 220 
214. Admittedly, Thayer's two presuppositions concerning the admissibility of irrelevant 
and relevant evidence are useful pedagogically, helping the student of evidence to remember 
the checkpoints of admissibiliti law. Even in this regard, however, they should be supple-
mented by at least two further axioms: Evidence admissible for one purpose (taken alone) but 
not for another (taken alone) is presumptively admissible, subject to a possible limiting 
instruction, see, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 105; and, Evidence that is normally inadmissible may become 
admissible because of the opponent's actions, see, e.g., FED. R. Evm. l 03, 106 (waiver and verbal 
incompleteness). See generally l]. WrcMORE, supra note 28, §§ 9-21 
215. Compare Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications by Refennce to Organizing 
Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1080, 1082 (1985) 
("Even if a particular analytical construct is well suited to its tasks, useful insights may be 
generated by probing the structure based upon that construct from a different perspective 
than that contained in its operant assumptions."). 
216. This is intended to restate in shorthand form the ideas presented supra notes 65-8 l and 
accompanying text. 
217. This is arguably the legitimate essence of Bentham's truth-utilitarian vision of evidence 
law. See generally 4]. BENTHAM, supra note 133, at 506-645 ("View of the Cases in Which 
Exclusion of Evidence is Proper"). For example, Bentham's argument for excluding irrelevant 
evidence is predictably pragmatic-the avoidance of"vexation, expence, and delay." !d. at 571. 
218. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text; Cf Cohen, Freedom of Proof, in FACTS rN 
LAw 1-21 (W. Twining ed. 1983) (suggesting both epistemological and political reasons 
supporting presumptive noninterference). 
219. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
220. We have already considered, for example, the rejection of most of the common-law 
witness-competency disqualifications and the relaxation of the attested document rule. See 
supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. Also of considerable importance are various 
BEST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE 273 
On the other hand, irrelevant evidence should not be presented, as it 
does nothing toward the rational determination of the issue, yet it con-
sumes resources of litigants and the public.221 This is so even if all relevant 
evidence, or all reasonably available relevant evidence, is also presented to 
the tribunal. The principle thus generates a preference, stated most 
generally, for any set of evidence over another that has the same items of 
relevant evidence but more irrelevant evidence. Moreover, the principle 
does not require all relevant information, for it is not reasonable to seek and 
await the accumulation of every bit of relevant evidence, however proba-
tive. The importance of the point in controversy may not justify the 
expenses of obtaining, presenting, and evaluating all such information.222 
Not only is evidence of de minimis probative value not required, but it 
should be disallowed. This "contractionary" aspect of the principle is, of 
course, well confirmed by extant evidence law. 223 
Finally, the expansionary aspect combines with the contractionary 
inroads on the restrictions traditionally placed upon credibility evidence, most notably the 
modern reforms expanding a party's ability to present evidence reflecting negatively upon the 
credibility of a witness called by that party. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 607; McCoRMICK,supra note 
3, § 38. 
221. Of course, the absence of rational probative. value will generally provide sufficient 
incentive, if not reason, for the parties not to waste their resources in presenting irrelevant 
evidence, absent some ulterior prejudicial purpose. The exception concerns evidence the 
relevance of which is reasonably debatable. If the expenses of developing the evidence have 
already been incurred, as by hypothesis they will have been if the issue arises at trial, the focus 
upon wasting resources, as well as the principle of presumptive noninterference, suggests that 
a liberal standard be used in the judicial determination of relevance for admissibility purposes. 
Thus, generally the court ought to admit evidence if it finds that a reasonable juror could find 
the evidence relevant. This kind of standard is available for the determination of preliminary 
facts that supposedly condition relevance. See FED. R. Evm. l04(b). Yet, there is sparse and 
conflicting authority on the determination of basic, that is, unconditional relevance. Compare, 
e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 53, at 137 (suggesting judges should determine whether they 
believe evidence relevant) with R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MooERN APPROACH TO EviDENCE 155 
(2d ed. 1982) ("If the evidence might influence a reasonable trier of fact it should be admitted 
regardless of the value which the judge personally would place on it.") and G. LILLY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw oF EviDENCE § 10.3 (2d ed. 1987) (same). None of these secondary 
authorities cites any primary authority on the point. What there is appears to favor the latter 
view. See United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating standard 
deferential to jury). The paucity of authority on what might seem a fundamental question is 
not really surprising, given that relevance itself is defined so liberally. The two standards are 
easily conflated. See 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 37.2, at 1023 n.6. 
222. The natural desire to consider all relevant evidence is strong enough that jurors in civil 
cases may need to be reminded as follows: 
The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have been 
present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have 
knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law require any party to 
produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the case. 
3 E. DEviTT & C. BLAcKMAR, supra note 84, § 73.11. A similar instruction may be given in 
criminal cases. See I id. § 17.18 (1977). 
223. See James, supra note 30, at 700-01. It is now widely accepted that judges have authority 
to exclude relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
FED. R. Evm. 403; see I J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § lOa; R. CRoss, supra note 123, § 5.B. 
Although efficiency concerns are part of the reason for excluding evidence on collateral 
matters, rules in the witness credibility area, for example, also reflect a concern for the witness' 
sensibilities. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, at § 49. 
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aspect of the principle to produce a "substitutionary" effect: it provides a 
reason for preferring some items of logically relevant information over 
others when not all should be introduced for an optimal tradeoff between 
logical probativity and the consumption of resources by litigant and 
tribunal. This was the effect that the classical exponents of the best evidence 
principle most often noted, using the hearsay and original document rules 
as examples.224 Substitution is generally the consequence when the second-
ary evidence must be either redundant or 'erroneously at variance with the 
primary evidence.225 Yet, there are occasional situations in which, for 
example, hearsay is admissible corroboration provided the declarant 
testifies,226 or a copy is admissible provided the original document has been 
presented.227 In these situations, these rules have an essentially expansion-
ary purpose and effect. 22s 
Thus, we begin to see a broad explanatory function of the best 
evidence principle with regard to the rules governing the process of proof. 
As discussed previously, some early evidence scholars used the term "best 
evidence" to capture the essence of many of these rules.229 Others have 
224. In these contexts, the substitution is "complete": the preferred evidence is entirely 
distinct from that which is excluded, even though they supposedly refer to the same 
information. Obviously, other contexts rriay involve "partial" substitution, in which Sand Pare 
overlapping items of evidence. See supra note 89. 
225. Conversely, under the best evidence principle, exclusion of allegedly secondary 
evidence is unwarranted when the allegedly primary evidence has been, or will be, admitted 
and the two proffers are not unduly cumulative. Cf Howard v. State, 264 Ind. 275, 281-82, 
342 N.E.2d 604,607-08 (1976). In this case, the court affil"IT\ed the admission of photographic 
evidence showing a shirt as well as loose buttons allegedly from the shirt. The defendant-
appellant claimed that other photographs, already in evidence, were the best evidence of these 
items. The court rejected this argument on the familiar but misleading ground that the "best 
evidence" rule applies only to writings and went on to reject defendant's argument that the 
challenged photograph, somewhat different from the earlier exhibits, was cumulative. See id. 
The court's ruling was better than its explanation. Identifying the best evidence principle with 
the original docu.ment rule presupposes a substitutionary structure .. Defendant's argument 
was wrong precisely because it attempted to invoke substitution in an inappropriate context, 
not because the best evidence principle has no force beyond the original document rule. 
226. The most important example is the admissibility of evidence of pretrial identification, 
frequently and reasonably thought to be of greater probative value than an identification 
made under the peculiar conditions of the courtroom. See, e.g., Fw. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(C); M. 
GRAHAM, supra note 3, §§ 801.13-.14. 
227. Although secondary evidence of the contents of a document is usually superfluous 
given admission of the original, it may nevertheless be independently helpful if, for example, 
there is a claim that the original has been altered since the event creating the secondary 
evidence. See 4]. WIGMORE, s!lpra note 96, § 1190. 
228. Wigmore perceptively labelled this effect a "conditional preference." See id. § 1172. 
The common-law attesting witness rule was the paradigm of this type of rule, as it did not 
preclude other authenticating evidence provided that attesting witnesses were presented or 
their absence was adequately excused. See id. §§ 1285-I32l. The American Law Institute's 
MonEL ConE OF EviDENCE (1942) would essentially have transformed the hearsay rule from its 
conventional, substitutionary form to a largely expansionary form by admitting hearsay 
statements if the declarant testifies or is shown to be unavailable. See id. Rule 503(b). This 
proposal, which unfortunately met with little success, recognizes that the consideration of 
hearsay is not necessarily a waste of the tribunal's time simply because the declarant testifies 
in person. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 251. An expansionary rule would leave the exclusion 
of the hearsay statements of a testifying witness to case-by-case analysis of its cumulative 
quality. 
229. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text. 
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identified some of these rules as related without calling that relation by the 
name "best evidence." For example, Bentham was a harsh critic of 
exclusionary rules and of talk about "best evidence" or misleading the trier 
of fact or judge, concepts variously used to justify such rules.230 Neverthe-
less, he approved of using "securities" for the "correctness and complete-
ness" of evidence, such as the requirement of public testimony under oath 
subject to penalty of perjury and to cross-examination. These requirements 
would result in rules excluding evidence that the litigants, or their wit-
nesses, refuse to subject to such securities. Moreover, the want of these 
securities constituted for Bentham the defining characteristic of, and the 
reason for a preference against, "makeshift evidence" -a category that 
subsumes hearsay and nonoriginal evidence of a document's contents. 
Bentham would enforce such a preference by exclusion only when the 
better evidence, that is, evidence subject to the appropriate securities, is 
reasonably available. 23 1 
Over a half century later, Thayer himself offered a veritable catalog of 
best evidence applications, except that they were presented as ways to 
simplify evidence law for future jury trials.232 Specifically, he suggested that 
we exercise greater judicial discretion in applying "certain great principles, 
such as these:" 
(1) That the jury must, so far as possible, personally see and hear 
those whose statements of fact, oral or written, they are asked to 
believe; (2) that witnesses must, so far as possible, testify orally, 
publicly, under strong sanctions for truth-telling, and that both 
parties must have full opportunity to examine or cross-examine 
under the court's supervision; (3) that in the case of writings the 
jury must, so far as possible, personally and publicly inspect such 
as they are expected to act upon; (4) that whatever is said or 
shown to the jury, or privately known to them, bearing on the 
case, must be said, shown, or stated publicly, in presence of the 
court and of all parties concerned; (5) that the execution of 
solemn documents must be clearly shown, and that they must be 
faithfully construed according to the written terms; (6) that the 
jury must not be obliged or permitted to listen to what will unduly 
delay the case, or too much tend to confuse or mislead them; (7) 
that the jury may be aided by the opinions, on matters of fact, of 
persons specially qualified, wherever they are likely to be materi-
ally helped by it. 233 
230. See generally 4]. BENTHAM, supra note 133, at 477-645 ("On Exclusion of Evidence"). A 
reading of Bentham suggests that his hostility to the best evidence concept arose from his 
reformist opposition to certain existing rules, especially witness competency rules, that were 
lamely defended in best evidence terms by more conservative scholars. See supra notes 144-47 
and accompanying text. 
231. See 3 id. at 395, 553-54; see also W. TwiNING, THEORIES OF EviDENcE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 
38-40 (1985). 
232. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 535-38. 
233. Id. at 536. The list includes only one further item, which is clearly not attributable to 
the best evidence principle, but which will be relevant to later discussion: 
(8) that the court must have power to review and set side the verdict of the jury, in 
order to prevent gross injustice, and secure conformity to the rules of law and the 
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All of these, save parts of items (5) and (6),234 are derivable from the 
epistemic best evidence principle, though Thayer went out of his way to 
undermine any such claim.235 
Wigmore also came very close to recognizing this pattern in the law of 
evidence. He devoted the bulk of his great treatise to the rules of 
admissibility, a subject in turn divided into three major parts. 236 The second 
part, devoted to the "Rules of Auxiliary Probative Policy," which "include 
the most characteristic features of the Anglo-American law of evidence," is 
of most interest to us here.237 Under this head, Wigmore discussed, inter 
alia, all those rules concerning "securities" and "makeshift" evidence about 
which Bentham wrote, but he also explicitly rejected the use of the term 
"best evidence," as well as the related notions of "primary" and "secondary" 
evidence, to indicate a unifying principle.238 He argued that 
so far as the term is understood to group together all rules 
exacting a certain quality of evidence when it is available, it groups 
rules which are in practical tenor essentially distinct. ... On the 
whole, it should be abandoned as more likely to confuse than to 
clarify the application of the various Auxiliary Rules which 
naturally form an independent group in our system of 
Evidence. 239 
Wigmore did not go on to explain exactly how rules that are m 
practical tenor distinct" can also be rules that "naturally form an indepen-
I d. 
requirements of sound reason,-in no case substituting their own judgment for that 
of the jury, and always exercising a merely restraining power. 
234. Item (5) is a mixture of authentication requirements and the parol evidence rule. The 
latter Thayer ardently wished to exclude from "evidence" law proper as being in truth a rule 
of substantive law. See id. at 390-483, 512-14. The reference in item (6) to confusing or 
misleading the jury raises the question of jury distrust generally, on which see infra notes 
24 7-316 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text. 
236. This and the following statements on the scope of the different parts of the treatise can 
be verified most directly by looking at the table provided at 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 107, at 
xc-xcii. Actually, there is a fourth part on admissibility concerning only the parol evidence 
rule, which Wigmore, following Thayer, considered a rule of substantive law that should be 
discussed only begrudgingly in a treatise on evidence. See 9 id. § 2400. 
237. See 4 id. § 1171, at 298. The first part is devoted to the topic of "Relevancy," which 
includes rules of competency and credibility of witnesses as well as rules limiting the use of 
circumstantial evidence. The third part covers "Extrinsic Policy," which includes mainly the 
rules of privileged communications and illegally obtained evidence. 
238. See id. §§ 1174-ll75. 
239. Id. § 1175, at 304. The passage contains another "serious objection" that seems little 
more than a terminological quibble, at least in. this context. Wigmore claimed that any 
understanding of the best evidence notion that entails a preference for t.he presentation of a 
tangible object-for example, the original of a document-is not a preference for "evidence" 
at all. The presentation of a tangible object, which Wigmore calls "autoptic proference," is not 
evidential when there is no inference from the reality of the thing presented to some 
proposition of fact important in the case. Whether this condition of noninference is ever 
satisfied in the use of tangible objects is debatable, and Wigmore himself recognized the 
propriety of a broader notion of evidence. See 4 id. § II 50. 
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dent group," except to suggest a trivial sense of unification under the 
catch-all taxonomical grouping of all those rules, other than relevancy 
rules, that are motivated by the goal of accurate truth finding. 240 Rather, he 
claimed that these rules are "designed to strengthen here and there the 
evidential fabric and to secure it against dartgers and weaknesses pointed out by 
experience," and he distinguished this group of rules from "extrinsic policy" 
rules by observing that "the latter do not aim at the strengthening of the 
mass of evidence but at the avoidance of collateral disadvantages uncon-
nected with the object of securing good evidence."241 The only hint in this 
of a divergence from the principle described in this Article is the word 
"dangers," and it turns out that Wigmore did indeed include within the 
rubric of "auxiliary probative policy" a very short chapter on rules designed 
to guard against the jury being misled, that is, rules barring evidence that 
would confuse the jury or arouse prejudice among its members.242 We are 
left, then, to a more careful examination of particular rules to discern the 
extent to which Wigmore considered jury distrust as a crucial ingredient of 
the other, principal rules of auxiliary probative policy.243 
It is true that Wigmore inclined generally to the view, advanced earlier 
by Thayer, that the Anglo-American law of evidence is predominantly 
attributable to the institution of the lay jury. 244 Peter Tillers, in his revision 
of the first volume of Wigmore's treatise, notes that one of the two general 
_perspectives that "inform Wigmore's treatment of every branch of the law 
240. See 1 id. § 11. Notwithstanding his attention to the practical point of the rules, Wigmore 
often argued that classification of the rules is best done by reference to their pragmatic 
consequences or procedural effect, rather than by reference to their purposes, because the 
purposes are often multiple, resulting in classification that is not unique. See 4 id. § 1172. Yet, 
if this is the underlying reason for his belief that the various best evidence rules cannot be 
grouped together, he really meant that they ought not to be so united for the purposes of a 
manageable treatise. So viewed, Wigmore's argument is not at all inconsistent with the present 
thesis. Whatever the best way to organize a treatise, we must resist identifying the best evidence 
principle with any particular remedial device, such as the exclusionary sanction used under the 
original document rule. 
241. 4 Id. § 1171, at 297-98. Elsewhere, he described this purpose or function of the 
auxiliary rules as "based on the desire to secure the highest probative efficiency for the 
evidence and to eliminate disturbing evidential facts." 6 id. § 1906, at 576. 
242. See 6 id. §§ 1904-1913 (involving primarily cross references to discussion in the part on 
"Relevancy," mentioned supra note 238). 
243. Interestingly, Wigmore offered a suggested "summary of principles of evidence-
admissibility for judges trying without a jury." See Wigmore, jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in the 
Next Century, in 1 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 347, 350 (1937). He also 
published, of course, a "pocket code" of evidence, intended to rationalize the usual rules for 
jury trials. See WIGMORE's CooE OF THE RuLES OF EviDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW§ 9 (3d ed. 1942). A 
perusal of these two documents shows no difference in the fundamental principles behind, or 
the basic outline of, the admissibility rules to be employed in the different contexts. The major 
difference is the degree of detail, the former being much more concise, suggesting at most a 
greater need of flexibility for bench trials in the employment of the same basic principles of 
admissibility. Even this difference is minimized by Wigmore's suggestion, added in the preface 
to the third edition of his code, that the relatively detailed rules given therein are made 
"directory, not mandatory-by forbidding the review of the Trial Court's application of them 
except in extreme instances." See id. at xii. 
244. See 1]. WIGMORE, supra note 107, §§ 4-4m, 8c, 28. 
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of evidence" is "his view of the relationship between the exclusionary rules 
of evidence and the institution of trial by jury," the other being Wigmore's 
"view of the nature of proof and inferential processes and of the relation-
ship of those matters to the exclusionary rules."215 The tension between 
these two perspectives can now be seen as arising from Wigmore's inability 
to free himself from Thayer's influence. The following section addresses 
this preoccupation with the role of the lay jury. 
B. j·uridical .l? ..oles, Jury Distrust, and Best Evidence .l:::.uies 
The nineteenth century witnessed the fruition of a long trend toward 
separating questions of law from questions of fact and assigning these issues 
to the judge and jury, respectively. 216 As this occurred, the judiciary 
developed means of preventing juries -from overreaching their supposed 
domain by ignoring the law as given to them by the trial judges. The devices 
employed by the judges in the resulting jurisdictional struggle included the 
granting of new trials or directed verdicts and the use of special verdicts and 
interrogatories to the jury.24 7 There was and continues to be a tendency to 
expand the use of these devices, allowing the judge to invade the nominal 
province of the jury by nullifying or preempting the jury's genuinely factual 
findings. 248 Thayer, whose views were largely endorsed by Wigmore and 
thereby widely disseminated,219 was thoroughly aware of these trends; 
indeed, he \Vas an integral participant in then1.2so An1id a professional, elite 
attitude of the times, increasingly hostile to the institution of the lay jury as 
a whole, it is understandable that the evolving admissibility rules would be 
seen as generally representing distrust of the jury's competence.251 
245. 1 ]. WIGMORE, supra note 28, at xii (reviser's preface); id. § 4, at 25 n.l. One may 
plausibly argue that the latter perspective provided the starting point for Wigmore's most 
interesting and creative work,]. WIGMORE, THE SciENCE oF juDICIAL PRooF (3d ed. 1937). See 
generally Tillers & Schum, Charting New Territory in judicial Proof' Beyond Wigmore, 9 CARDozo L. 
REv. 907 (1987). 
246. See j. FmEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 53, § 11.2. The process was made 
possible by changes in pleading practices and is thought to have been necessitated by factors 
such as the increasing complexity of legal rules, to which lay jurors could not be assumed to 
have direct access. See Arnold, Law and Fact in the JHedieval jury Trial: Oul of Sight, Out of Mind, 
18 A~t.J. LEGAL HisT. 267,277-80 (1974). It posed serious constitutional issues about the right 
to a jury trial, issues that remain with us even today, especially in criminal trials. See generally 
Scheflin & Van Dyke, jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAw & CoN1u1r. PRrms., 
Autumn 1980, at 51. 
247. See, e.g., W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION oF THE Com.IoN LAw 165-74 (!975); Note, The 
Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 184-85 (!964). See generally 
F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, § 7.4 (historical methods of controlling the jury). 
248. Again, constitutional issues concerning the right to a jury trial have been implicated. 
See generally johnston,]wy Subornation throughjudica.l Control, LAw Sc CoNTEMI'. Pnous., Autumn 
1980, at 24; Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1982). 
249. See Morgan & Maguire, Loolling Bacllward and Foreward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 
909, 909 (1937). 
250. See]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 183-262; see also id. at 534-35 (suggesting reduction in 
use of juries because they are "potent cause of demoralization to the bar" notwithstanding 
"that the old conceptions of the jury's incapacity, and of the need of so much exclusion, were 
overstrained, and that they are largely inapplicable to modern juries"). 
251. Cf F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, §§ 7.4, 7.12 (discussing exclusionary rules as 
one of many preverdict devices for controlling jury). The notion of "incompetency" involved 
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In the 1 930s, Edmund Morgan strongly criticized this Thayerite view 
of the admissibility rules: 
Among the factors which will most powerfully influence the 
character and content of these rules one would expect to find not 
only the competence or lack of competence of the tribunal upon 
which is imposed the task of resolving the dispute, but also the 
means by which and the extent to which sources of information 
are made available to it. Since the adversary feature of our system 
is quite as distinctive as is its use of a jury, it may be well not to 
accept without scrutiny the oft-repeated statement that the jury is 
responsible for the origin and persistence of our law of 
evidence.252 
Morgan proceeded to examine several important evidentiary rules and to 
argue that each is based upon considerations other than the nature of the 
lay jury.253 He concluded that "[o]ur exclusionary rules of evidence are the 
resultant of several factors .... But the dictum of the great Thayer that the 
English law of evidence is 'the child of the jury' is, it is suggested with the 
greatest deference, not more than a half-truth."254 
Unfortunately, Morgan's arguments have not taken a firm hold.255 
Jury distrust remains the principal vehicle-perhaps "metaphor" is more 
appropriate-for understanding and interpreting nonprivilege admissibil-
ity rules today.256 Thus, for example, much contemporary argument 
here hovers ambiguously between unruly and unintelligent. Our profession's attitude toward 
the intelligence and capacity of the jury qua fact finder has varied considerably over the last 
two hundred years, but the low point in professional confidence probably occurred around the 
turn of the century, whereas modern attitudes are generally more sanguine: 
Certainly_there can be little question that modern jurors are better educated and 
have a broader experience than jurors of the middle nineteenth century. Jurors at 
that time were largely illiterate and ignorant of any matters beyond their day to day 
existence. Nowadays, not only can virtually all jurors read, but most have a high 
school education and all of them will have been exposed through the mass media to 
an incredible range of information about the world in which they live. It would be 
both presumptuous and negligent for a law reform commission today to tolerate rules 
of evidence that were formulated to protect "rude and illiterate" jurors. 
Brooks, The Law Reform Commission of Canada's Evidence Code, 16 OscoonE HALL L.J. 241, 252 
(1978) (citations omitted). Probably the most critical voices have been those of the commercial 
interests, fearing unpredictable or redistributive verdicts. See generally Arnold, A Historical 
Inquiry into the Right to Trial by jury ir> Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1 980); 
Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex C('-;es and jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. 
L. REV. 965 (1980). 
252. Morgan, supra note llO, at 248. 
253. He examined witness incompetency rules based upon mental deficiency, interest, 
marital relationship. infamy, or the absence of an oath; rules of privileged information and 
communications; the original document rule; the attesting witness rule; the opinion rule; the 
hearsay rule; the rule excluding evidence of minimal relevance for waste of time; and the rule 
forbidding the impeachment of one's own witness. See id. at 248-58. 
254. /d. at 258 (footnotes omitted). 
255. His view did receive some support. See, e.g., Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA 
L. REv. 213, 215-18 (1942). 
256. See, e.g., Nokes, The English jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TuL. L. REv. 153,'161-70 
(1956); Strahorn, Extra-Legal Materials and the Law of Evidence, 29 ILL. L. REv. 300, 301- 02 
(1934). Some modern texts recognize the adversary system as the other principal feature 
behind our law of evidence, excluding privilege rules. See R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. 
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follows Wigmore in advocating a significant relaxation, if not wholesale 
abandonment, of the "technical" rules of evidence in bench trials, admin-
istrative adjudications, and other nonjury hearings.257 Conversely, some 
commentary suggests that the absence of any good reason to doubt the 
fact-finding competency of the modern lay jury removes the principal 
obstade to the wholesale elimination of exclusionary rules even in jury 
trials. 258 .· 
Yet, cogently. expressed doubts continue to surface. Consider the 
following comment on the now orthodox espousal of liberal admissibility 
rules in nonjuryproceedings: 
The ironic twist in this entire affair is that careful examination 
shows that exclusionary rules of evidence are applied with sur-
prising frequency in various type:s of nonjury proceedings. [This] 
is a puzzling and intriguing phenomenon. What purposes do the 
rules serve in nonjury proceedings? What does the answer to this 
question tell us about the function of rules of evidence in jury 
trials? ... Are the rules of evidence important because of the air 
of formality they may lend? Does the tendency to ttse rules of 
evidence depend on the gravity and solemnity of the proceeding 
rather than on the use of trial by jury? Do we value the rules of 
evidence because they promote regularity rather than because 
they promote accuracy? To what extent do we use the rules of 
evidence because of an unthinking faith in legalism or because of 
self-serving motives rather than because of any conviction that the 
rules serve more general and worthwhile purposes? To what 
extent do we value the rules of evidence because they give us the 
appearance if not the substance of objective, scientific, and 
impartial decisionmaking ?259 
KIONKA,supra note 123, at 13-17; R. CRoss, supra note 123, § 1; G. LILLY, supra note 221, § 1.3. 
However, there is much less of a conscious attempt to apply this general observation to 
explaining and interpreting particular admissibility rules than there is for the jury distrust 
model. The implications of the adversary system seem to be thought to lie predominantly in 
the reluctance of the trial judge to call and interrogate witnesses, the need for rules to structure 
the presentation of evidence, and the need for rules to control the form and intensity of 
witness interrogation. 
257. See generally]. WEINSTEIN,]. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, supra note 82, at 
1207-19; 1]. WIGMORE, supra note 28, §§ 4-4m. Professor Tillers notes: 
A considerable amount of [the] discussion of rules of evidence in nonjury trials is 
the byproduct of reflections on the place of the law of evidence in administrative 
proceedings. Hence, there has been an understandable tendency to assume that the 
same considerations _apply with respect to the problem of the use of rules of evidence 
in both administrative proceedings and in bench trials. This view rests on the 
assumption that all the differences between administrative proceedings and bench 
trials ... are immaterial. 
!d. § 4d.1, at 212 n.1 (citations omitted). 
258. See, e.g., Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REsERVE L. REv. 154, 171- 75 
(1 958) (arguing for dramatic simplification of jury and bench trial rules based upon most 
liberal standard used in administrative proceedings). See also Note, The Theoretical Foundation 
of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786 (1 980) (jury not sufficiently incompetent as to justify 
hearsay prohibiton). 
259. 1]. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 4, at 26 n.1; see also id. § 4d.1 (rules applicable in bench 
trials). On the law of the Commonwealt!·. countries, see generally Campbell, Principles of 
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in this Article, we have seen that educating, and if necessary disciplining, 
the parties in their presentation of evidence is a concern that can provide at 
least a significant part of the answer to these queries, explaining . the 
presence of exclusionary rules in non jury proceedings that are nonetheless 
adversarial.260 This answer renders largely .unnecessary, though it is not 
inconsistent with, the psychological or socio-economic explanations that 
some of those queries suggest.26I 
A brief consideration of two basic rules illustrates the superiority of the 
best evidence rationale over the jury distrust rationale. Consider first. the 
requirement of an oath as a condition precedent to testimony. It is widely 
agreed that the function of the oath is to impress upon the witness the 
importance of the occasion, to remind witnesses of their duty to the tribunal 
to testify honestly, and to place the witness within the scope of the perjury 
laws.262 Now, one may quarrel with whether these functions are well served, 
but the oath surely is intended to create conditions ensuring more reliable 
testimony. Does one need to go further and posit the "real" goal of avoiding 
misleading the lay jury? Surely not, for a judge sitting without a jury is just 
as interested in reliable testimony, and there is no reason to assume that an 
unsworn witness could more easily mislead a lay jury than a judge.263 If 
anything, the jury is more likely to be misled by swam testimony because of 
erroneous beliefs that perjury is regularly detected and prosecuted.264 
Evidence and Administ:rative Tribunals, in WELL AND TRULY TRIED 36-87 (1982). 
260. In European law, considered relatively inquisitorial, lay juries are sometimes used, 
particularly in criminal cases. Nevertheless, those Anglo-American admissibility rules that are 
used in Continental trials seem to be employed to the same extent whether before jurors or 
not. See generally G. Gws, CoMPARATIVE LAw 15-16, 22-23 (1979); id. passim (various sections 
addressing specific countries);]. MERRYMAN, supra note 24, at 138-39. This suggests that, as 
between the two systems, the differences in use of admissibility rules relate to the differences 
in the respective roles of the judge and parties rather than to the differences in the use of lay 
juries. Yet, some comparativists accept uncritically the jury distrust rationale for Anglo-
American evidence law. See, e.g., id. at 134. 
261. Consider, for example, the comments of an experienced labor arbitrator: 
The exclusionary rules of evidence permit an arbitrator to use his discretion in 
refusing evidence which is unreliable and therefore not helpful to him in deciding the 
case. This is the best reason for rejecting the evidence, but a beneficial consequence 
is that the hearing is shortened and more attention can be given ·to competent 
evidence .... Other exclusionary rules have utility in putting constraint on the parties 
to offer reliable (competent) evidence and to forego time-consuming forays which 
add little to the case. Familiarity with the exceptions to the hearsay rule is of great 
advantage, since they have attributes which make the evidence reliable. 
Larson, Labor Arbit:ration: The Utility of Rules of Evidence, in EssAYS IN THE LAw oF EviDENCE 22, 31 
(1974). Professor Tillers generalizes the point, noting the function of "preferential rules that 
force the parties to look for and produce more reliable evidence-a matter of no small concern 
when the finding and presentation of evidence is largely left in the hands of the parties rather 
than those of the court." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 4d.1, at 229-30. 
262. See 6]. WIGMORE, EviDENCE,§ 1816 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); see also Fw. R. Evm. 603; M. 
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 603.1; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLES oF EviDENCE MANUAL 
437-39 (4th ed. 1986). 
263. "In so far as the oath or its equivalent is a prerequisite to admissibility of testimony, 
neither its history nor its employment in modern litigation furnishes any basis for any 
reasonable contention that it is imposed for the peculiar benefit of the jury." Morgan, supra 
note 110, at 253-54. Testimony of witnesses in important nonjury proceedings, including 
legislative hearings, commonly is required to be given under oath. 
264. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 263, § 1831, at 433 n.l. 
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Should a witness refuse to take the oath despite all appropriate pressures, 
we can either allow the testimony without the oath or exclude the testimony 
entirely. What plausible calculus of jury behavior leads to the conclusion 
that the jury would be less "misled" without otherwise admissible testimony 
than with such testimony unsworn?265 
The requirement that a witness submit to cross-examination provides 
a second example. It is generally agreed that the opportunity for cross-
examination is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of 
testimony. 266 If a witness refuses to answer questions on cross-examination, 
established principles of evidence law indicate a number of factors relevant 
to deciding whether to strike the direct testimony. 267 What is remarkable 
about these factors is their compatibility with the best evidence analysis and 
their relative incongruence to any concern about misleading the jury. For 
example, intervening siclr ...... 11ess or death Of the \Vitness may be considered as 
a factor that allows the uncross-examined testimony to stand. Such consid-
erations look to degrees of fault and excuses for noncompliance on the part 
of witnesses, and to the incentives created for them in the absence of some 
sanction, more so than to any calculation of jury reaction. Indeed, such 
calculations would present unfathomable empirical problems for the trial 
judge. 
Of course, the litigants' responsibility with regard to witnesses not 
within their control can at most require the presentation of the witness and 
encouragement of the witness to take the oath and to submit to cross-
examination. Absent collusion, the litigant surely is not responsible for the 
witness' refusals beyond that, and in fact exclusion of testimony is less likely 
under existing law for a "neutral" witness who refuses these testimonial 
securities.268 Again, this kind of consideration is hard to reconcile with a 
jury distrust theory. One would assume that, if anything, the jury would be 
more suspicious of, and therefore less likely to be misled by, a witness who 
has an easily demonstrable connection to one of the parties and who refuses 
to take the oath or to answer questions on cross-examination. 
The oath and cross-examination requirements are important because 
it is widely accepted that they underpin the hearsay rule. 269 Nothing in the 
265. Such a conclusion is particularly hard to reconcile with the long-standing British 
Commonwealth practice that allows a criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement in his 
own behalf. See Z. CowEN & P. CARTER, EssAYS IN THE Lnv oF EvmENCE 210 (1957). Due to 
complications in the administration of that practice, it was eliminated in England as 
unnecessary. See Criminal Tustice Act of 1982, ch.48, § 72. 
266. Sec; e.g., 5 J WIGM;RE, EViDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
267. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 19. 
268. See id § 19. Even a neutral witness has some obligation to the tribunal, which explains 
the general exclusionary rule. 
269. The other principal factor supporting the hearsay rule is the epistemic superiority of 
direct observation of the speaker's demeanor. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 245. It is worth 
observing that, between the second and fourth centuries A.D., there developed a "free system 
of proof' in Roman law, including "the origins of the modern law of evidence" in both civil-
and common-law jurisdictions. See Honore, The Primacy of Oral Evidence?, in CruME, PROOF, AND 
PuNISHMENT: EssAYS IN MEMORY OF Sm RuPERT CRoss 172, 174 (1981). That system included 
the general principle that a judge might insist on the better form of evidence being 
produced if it was available. Thus the emperor Hadrian, who was particularly 
interested in questions of evidence, replies to one of his provincial governors that he 
BEST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE 283 
resulting explanation of that rule indicates jury distrust as a principal 
concern.270 Moreover, a close relationship between that rule and the best 
evidence principle does not preclude, and is not falsified by, apparently 
inconsistent convolutions of hearsay. doctrine.27I Indeed, the lack of a 
perfect fit between the hearsay rule and the best evidence principle has 
been a source of much critical commentary.272 
declines to allow a prosecutor to adduce written depositions before him instead of 
oral testimmony [sic]. He therefore remits the case to the provincial governor in order 
that the latter should hear the witnesses, who are resident in his province, and form 
a conclusion as to their credibility. The emperor gives as his reason that he prefers to 
question witnesses personally .. 
/d. at 178 (footnote omitted). There continue to be occasional judicial references to the 
fundamental relationship between the hearsay rule and the best evidence principle. See, e.g., 
Padgett v. Brezner, 359 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). 
270. As Professor Morgan concluded: 
It is, therefore, suggested that had the Normans abolished the Anglo-Saxon forms of 
trial and replaced them with trial by any body of skilled triers, such as judges or other 
expert investigators, and had the parties succeeded, by the process of securing and 
enlarging the privilege of submitting evidence, in changing the trial from an 
investigative to an adversary proceeding, a rule forbidding the reception of hearsay 
would have developed .... It may be true that non-jury systems have not created a 
hearsay rule; but that has no compelling significance so long as they have not adopted 
an adversary theory of litigation. 
Morgan, supra note 110, at 254-55; see also Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WAsH: L. REv. 1, l-4 
(1937). 
271. Potential "defects" can arise because the hearsay exclusion is applied mechanically in 
an unusual context to avoid complicating the rule with yet more formal exceptions. See Moffat, 
judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Morality and Law in Interaction, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 
297, 300 (1985) (using important British decision on hearsay rule, excluding apparently 
epistemically best available evidence, as springboard for reconsideration of jurisprudential 
tension between flexibility and predictability). Similarly, the precise scope of a hearsay 
exception may have been affected by second-order concerns about misleading a jury. See 
Morgan, supra note llO, at 252-56. The relationship of the evolved doctrines to the best 
evidence principle is well summarized by an authority who, ironically enough, has endorsed 
Thayer's views: 
[T]he great characteristic feature of the common law of evidence, is the group of 
rules requiring that testimony be limited to statements in court of witnesses who 
observed the facts first hand, and are produced for cross-examination. This demand 
for the best, reduced to a rule, voices a high ideal, but manifestly one that in the 
every-day world must constantly be compromised. First-hand observers die and move 
away; their letters and declarations must be accepted as second-best. When will the 
second-best be good enough? It now seems strange that the courts should have 
attempted to answer this by defining in sharp categories the special situations when 
the secondary proof would be allowed. But the urge for certainty prevailed, and the 
particular situations where the second-hand evidence seemed most needed in the first 
half of the-eighteen hundreds, as for example, dying declarations and book-entries, 
were crystallized into exceptions to the hearsay rule. These now number from ten to 
twenty, depending on the minuteness of the classification. Of course,. they were 
improvisations intended to be played by ear, but they fail of that purpose because the 
classes are grown so many and the boundaries so meandering that no one can carry 
any large part of this hearsay-exception-learning in his head. Moreover, the values of 
hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them, in particular situations 
cannot with any degree of realism be thus minutely ticketed in advance. 
McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.]. 507, 512 (1938); see also E. MoRGAN, SoME 
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER TilE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 106-17 (1956). 
272. See, e.g., 1 ]. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 8c. "What the hearsay rule implies-with 
profound verity-is that all testimonial assertions ought to be tested by cross-examination, as 
the best attainable measure, and the rule should not be burdened with the pedantic 
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The examples of the oath and cross-examination rules are also 
important because they illustrate the best evidence principle in each of its 
more controversial aspects. The cross-examination requirement contem-
plates the elicitation of testimony by all parties rather than by the propo-
nent of the witness alone. The requirement is thus an expansionary rule 
because it expresses a preference for a larger set of evidence without 
excluding the smaller, except by way of sanction.273 The oath requirement, 
on the other hand, contemplates the presentation of only sworn testimony; 
obviously, presentation of both sworn and unsworn testimony; unlike 
presentation of both direct and cross-examination, would be a waste oftime 
and energy. That requirement thus exemplifies the substitutionary aspect of 
the best evidence principle.274 
It should now be clear enough w.hat "expansionary" and "substitu-
tionary" mean, and it may be appropriate to mention, without much 
elaboration, some further rules and doctrines that reflect these aspects of 
the general principle. The first, and most obvious, is the common-law rule 
that Wigmore aptly called the rule of "Verbal Completeness."275 Its central 
purpose is to correct distortions created by presenting only part of a verbal 
transaction or series of related transactions rather than the whole. 276 It 
implication that assertions must be rejected as worthless if the test is unavailable." Jd. at 644; 
see also E. MoRGAN, supra note 272, at 117-95. Such commentary does not always suggest 
liberalizing admissibility under the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Stewart, Perception, Memory, and 
Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 
1 (arguing that various exceptions should be additionally conditioned upon showing unavail-
ability of hearsay declarant). An important recent contribution along these lines is Swift, A 
Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1339 (1987). 
273. Professor Morgan emphasized that cross-examination is a party opponent's and trial 
judge's right, not duty, with the result that testimony which is not cross-examined is sometimes 
presented to a jury. See Morgan, supra note 110, at 254. This reflects an obvious efficiency 
concern: unnecessary cross,examinationwastes time and energy. 
274. Because the hearsay rule is built upon both expansionary and substitutionary rules, its 
status in this regard becomes somewhat complicated. The difficulty is multiplied by the 
enormous variety of evidentiary items that are included within the usual definitions of hearsay. 
See Loevinger, supra note 259, at 165. Roughly speaking, the general prohibition combined 
with those exceptions that do not depend upon the unavailability of the hearsay declarant 
define when hearsay evidence is considered secondary, while those exceptions that are 
conditioned upon unavailability of the declarant mark out subcategories of the remainder, in 
which the use of secondary evidence is excused. The net pattern is essentially substitutionary. 
But see supra notes 226, 228 and accompanying text. Of course, a significant subclass of hearsay 
statements, the unsubstantiated and untestable rumor variety, is rightly subject to exclusion as 
simply a waste of judicial resources; the rule is redundantly contractionary as to such 
statements. Compare the following: 
The real reasons for the Hearsay Rule seem to be: (a) it forces the parties to produce 
better (first-hand) evidence; (b) it gives the court a handy tool for excising time-
consuming, but usually relatively useless, testimony; (c) it prevents errant [i.e. 
unconscientious] juries from basing an essential finding upon the slender read of 
hearsay evidence; and-one must admit-(d) it is, with its sixteen exceptions (more or 
less), a technicality in which the trial lawyer has an intellectual investment and a 
valuably exclusive expertise. 
Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EviDENCE A:-:o hFERENCE 56 (D. Lerner 
ed. 1959). 
275. 7 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE §§ 2094- 2125 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). The term "verbal" 
embraces both oral and written communication. See id. § 2094, at 595 n.l. 
276, See id. § 2094. Wigmore distinguished two types of incompleteness: that arising from 
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expresses a preference for the larger set of evidence consisting of so much 
of the whole as is necessary for the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, to 
understand the significance of the part initially presented. Under the rule, 
the opponent may present· that larger set, notwithstanding most otherwise 
applicable exclusionary rules, and in certain cases, the court may require 
the initial proponent to present the larger set as a condition of admitting 
the smaller.277 This is a best evidence rule of great potential power. 
A second illustration, more commonly used but less obviously related 
to the best evidence principle, is the doctrine going under the misleading 
name of "conditional relevance."278 The requirement that witnesses speak 
from personal knowledge and the authentication requirement for real 
evidence are said to reflect this doctrine. 279 Critics have argued convinc-
ingly that the idea. of "conditional" relevance, at least in the kinds of 
situations usually discussed, confuses the issues of admissibility and suffi-
ciency of evidence.280 It is submitted that the expansionary aspect of the 
best evidence principle provides the key to understanding and identifying 
most of the intelligible instantiations of this otherwise dubious doctrine.2Bl 
imprecision of an oral recounting and that arising from a lack of the entirety of the written or oral 
parts of the original transaction. See id. at 597. We are here concerned with the latter type. The 
former, concerning whether a witness may testify to the gist of an out-of-court verbal event, 
rather than to its exact words, presents a problem of the substitutionary effect of the best 
evidence principle, which has now merged comfortably with the opinion rules. See id. §§ 
2097-2098. 
277. See id. § 2095. Cases .involving only rebuttal evidence reflect the expansionary 
component of the rule of completeness. Cases of conditionally compelled presentation by the 
original proponent reflect an additional substitutionary component. Rule 106 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence speaks only to the latter cases, which has led some courts to suggest that 
invocation of the completeness doctrine under the federal rules cannot override other 
admissibility rules, its effect being limited to changing the timing of presentation of evidence. 
SeeM. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 106.1. The better view, however, is to the contrary. See United 
States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 1 D. LouisELL & C. MuELLER, supra 
note 3, § 49; McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 56. It has frequently been observed that the earliest 
!mown cases more or less explicitly invoking the best evidence principle admitted evidence that 
then prevailing rules would otherwise have excluded. See, e.g.,]. THAYER, supra note 103, at 
489-92. The rule of verbal completeness is one of the few formalizations of this inclusionary 
authority. · 
278. For a lucid, though conventional, discussion of conditional relevance, see G. LILLY, 
supra note 221, § 2.6. 
279. See R. CARLSON, E. lMwiNKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 123, at 161-73 (grouping 
authentication and personal knowledge doctrines together, under rubric of "underlying 
logical relevance," and expressing their now conventionally accepted relation to general 
doctrine of "conditional relevance"). 
280. See Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435 (1980) (arguing that facts 
supposedly conditioning relevance of certain evidence should be viewed as affecting rather the 
weight of the evidence); see also 1]. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 14.1. 
281. Without going into great detail, the sense in which this is so can be gleaned from Lee 
Loevinger's perceptive comment thirty years ago: 
A ... practical consequence of the rules of evidence that is seldom noted is their 
effect in forcing the production of evidence that might not otherwise be secured. The 
rules themselves are cast almost wholly in terms of the exclusion of evidence, but as 
every experienced trial lawyer and judge knows, the practical effect of the rules often 
is simply to require that certain "foundation" material be made available to the court 
or opposing counsel. 
Loevinger, supra note 259, at 173. 
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As for substitutionary best evidence rules, besides those already 
discussed, the rule excluding lay opinion testimony is probably the most 
obvious.282 Its "excusable preference" structure, encouraging to the extent 
possible testimony as to the most elemental observations of the witness, is 
well known. 283 Less conspicuous, but no less important, is the rule allowing 
for the sequestration of witnesses.284 Sequestration is intended to substitute 
fresh testimony for that which may be influenced by exposure to the 
testimony of other witnesses.285 Again, whatever advantages accrue from 
these rules are essentially the same in jury and bench trials. 286 
In general, there is strong reason to doubt that the risk of misleading 
the jury provides a satisfactory account of any exclusionary rule under 
which the presentation of challenged evidence may be excused on some 
argument of practical necessity. This is so because the risk of misleading the 
jury by presenting that evidence, in and of itself, is the same '\vhether its 
presentation is excusable or not. Only when alternative superior evidence is 
available does the risk of being misled become both real and remediable. 
One must be careful, then, for the phrase "misleading the jury" conceals an 
important ambiguity. When used to characterize the effects of admitting 
secondary evidence, it can refer to nothing more than the obvious point 
that epistemicallv better evidence enables the trier of fact to make more 
accur;te determinations. This sense of the capacity to mislead applies as 
easily to the judge as to a jury and is a sense entirely consistent with-
indeed, it is at the core of-the present thesis.287 
However, there is another sense of the phrase that is often mixed 
together with the first: that secondary evidence is peculiarly misleading by 
virtue of the lay membership of the jury.2ss It is this latter sense that 
282. Consider the comment of Charles A. Wright that "rules which were spawned, in whole 
or in part by the jury system, such as the hearsay rule, the 'best evidence' rule, the rule against 
opinions, and the like have no logical place in a court trial." Wright, A PrimeT of Practical 
Evidence, 40 MINN. L. REv. 635, 667 (1956). Contrast the more insightful grouping of these 
three rules under the rubric of "preferential" rules-rules that exclude relevant evidence 
because of doubts about its trustworthiness, except when practically necessary to do otherwise. 
This approach is strongly reminiscent of the classical best evidence view. See R. CARLSON, E. 
IMWINKELRIED & E. KioNKA, supra note 123, at 419-20. The latter authors nevertheless display 
considerable ambivalence about the relation of these rules to concerns about misleading the lay 
jury. See id. at 38-39. 
283. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § ll, at 28-29; Comment, The Opinion Rule as a Rule of 
Preference: Application to Extrajudicial Declarations, 42 Mo. L. REv. 409, 412-14 (1977). 
284. See Fw. R. Evm. 615; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 263, §§ 1837, 1839-1841. 
285. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 263, § 1838. 
286. For example, with regard to decisions on sanctions for the violation of a sequestration 
order, the importance .of the degree of fault involved as well as the availability of remedies 
other than exclusion of the testimony of the implicated witness indicate the compatibility of 
such a rule with the best evidence principle and the relative insignificance of concerns that the 
admission of tainted evidence will mislead a gullible jury when it would not mislead an 
experienced judge. See id. § 1842; M. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 615.1. 
287. Accordingly, "misleading the jury" should be interpreted to mean "misleading of the 
trier of fact," whether judge or jury, when that language appears in general discretionary 
exclusion provisions like rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Dolan, Rule 403: The 
Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CALIF. L. REv. 220, 221 n.1, 281 (1976). 
288. A fairly typical example of this easy conflation is the following: "All these doctrines-
authentication, best evidence, and hearsay-are calculated to enhance the reliability of the 
evidence ultimately presented to the jury. The doctrines insist upon additional evidence of 
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presents such difficult problems of judicial estimation by shifting the focus 
from litigant conduct to empirical predictions of jury behavior under 
alternative evidentiary sets. The jury distrust theory must rely on this sense 
in accounting for our existing practices. The first sense, however, is the 
more workable, for it requires only that judges put themselves in the 
position of the jury, ask what they, as rational fact-finders, would want to 
see as evidence, and weigh that against what they know, with information 
supplied by the litigants, about the feasibility of getting it. Moreover, this 
approach is far more respectful of those citizens who spend their time and 
energy as jurors. It does not reflect an objectification of the lay juror as part 
of "them," not "us," as .a person largely driven by ignorance and irrational 
impulses.289 
Of course, it is not claimed that no rules of evidence are based to a 
significant degree upon the institution of the lay jury, but one must be 
careful about what it is that properly causes concern. For the most part, the 
special competence that the word "lay" excludes is an appreciation of the 
workings of the legal system, not a superior acumen in fact-finding 
generally.290 It makes good sense to say that, for those types of evidence 
about which reasonable inferences depend upon an understanding of the 
functioning of the legal system itself; the lay jury rationale may have a role. 
trustworthiness to compensate for the jurors' supposedly uncritical judgment." R. CARLSoN, E. 
lMWJNKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 123, at 8. Laudably, the authors go on to question lawyers' 
suppositions about juror incompetence. See id. at 8-12. They do not, however, pause to 
consider the importance of reliability-enhancing rules that do not depend on these supposi-
tions. 
289. Such objectification denies pro tanto jurors' membership in civil society by treating them 
as means only, that is, as the positivist's instrument for truth fmding rather than as constituent 
parts of the realm of ends. See generally I. KANT, GRoUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRALS (H. 
Paton trans. 1964) (1785). There have long been warnings that one should perceive the system 
from 
the more intelligent view, that it is not merely a piece of machinery for truth-seeking, 
but one subsidiary to the distribution of justice, worked through the agency of an 
untrained tribunal, and shaped to the uses of that tribunal by judges who were often 
very distrustful of its capacity and fairness. 
J. THAYER, LEGAL EssAYs 265 (1908). Sensitivity to this distinction seems very difficult to 
preserve. 
290. Even Wigmore conceded that 
the judge himself is not a specialist in the science of proof. The substantive law, and 
the law of procedure, form the main part of his equipment. And, under our system 
of frequent judicial change, the judge rarely has an opportunity to become a specialist 
in the valuing of evidence. 
j. WIGMORE, A STUDENT's TEXTBOOK oF THE LAw oF EviDENCE 12 (1935). The results of the Chicago 
jury project suggest that juries are, perhaps surprisingly, good fact-finders. See H. KALVEN & H. 
ZEISEL, THE AMEIUCAN juRY 494-95 (1966). Subsequent studies tend to confirm this suggestion. 
See generally R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE juRY (1983). Nothing in these 
studies suggests that the single fact fmder, even ah experienced judge, performs this task 
significantly better than a jury. The point, however, is not that juries are better fact-finders, 
and certainly not that juries are employed because they are superior fact-finders, but rather 
that, whatever the reasons to use lay juries, the rules of admissibility are only minimally related 
to either those reasons or the resulting use. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 25, 
at 169-77 (jury trial serves democratic functions that conflict at times with goal of formal 
adjudication based upon accurate fact-finding). 
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Here, the law may need to balance the probative value of the evidence 
against the consumption of time and resources required, if in fact available, 
adequately to educate the jury on the subject and, if that educating process 
is not undertaken, against the evidential distortion created for the jtiry.291 
Prior crimes evidence probably f~s here.292 Similar concerns are also a 
likely reason for the rules excluding evidence of compromise offers and 
withdrawn pleas.293 
In some contexts, t:liis proper j.Ise of the notion of misleading the lay 
jury may provide additional support· for rules based primarily upon the 
reasonable availability of better evidence. Provided that the jury is assigned 
the task of discounting the probative value of the allegedly secondary 
evidence, provided that this discounting, to be accurate, requires a practical 
knowledge of the conditions of modern litigation, and provided that this 
:knowledge cannot be conveyed to the jury in a cost-effective manner, there 
is an additional reason to exclude the secondary evidence.294 Not only may 
291. Compare the following comment: 
In a sense, time-consumptiOn is the fundamental reason to exclude relevant evidence. 
It might be thought, for example, that "estimation" problems ... could be solved by 
supplying the jury with supplementary information or expert instruction in how to 
handle certain types of information which are prone to be misunderstood. Similarly, 
one could try to counter evidence condemned as prejudicial for the reason [that it 
affects the juror's regret matrix with regard to the utilities of different possible 
decisions] by educating jurors more extensively in the meaning of the burden of 
persuasion. Even if such strategies always· had the desired effects, however, the 
probative value of the evidence rarely would justify the time and effort that would be 
consumed. 
McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 185, at 546 n.34 (citations omitted). 
292. The rule prohibits using evidence of the defendant's prior crimes or other "bad acts" 
simply to.suggest a propensity of the defendant to commit criminal acts. See McCoRMICK, supra 
note 3, § I 90. There are a number of grounds for such a rule, not the least of which is the fact 
that general recidivism rates are misleading in evalu_ating the significance of the criminal 
history of a defendant who goes all the way through the legal process to trial, see R. LEMPERT 
& S. SALTZBURG, supra note 221, at 215~20. The Chicago jury project empirically demonstrated 
the importance that juries attach to a criminal record. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEJSEL, supra note 
291, at 149-62. On the other hand, that study also indicate-d the similar importance that a 
criminal record had on the decisions of judges, which may indicate that, rather than the lay 
jury institution necessitating the exclusionary rule, the independently desirable exclusionary 
rule necessitates a separate fact finder, whether lay or expert, whom we can shield from the 
prejudicial evidence. See id. at 121-33. 
293. See generally R. LEMPERT & S. SAI.TZBURG, supra note 221, at 196-202; McCoRMICK, supra 
note 3, § 274. 
294. The first mentioned proviso raises an important point concerning a third possible 
sense of the capacity to mislead, one that depends upon the existence of a separate trier of fact, 
but not upon the trier consisting of a group of lay persons. To the extent that a bifurcation of 
decision-making responsibility results in the jury being instructed that their duty does not 
include the consideration of the significance of missing evidence, then the jJ.lry's very attempt 
to perform its function conscientiously can result in its· erroneous failure to discount evidence 
that is presented. Consider, for example, what a conscientious and reasdnable juror might 
think upon being given the instruction quoted supra note 222. Cf Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of 
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 
lOll (1978) (considering reverse problem of jury discounting for failure to produce evidence 
when party, unbeknownst to jury, has tried un;successfully to get evidence admitted). The 
present problem is most serious if trial judges fail to compensate by reinforcing the best 
evidence principle pursuant to their duty. Of course, the jury should at least be given 
unambiguous instructions about the consideration to be given to possibly missing evidence. 
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an exclusion encourage the presentation of primary evidence, it may also 
avoid misleading a legally inexperienced trier of facL Yet these provisions 
are not easily satisfied.295 Again, it is difficult to ground exclusion on the 
latter consideration when no better evidence is reasonably available, since 
one must be able to conclude that the jury will be better informed without 
the evidence in question than with it, ceteris paribus. 296 
Now despite the "best evidence" foundation of many admissibility 
rules, extant doctrines sometimes conflict with reasonable instincts 
grounded in the best evidence principle. The result can be the invocation of 
constitutionallaw.297 Moreover, the best evidence principle also appears 
This requires clarification of the respective roles of judge and jury in administering the best 
evidence principle. Primary responsibility, after the litigants, for administering the best 
evidence principle ought to reside with the trial judge. Certainly we should not distract the 
jury, who must determine historical fact, with collateral administrative rulings aimed at 
encouraging litigants, in the long run of cases, to present the best reasonably available 
evidence. See generally Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 
CALIF. L. REv. 987 (1978) (making same basic point but unnecessarily slipping into language of 
jury distrust). Accordingly, most such preliminary issues under the original document rule, for 
example, are decided by the judge as the "trier" of those issues, rather than as a mere 
"screener" ofthose issues before they are submitted to the jury. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, 
§ 53; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 263, at 1078-80. 
295. One example rrright be the use against an accused of a co-conspirator's hearsay 
declaration, made under possibly coercive circumstances of interrogation. Compare Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965) (reading of transcript of co-conspirator's alleged 
confession at defendant's trial violates defendant's confrontation rights when co-conspirator 
refuses to testify under fifth amendment) with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-90 (1970) (use 
of evidence of co-conspirator's spontaneous hearsay declaration to fellow inmate does not 
violate defendant's confrontation rights). 
296. A related but distinguishable rationale for exclusion draws upon a different contrast 
associated with the word "lay." The jury ordinarily lacks expertise in most fields of specialized 
human endeavor, a fact reflected in the distinciton between lay and expert witnesses. It is also 
plausible to exclude relevant evidence, such as scientific or technical information or test 
results, that the jury cannot adquately evaluate in the absence of further education or 
information that is too expensive or burdensome to be provided pendente lite. However, this 
exclusionary rationale rests directly upon the contractionary aspect of the best evidence 
principle without any ancillary negative assumptions about the jury's competence. The 
exclusion is equally justifiable in a bench trial. On the relative competence of judge and lay jury 
in handling scientific evidence, see Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: 
A Critique from the Perspective of juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 566-71 (1983). 
297. The constitutional cases do not, for the most part, explicitly draw upon the classical 
authorities or statements of the best evidence principle, any more than do most modern, 
authoritative statements of nonconstitutional evidence rules. Yet, cases arising under the 
confrontation and compulsory process clauses seem to display a marked sensitivity to the best 
evidence principle, in the practical form classically expressed and here restated. See, e.g., 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-98 (1973) (due process requires allowing 
defendant to present evidence concerning another's out-of-court confession to instant crime, 
notwithstanding state's restrictive evidence rules regarding impeachment and hearsay); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720-26 (1968) (use of transcript of earlier testimony of witness 
violates confrontation clause if witness, incarcerated in federal prison, not produced by 
prosecution). See generally G. LILLY, supra note 221, § 7.29, at 315-18 (giving historical 
argument for treating confrontation clause as, in effect, an expansionary best evidence rule). 
An important recent case is United States v. Inadi, 4 75 U.S. 387, 394- 96 (1986), in which the 
Court addressed the extent to which the confrontation clause requires that the prosecution 
produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, a declarant whose hearsay statement it proposes 
to use against the defendant under an exception to the hearsay rule. Both the majority and 
dissent discussed the use of declarations of a co-conspirator in terms generally consistent with 
the analysis presented here, see id. at 392-400; id. at 406-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting), despite 
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outside the context of admissibility, such as in the judge's authority to call 
and interrogate witnesses298 or to instruct the jury about "missing wit-
nesses" or "missing evidence."299 It is conspicuous in decisions that consider 
the absence of reasonably available evidence in ruling on the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence presented.3°0 The principle is even reflected in 
substantive rules, such as those requiring certain transactions to be memo-
rialized in writing301 and the important statutes of limitations.3°2 In short, 
a considerable portion of the characteristic admissibility rules, as well as a 
number of other rules of Anglo-American legal systems, are properly 
the majority's claim that "the unavailability rule cannot be defended as a constitutional 'better 
evidence' rule." Id. at 396. 
298. See 9]. WIGMORE, supra note 207, § 2484. Closely related is the authority of the trial 
judge to appoint and call experts. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 17. 
299. One standard jury instruction reads: "If a party fails to produce evidence which is 
under his control and reasonably available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse 
party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have 
produced it and did not.'' 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 84, § 72.16; see also id. § 72.15; 
1 id. §§ 15.27, 17.14, 17.19 (1977) (criminal cases). See generally Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 
Amz. L. REv. 27 (1984). 
300. Some of the earliest uses of the best evidence principle, though not always well 
executed, were in the context of sufficiency rulings. See supra notes 106, 148-51 and 
accompanying text. More modern sufficiency decisions, which usually do not rely explicitly on 
the principle, arise in a wide variety of typical situations. In criminal cases, for example, some 
jurisdictions require the prosecution to present all available eyewitnesses to the events 
immediately surrounding the alleged crime. See, e.g., People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 367,40 
N.W.2d 184, 186 (1949). Others require the production of reasonably available, decisive 
scientific evidence. See, e.g., People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 213-14, 380 N .E.2d 795, 800 (1978) 
(discussed supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text). Some require the production of physical 
evidence in addition to reliable testimony concerning its relevant characteristics, at least if the 
defendant so demands. See, e.g., G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 1982) (explicitly 
relying upon classical expressions of best evidence principle in establishing this rule for 
contraband in prosecutions for possession). In civil cases, one example is the reluctance of 
courts to invoke res ipsa loquitur when better evidence on the issue of negligence is available to 
the plaintiff but not presented. See, e.g., Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234-35, 196 N.E. 
36, 38-39 (1935); Warren v. Jeffries, 263 N.C. 531, 533, 139 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1965). Of 
importance to both civil and criminal litigation, and generating considerable theoretical debate 
in recent years, is the supposed judicial reluctance to allow judgments based upon "naked" 
statistical evidence. One argument is that this kind of evidence is almost never the only 
available evidence on liability. See Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 
Amz. ST. L.J. 101, 104-08; see also Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L REv. 401, 
409-15 (1986); Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship, 66 B.U.L. REv. 439, 454-62 (1986). 
301. Aside from ritualistic functions, which may improve witnesses' memories, the 
requirement that an appropriate Writing be executed increases the likelihood that such 
documentary evidence will be available in the event of subsequent litigation. See, e.g., E. 
FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs§ 6.1 (1982). This is so even though presentation of the document may 
be ultimately impossible. See id. § 6.7 (loss or destruction of memorandum does not negate 
compliance with statutory requirement). 
302. One common rationale for statutes of limitations is that parties should not let their 
claims grow stale so that the quantity and quality of evidence has dissipated. For a concise 
summary of the learning on statutes of limitations, see Miller, Barbed Wire in the Borderland: 
Statute of Limitations Choices for Wrongful Discharge Claims, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 833, 835-40 
(1986). Limitations reinforce the duty of complainants to bring their controversies before a 
trier while the evidence is still fresh. 
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construed as epistemic best evidence rules. That is, the proper, often 
predominant, purpose of those rules is to allow and encourage actual or 
potential litigants to present or be able to present the most probative, 
practicable proofs. 
To the extent that the present thesis is correct, and the epistemic best 
evidence principle lies behind an impressive array oflegal rules, the judge's 
role vis-a-vis the jury should be conceived somewhat differently than it is. 
Today, the judge is often viewed as using those rules to protect the parties 
from irrational juries. In contrast, the present thesis emphasizes the judge's 
role in protecting the jury from actions attributable to understandable biases 
or weaknesses of parties, their witnesses, and of course, their lawyers. This 
function is especially important because the jury. ordinarily can do little 
itself to control the conduct of these participants.303 The judge, in other 
words, can speak as a representative of the silent jury, with courtroom powers 
the jury does not have and with a fuller appreciation of the unpreparedness 
of some attorneys, the tactical ploys _some use, and the economics of 
litigation in general. 
This perspective may improve our understanding of related rules 
barring prejudicial or confusing evid<;nce.304 Many courts and commenta-
tors discuss these rules immediately from the point of view of assessing the 
likely impact upon jury members. 305 But this kind of talk is often misleading. 
In the first place, trial judges' capacity within the courtroom setting to 
predict juror response is much less impressive than the legal community 
would like to believe.306 Moreover, this effects-orientation is often mis-
guided, for the main problem with, for example, prejudicial evidence is that 
303. Notice that the other laypersons in the courtroom are, or at least can be, represented 
by counsel in a meaningful way. Moreover, jurors are generally discouraged from active, 
personal participation in the proceeding. See A. OsBORN, supra note 20, at 80-86; Comment, The 
Questioning of Witnesses by jurors, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 127, 129-34 (1977). 
304. For example, the federal rules provide: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
305. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 288, at 226-28,235-37, 240-42; Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 
403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WAsH. L. REv. 497, 503-06 
(1983); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1021, 1036 (1977). We may trace this 
focus particularly to Bentham's uncompromising consequentialism. In a typical passage, he 
wrote: 
MJsDECISION is the word to be used in this place, not deception. Why? Because in 
misdecision consists the mischief, the only mischief. Suppose deception, and yet no 
misdecision, there is no real mischief: suppose misdecision, yet no deception, the 
mischief is as great as if deception had been the cause of it. 
5 ]. BENTH~M, supra note 133, at 9. Yet, Bentham generally saw no reason to distinguish 
between judge and jury regarding the appropriateness of the rules of evidence. See 4 id. at 
477-645 ("On Exclusion of Evidence"); 5 id. at 1-610 (same). In contrast, the modern view 
tends to be that prejudice is a problem peculiar to the lay jury. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. 
v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981) ("prejudice" exclusion under rule 403 of 
the federal rules does not apply in bench trial). 
306. A suggestive, if poorly constructed, study is Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, 
Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can judges IdentifY the Impact of Improper Evidence on 
juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147. 
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it involves an attempt to prejudice the tribunal-whether likely to be 
successful or noL A better conception of these rules would exclude evidence 
that invites decision upon an improper basis. 307 After all, trial judges, who 
are generally drawn from the practicing bar, would more likely understand 
attorney motivation than jury response. 308 The balancing that these exclu-
sionary rules call for is thus essentially a moral balancing, not simply a 
prediction of whether or not admission will lead the jury in the "right" 
direction. 309 
Employment of this paradigm of judicial role also helps to explain and 
reform other conventional doctrines. Consider, for example, the doctrine 
of limited admissibility, under which evidence is admitted for a legitimate 
purpose, subject to a limiting instruction if requested, when it is inadmis-
sible for another purpose.310 When the inadmissible aspect of the evidence 
is attributed to a suooosed distrust of the iury, the consequences are indeed 
paradoxical: • • ~ · -
It often happens ... that an item of testimony will have a highly 
and illegitimately prejudicial effect upon one issue and a substan-
tial, legitimately logical value upon another. The court then, with 
an inconsistency born of necessity, assumes that the jury which 
has not sufficient capacity to make the necessary discriminations 
307. This distinction is illuminated in Nonet, In the Matter of Green v. Recht, 75 CALIF. L. 
REv. 363,365 (1987); see also Dolan, supra note 288, at 237-40. The drafters of the federal rules 
commented: " 'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessaFily, an emotional one." FED. R. 
Evm. 403 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). 
308. "Confusion of the issues" is perhaps more likely to occur out of mere inadvertence, and 
judges need only consult their own sense of confusion to discern whether some guidance of 
counsel is needed. The concepts of "unfair prejudice" and "confusion of the issues," as well as 
"misleading the jury," are complex and overlapping. Much more can be said in. the analysis of 
these terms as found in exclusionary rules. See generally 22 C. WRIGHT Sc K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§§ 5215-5217 (1978). The present comments are intended merely to 
shed some light upon a subject that remains obscured by the predominance of the jury distrust 
approach. 
309. At most, one could say that a ground for refusing to sanction appeals to the jury's baser 
side is the "no harm done" rationale, applicable in situations in which the proffer is not 
egregious and the invitation will likely be declined by a judicious jury. Sec Muehlebach v. 
Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 65, 378 P.2d 741, 744 (1963) (inappropriate to 
grant motion for new trial, based on mention of defendant's liability insurance, when mention 
had no prejudicial purpose and speculative prejudicial impact); sec also R. LEMPERT & S. 
SALTZBURG, supra note 221, at 157. In performing such an analysis, the judge may well introspect 
with regard to the effect of the evidence: 
To exclude evidence of relatively low probative value, when compared to its likely 
prejudicial effect, is not to treat jurors as if they were 'low grade morons.' Rather, it 
is to admit our own likely responses and to recognize that jurors also have been raised 
in a society where trading on innuendo and hysteria has rarely proven to be wholly 
ineffective. 
Dolan, supra note 288, at 228 (citations omitted). 
310. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, §59. The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
the general propriety of the employment of limited admissibility. See United States v. Abel, 469 
U.S. -45, 49-51 (!984) (evidence admissible for bias impeachment purpose even· if not 
admissible as evidence of witness' bad character). 
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upon the first issue has the ability to perform the psychological 
feat of disregarding the item entirely upon the first issue and of 
confining its influence to the second issue.s11 
293 
This kind of critique has much force when the impropriety of the one use 
is properly attributable to the risk of untoward effects upon the trier of 
fact.312 A focus upon the litigants' conduct, however, often deprives this 
kind of situation of much of its strangeness. On this view, the real message 
of the judge's limiting instruction is a public acknowledgment of possible 
impropriety, reminding the forum that it has not gone unnoticed and is not 
condoned, and an explanation, with the deference of an apology to the 
jurors, for failing to perform as might seem to be required by the judge's 
representative role. 313 Furthermore, when the impropriety of the one use 
is predicated upon a concern about the availability of epistemically better 
evidence with regard to the particular inference, as when substantively 
hearsay evidence is admitted for an impeachment purpose, then the 
instruction need only be seen as a reminder that concerns about the 
secondary nature of the evidence are not of controlling importance in 
context.314 
Whatever the merits of these last suggestions, the superiority of the 
best evidence principle, as an interpretive device, as compared with the 
long-prevailing jury distrust model of evidence law, should be clear. Of 
311. Morgan, supra note 110, at 257. 
312. The problem is acute, for example, when evidence of the defendant's other crimes is 
admitted for a limited impeachment purpose. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 43, at 99; Wissler 
& Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 37 (1985). It is also serious 
in some cases in which evidence of a codefendant's hearsay declaration is admitted, subject to 
an instruction limiting it to use against the declarant. Compare Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 126-37 (1968) (in joint trial, admission of evidence of codefendant-declarant's oral 
confession violates rights of defendant, against whom declaration is not usable, if codefendant 
refuses to testify) with Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-30 (1971) (in joint trial, admission 
of evidence of codefendant- declarant's oral confession does not violate confrontation rights of 
defendant, against whom declaration is not usable, if codefendant testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination). 
313. It is not implausible, too, that bringing the potentially distorting effects of an improper 
inference to the attention of the jury may help its members perform their task properly. See 
I. GoLDSTEIN, TruAL TECHNIQUES 167-68 (1935). Of course, the litigant's motive is only presump-
tively legitimate, and a serious breach of etiquette may be unavoidably surmised when the 
legitimate inference is very weak and the improper one is transparent. This, as well as the 
possibility that even the most conscientious jury may be unable to ignore the improper 
inference, accomits for the residual authority to rule, in appropriate cases, that a limiting 
instruction is an insufficient response to the situation. See Fm. R. Evm. 105 advisory 
committee's note. 
314. Indeed, in such cases once the risk of being misled is identified by an appropriate 
cautionary instruction, warning the jury of the secondary nature of the evidence concerning a 
particular purpose, it is arguable that a limiting instruction is generally inappropriate. Some 
modem reforms of the hearsay rule tend in this direction. See, e.g., Fw. R. Evm. 801 (d)(l) 
(essentially allowing substantive use of certain out-of-court declarations when otherwise 
admissible for credibility purposes); McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 251. Once again, a transparent 
attempt to circumvent a best-evidence-based exclusionary rule may be grounds for exclusion 
of the evidence. Cf Shephard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 102 (1933) (reversal for erroneous 
admission of hearsay may not be avoided by concocting on appeal some nonhearsay use). 
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course, the demand for the best reasonably available evidence could be 
viewed as distinct from an insistence upon a respectful attitude toward the 
trier of fact. Indeed, conventional thought seems to view a judge-centered, 
cynical version of the former as important precisely because of the relatively 
low competence of the lay jury. It is here argued, however, that the two 
ideas are closely related aspects of the obligations of the participants in the 
trial, yielding a litigant-centered epistemic best evidence obligation subject 
to limited privileges in an imperfect adversary process. As a corollary, the 
best evidence perspective tends to undercut the argument for the elimina-
tion of the admissibility rules in nonjury proceedings by shifting the focus 
of attention away from distrust of the jury. 3 15 The present view does suggest 
that the greater the judge's alternative forms of leverage over the litigants, 
the less the need to employ the familiar exclusionary sanctions. Significant 
additional leverage can be seen to arise in bench trials from the merger of 
the fact-finding role into the other functions of the judge, a power the 
litigants are unlikely to ignore, for example, in the face of judicial requests 
for additional information. Moreover, this leverage is multiplied when the 
decision maker on law and facts is also part of an administrative agency that 
has a continuing relationship with the litigant. These facts help to explain 
the plausibility of a relaxation of admissibility rules in typical nonjury 
proceedings. They do not, however, rest upon any assumption of juror 
incompetence or irrationality. 
Conclusion 
Since the eighteenth century, it has been generally accepted that the 
rules of evidence with respect to trial in a court of law are, and should be, 
focused primarily on ascertaining the truth about controverted issues of 
fact within appropriate resource constraints. 316 Of course, other consider-
ations were understood to influence the fashioning of some evidentiary 
rules, but the extent of these incursions has been small. 31 7 Unfortunately, 
however, during the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, the focus 
was narrowed further by a preoccupation with problems of juror compe-
tence and a reluctance to think in terms of the litigants' duties to the forum. 
The result has been a tendency in many quarters to rationalize and criticize 
exclusionary rules, other than those of privilege, on the basis of whether 
315. No opinion has been expressed about the general desirability of trial by jury. The 
arguments presented here do suggest a sympathetic attitude toward that institution, and it 
may be appropriate to note that the author nonetheless has serious doubts that it should be as 
widely employed as it is today in this country-even though only a small minority of all legal 
controversies are decided in the context of an actual or potential jury trial. See 3 K. DAvis, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 16.2, at 224 (2d eel. 1978). Those doubts arise, however, not from 
concerns about jury competence so much as from the indignities, inconveniences, and costs 
suffered by the citizens who serve, their families, their businesses, and the taxpayers. See 
generally P. DIPERNA, juRIES oN TmAL (1984). 
316. See generally Twining, supra note 102, at 213-14. 
317. See generally Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Detennining Tmth in judir.ia1 
Trials, 66 CmuM. L. REv. 223 (1966). 
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exclusion itself, apart from any message it may entail or consequence it may 
have on litigant behavior, serves the goal of accurately determining the 
truth about the disputed events. 31 B 
In recent years, there have been signs of dissatisfaction with this 
explanatory framework for the existing rules. 31 9 For example, Charles 
Nesson has argued that many of the rules governing both admissibility and 
sufficiency are attributable to a policy, whether explicit or implicit, of 
generating verdicts that the public will accept, thereby increasing public 
respect for the legal system and especially for the substantive rules of 
conduct about which. the verdicts are concerned.32° In this framework, 
accurate factual findings are not so important as determinations that will 
comfort the public and give it appropriate behavioral messages. Such a 
framework suggests a ruthlessly utilitarian approach to litigation, pushing 
yet further down the positivist path of social engineering.32I Relative to the 
goal of justice between the parties to litigation, it carries the seeds of a 
deeply skeptical interpretation of evidence law. 
The present Article reflects a different view, one that draws more 
heavily upon the eighteenth-century intellectual roots of that law. This view 
understands at least a significant number of the rules of evidence as 
designed to protect the tribunal as a truth-finding, and thereby dispute-
resolving, forum by imposing educative restraints and disciplinary sanc-
tions upon litigants who would otherwise deprive the tribunal of the best, 
reasonably available evidence on a given issue. Although these measures 
may or may not be maximally conducive to the ascertainment of truth in the 
instant case, it is contemplated and hoped that their imposition will 
contribute in the long run not only to accurate fact-finding but also to a 
deserved public respect for the legal system.322 
318. The principal exceptions are certain quasi-privilege rules designed to encourage 
settlement negotiations, repairs, or other socially desirable activity unrelated to truth-finding 
by excluding evidence thereof. See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 72.1. 
319. See 1AJ. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 37.1, at 1018-19. 
320. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1368-77 (1985). The idea of using the rules of evidence to inspire public 
confidence is not a new one, but it has generally been thought to be consistent with, even a 
fortunate side effect of, accuracy in fact-finding. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 318, at 241-46; 
compare Cohen, supra note 218, at 4-5. 
321. Nesson's views are in this sense reminiscent of Bentham, which is ironic indeed given 
that Bentham was one of the earliest and most outspoken proponents of the truth-finding 
model of adjudication. The tension ir, Bentham's work between his zeal for the truth-finding 
model and his commitment to uncompromising utilitarianism is discussed in W. TwiNING, supra 
note 232, at 88-100. Bentham's veritable crusade for honesty in government contrasts sharply 
with Nesson's view of many evidentiary rules, for central to the latter's thesis is the idea that 
judicial decisions actually based upon the available evidence are presented to the public as if 
they were decisions based, somehow, upon a knowledge of what "actually happened." See 
Nesson, supra note 321, at 1360-63. It should be noted that Nesson's view is that any social 
utility in the phenomena he discusses is not necessarily intended by anyone; it is rather seen as 
the result of an evolutionary process that has generated and preserved various rules. See id. at 
1368-69. 
322. The thrust of the present Article, therefore, remains generally within the "Rationalist 
Tradition" described by Professor Twining, see supra note 102, although it places more 
emphasis upon the limitations of the adversary process and less emphasis upon the feared 
irrational behavior of juries than has been typical of that tradition since the turn of the 
century. 
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This is not to _say that other goals, such as promoting compromise or 
providing a nonviolent alternative forum for the expurgation of hostility, 
are unimportant, either descriptively or prescriptively, for understanding 
the litigation process as a whole.323 Such goals are not fatally inconsistent 
with a model of litigation that provides opportunities for, and places 
reasonable demands upon, litigants to provide at trial the best available 
evidence on disputed factual issues.324 Indeed, fairness to litigants requires 
that determin;iiions oftheuse oftne coerCive power of the state be made on 
the best reasonably available evidence. Respect for the tribunal demands 
that it not be placed in the position of making such determinations upon 
evidence of lesser quality.325 In the final analysis, it must also be said that 
truth has intrinsic value, knowledge is a common good, and the presenta-
tion of the best reasonably available evidence is a crucial part of the 
participation in that good by persons ~vho utilize the judicial system.326 
Critical comments throughout demonstrate that the present Article is 
not intended primarily as a defense of existing practices. Certainly, partic-
ular rules of evidence law may need revision or even wholesale elimination. 
Alternatively, the infelicitous results of the application of particular rules 
may be ameliorated by the exercise of judicial discretion. Despite such 
measures, the whole structure of evidence law may be inadequate to the 
tasks we might properly ask of it, requiring that major reforms be 
instituted, such as the rejection or substantial modification of the traditional 
adversary process.327 Less dramatic reform, leaving that process largely 
intact, could substantially change evidence law but still adequately incor-
porate the best evidence principle.32B In any event, and this is most 
important, it seems impossible to understand fully the present system 
without reference to that principle. Certainly, then, appeals to it cannot 
reasonably be dismissed as no more than the invocation of a mistaken or 
outmoded idea. 
The suggested interpretation ofthe law of evidence is not as cynical as 
those that treat jurors as regularly irrational and oblivious to their legal 
323. For a succinct recent statement of the multiplicity of possible goals of a procedural 
system, see Gross, Th<I American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 
734 (1987). 
324. See M. DAMA.IKA, supra note 41, at 119-25- See generally supra notes 38-43 and 
accompanying text. 
325- Stated somewhat differently, the centrality of "truth finding" to the trial may be 
defended on several instrumental grounds, including its relation to doing justice between the 
parties, to developing wise common-law rules, and to effectuating social policies distinct from 
justice between the parties. See Summers, supra note 37, at 124-26_ See generally supra notes 
19-34 and accompanying text. 
326. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS§ III.1-III.6 (1980)_ 
327. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
328. For example, some time ago one commentator proposed the wholesale elimination of 
detailed admissibility rules, other than privileges, in favor of a simple rule drawn from 
administrative law practice: "All evidence is to be received and considered that would influence 
a fair-minded man in deciding the issue before the tribunal." Loevinger, supra note 259, at 
174_ This rule would be coupled, however, with another, designed to counteract the distorting 
effects of adversarial presentation: "The tribunal may and should require the production of 
evidence and witnesses that are or may be appropriate and useful in the investigation of the 
issue before the tribunal and are within the power of the party to produce_" /d_ 
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duties or as those that treat Citizens as objects of duplicitous social 
engineering. It turns away from the clubbish disparagement-of lay jurors 
and the public by the bench and bar and encourages professional intro-
spection and reform. It recognizes that the pressures placed upon litigants 
and counsel by the legal process in general, and the adversary system in 
particular, make more understandable and predictable their failings than 
those of persons who have comparatively less at stake in the litigation. 
Ultimately, such an interpretation provides a vehicle for seeing the law of 
evidence in its best possible light and, thereby, for making our practices the 
best that they can be.329 
329. See generally R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). 
